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Del dicho al hecho hay mucho trecho~ Mexican proverb 
 
As the above proverb states, things are easier said than done. One can spend 
years saying they will write a dissertation, but the actual business of completing one is a 
far more complicated task. That these pages exist is a testament to the outstanding 
committee members, faculty, friends, and family who have supported me throughout this 
protracted journey.  First and foremost, I owe my largest debts to Janet Davis, who not 
only offered rigorous feedback on chapter drafts, but who assisted me in innumerable 
ways throughout this process. Her patience, vigor for the field of American Studies, 
unrivaled intellectual enthusiasm, and generous mentorship have modeled for me the type 
of professional I aspire to be and scholarship I hope to practice. Quite simply, I could not 
have done this without her.  Beginning in my second year of graduate school, I had the 
good fortune of meeting and working with John McKiernan-Gonzalez, a Borderlands 
historian who introduced me to the field and who has cultivated in me a far deeper 
appreciation for Mexican-American Studies and US history than I ever thought possible. 
He always challenged me to see the “big picture,” even in the smallest details. I have 
admired his keen intellect, sly humor, and benefitted from his prescient analyses in ways 
both large and small. My debts to him are many. Likewise, I gained valuable insight from 
Dr. McKiernan-Gonzalez’s partner and UT-AMS faculty member Cary Cordova, with 
whom I had the distinct and memorable experience of serving as a Teaching Assistant for 
in the fall of 2014. Cary taught me many things, but above all, she demonstrated a 
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valuable critical approach to the synthesis of American Studies and Latina/o Studies that 
I have sought to utilize in my own scholarship. Cary is part of the phenomenal faculty 
that comprise the American Studies Department at UT-Austin, a place I have had the 
privilege of calling “home” for the last decade or so.  These faculty members include: 
Shirley Thompson Marshall, Mark Smith, Jeff Meikle, Julia Mickenberg, Nicole 
Guidotti-Hernandez, Elizabeth Engelhardt, and Stephen Marshall. Stephen Hoelscher, 
ever the consummate leader and gentle soul, stepped in to serve on my committee and 
assure me that I would complete this project. My gratitude to him knows no boundaries.  
Numerous scholars in the fields of American Studies, Latina/o Studies, and US 
military history have guided this project over many years, offering treasured advice and 
providing some of the most enlightening conversations of my life. In particular, I would 
like to thank David Kieran, Kristin Ann Haas, Jorge Mariscal, Gina M Pérez, Hector 
Amaya, Lorena Oropeza, Kyle Longley, Jose Navarro, Ariana Vigil, Elizabeth “Liz” 
Mesok, Ken MacLeish, and Maria Hohn. Within the canon of scholars addressing race 
and US military history, few stand taller than Maggie Rivas-Rodriguez. In addition to 
serving as one of my committee members, Dr. Rivas-Rodriguez’s work on Latina/os in 
World War II and her leadership of the VOCES Oral History Project at the University of 
Texas served as the intellectual foundation for this project.  
This project would not have been possible without the generous financial support 
I received to conduct archival research at sites in Florida, California, Washington D.C., 
Maryland, and Texas. The research for this dissertation was made possible through a 
Ford Foundation Dissertation Fellowship, University of Texas Powers Fellowship, and 
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numerous UT-American Studies research travel funds. Following suite, I’d like to thank 
the numerous librarians, archivists, and research assistants who helped me in this process. 
Among these research specialists I would like to give special thanks to Andrei 
Arduyakov of the Defense Equal Opportunity and Management Institute (DEOMI), 
Christian Kelleher of the Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection, Gregory Cina of 
the US Marine Corps Archives in Quantico, VA, Steve Hersh of the Special Collections 
at the University of Miami Libraries, LeRoy Jewell and Major Kone Faulkner at the 
DoD’s Defense Media Activity Center (DMA), Jerry C. Scarpate, Deputy Director of the 
Research Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI), Ira Pemstein of 
the Richard Nixon Presidential Library, and Brian McNerney of the Lyndon Baines 
Johnson Presidential Library. Special thanks and gratitude are reserved for Dr. Frank 
Montalvo and Dr. Richard Hope who provided oral histories that served to enrich this 
scholarship in unprecedented ways.  
 Writing a dissertation can be a lonely process, but I had the exceptionally good 
fortune of meeting, becoming life-long friends with, and even living next to Eric Covey 
and Andrea “Andi” Gustavson (aka “The War Writing Group”) during my very first year 
of graduate school. In no small measure, their good humor and lively spirits sustained the 
intellectual energy I needed to complete this project. Eric and Andi, you are my rocks. 
Eric and Andi were part of larger and very colorful cast of characters I entered graduate 
school with known to UT-AMS as the “Veritable Blunderbuss” and include Dave Croke, 
Gavin Benke, Marsha Abrahams, and Josh Holland. It has been a true joy to call them my 
colleagues and friends. The “Blunderbuss” was part of broader cohort of graduate 
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students I spent the last decade with at UT-AMS and who made my time here all the 
more special. Thus, I’d also like to recognize in no particular order: Rebecca Onion, 
Katie Feo-Kelly, Susan Quesal, Brendan Gaughen, Lily Laux, Christina Garcia, Marvin 
Bendele, Tony Fassi, Andrew Busch, Jaqueline Smith, Elissa Underwood, Andrew 
“Jonesy” Jones, Sean Cashbaugh, Danny Gerling, Carrie Andersen, Amy Ware, Carly 
Kocurek, Tracy Wuster, Allison Wright, Anna Thompson Hajdik, and Stephanie 
Kohlberg.   
Of course, our department and the vibrant intellectual community would not 
thrive without the tireless (and often invisible) labor provided by our outstanding AMS 
administrative staff: Stephanie Kaufman, Chad Crawford, and Ella Schwartz.  
 UT-Austin is a big place, figuratively and literally. Thus, UT-AMS was not my 
only “home” here. Almost as soon as I arrived in August 2006, I found my second 
community in UT’s Center for Mexican-American Studies (CMAS). Over the years, 
CMAS was alternately my refuge and place of critical intellectual development. For this, 
I would like to thank Anne Martinez, Jose Limon, Michael Cucher, Emilio Zamora, 
Deborah Paredez, Deborah “Deb” Vargas, Luis Guevara, Alberto Gonzalez, and Natasha 
Saldana. Among my UT AMS and CMAS colleagues, I offer mil gracias to Amanda E. 
Gray, Jaime Puente, and Jose-Centeno Melendez. I’d also like to acknowledge CMAS 
affiliate and my scholarly compatriot, Valerie A. Martinez.   
 Among the many mentors I have had over the years, two in particular stand out. I 
first met Stephen Pitti, my “consigliere”, when I was a freshman at Yale University in 
1998. His guidance, mentorship, and support have shaped the intellectual I have become 
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today. And second, to Nhi Lieu, who taught me to think in complex, unbounded ways; 
who showed me what courage, strength, grace, and resilience are; and who first 
convinced me that this was a worthy project. That this dissertation exists is confirmation 
of the enduring character she possesses and which I was fortunate to have learned from. 
Nhi, muchismas gracias por todo.   
 Over the years, some of my strongest and most reassuring support came from my 
Yale familia. To Alejandra, Jaqui, Mari, Pancho, LiYun, Mike, Alvaro, Anamaria and 
Jesus, I can simply say, siempre.   
     Finally, to my family: Mom, Dad, Tanya, and Daniel. There are not words profound 
enough to express my love and appreciation for you all. Dad, you first stoked my interest 
in this subject and for that, I remain forever grateful. Mom, you worked tirelessly my 
entire life and especially in these last few years to support me through school—a debt I 
can never repay. The sacrifices you’ve made on my behalf are innumerable, but they live 
within me and animate my desire to be a hard worker, loving soul, and extraordinary 
individual—just like you. Daniel, my “wonder twin”—we’ve shared our lives together 
and though it hasn’t always been easy, you’ve reminded me to laugh and keep a much 
needed perspective on my academic endeavors. And finally, to my beloved sister, 
Tanya….Sis, where do I begin? You literally kept me alive these past few months. 
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This dissertation considers the political and cultural import of Latina/os within the 
U.S. Armed Forces over the last four decades, from the latter years of the Vietnam War 
(1969) to the contemporary “Global War on Terror” (GWOT), to examine the productive 
tensions between U.S. military expansion and liberal racial inclusion.	   This study 
examines how the cultural meaning of race, specifically Latinidad, accrued meaning for 
the USAF from 1969-2006. Beginning just before the creation of the All-Volunteer Force 
(AVF) in 1973, Department of Defense officials, responding to intense racial turmoil and 
accusations of discrimination by African Americans, turned their attention towards the 
emerging Latina/o populace. The USAF began foregrounding Latina/o desires for 
national belonging, racial inclusion, and social prestige into Spanish language recruitment 
materials and national promotional campaigns presenting the Armed Forces as a desirable 
site of upward mobility, cultural recognition, and enfranchised citizenship. More broadly, 
I suggest that centering the racial, ethnic, and juridical identity of Latina/o participants in 
the military offers productive ways of interrogating the project of U.S. empire and global 
military hegemony after 1973. Martialing Latinidad employs multi-archival research 
methodologies, moving between congressional hearings, oral histories, and recently de-
 xi 
classified records in military archives. Martialing Latinidad argues that military 
authorities demonstrated a surprising interest in various Latina/o social movements, 
turning programmatic statements by the UFW, the Young Lords, MAYO, and land grant 
movements into the basis of new syllabi and ethnic studies programming for officers and 
NCO’s. Focusing on research reports, government studies, memos, Congressional 
hearings, personal and official correspondence, military periodicals, and military 
authored race relations training guides/ teaching syllabi demonstrate the vast 
transformation of military policies towards Latina/os from ancillary figures to a central 
role in public discussion of the future of military recruitment under the AVF. Martialing 
Latinidad argues for the prominent place of US military recruitment efforts in 
establishing the emerging visibility of Latina/os as a pan-ethnic political formation.   
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Three young men walked over the terraced paths of a beautiful garden one night. Only it 
was not really a garden. They had been disturbed from their eternal sleep, and wandered 
aimlessly over the hallowed grounds of Arlington National Cemetery.1 One was—or had 
been—of Mexican origin, and in life his name had been Felix Longoria. The names of the 
other two—one a Negro, the other a Japanese-American—are unknown. Names are not 
really important—it is what they symbolize that counts.2 
 
 In Gustavo Garcia’s, “So Said the Dead,” an unpublished short story written less 
than a year before the Mexican-American civil rights attorney’s death in 1964, the spirits 
of three soldiers mysteriously rise in Arlington National Cemetery “on a cold and clear” 
November night.3 Sauntering alone among the gravestones, they are unsure why they 
“the dead, walk that night.” Initially startled by each other’s presence, they soon started  
sharing cigarettes, exchanging biographies, and speculating about their unwelcome 
reception “at home”--a somber realization prompting Longoria to ask, “Comrades, just 
what did we die for?” Referencing the plight of Mexican Americans in Texas, Longoria 
wrote, “In my state, we were looked down upon, considered inferior, pistol whipped, 
                                                
1 The sign near the cemetery’s entrance pronounces the sacred nature of the space, instructing visitors 
accordingly: ‘Welcome to Arlington National Cemetery, Our Nation’s Most Sacred Shrine. Please Conduct 
2 Felix Longoria, a Mexican-American soldier killed during World War II, was refused burial in his 
hometown cemetery of Three Rivers, TX owing to a policy of racial segregation. Ensuing efforts to inter 
Longoria and challenge racial segregation in Texas became known as the “Longoria Affair”-- a hallmark of 
the Mexican-American civil rights movement. Gus Garcia served as legal counsel to the Longoria family. 
See Patrick J. Carroll, Felix Longoria's Wake: Bereavement, Racism, and the Rise of Mexican American 
Activism. (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 2003). 
3 Note: Día de Los Muertos and All Saints Day take place in November; The idea that fallen soldiers 
wander between two worlds was popular in Europe in the aftermath of World War I. See George Mosse, 
Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
1990); Likewise, war ghost narratives proliferated in France after World War I. Jay Winter, Sites of 
Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995). On the popularity of Civil War ghost stories featuring dead soldiers, see Nancy 




forced to migrate to other states to look for stoop-labor, segregated in 
schools…”Reflecting on the U.S.’s enslavement of African-Americans, the “Negro 
soldier” observed, “we were not considered human beings at all. We were just chattel—
like pigs or dogs—or stoves or furniture or chairs.” The Japanese-American soldier then 
exclaimed, “Listen to me, G.I.’s! Though my people were industrious and paid their 
debts, they were despised out there in the West where most of us lived. Comrades, I died, 
along with my brethren…to prove a point: That we were Americans and could die like 
Americans.”4 
 Like most apparitions, the spectral protagonists of “So Said the Dead,” are 
restless. Their souls ill at ease, Longoria and his compatriots awaken, presumably 
summoned by unresolved grief over the injustice of their demise; a lingering trauma 
presides over their battlefield sacrifices made on behalf of a nation that in life denied 
them equality, but in death, configured them as “ultimate expressions of national 
belonging.”5 Ambling between unbroken rows of identical headstones that sprawl for 
miles—a visual index of the immensity of US warfare--Longoria and his companions 
sought a philosophical reconciliation: What did they die for? As the story implied, this 
trinity of errant spirits were fallen World War II combatants whose fatalities, 
paradoxically, were incurred during the US’s global campaign to promote democracy 
abroad. Crossing the threshold separating the living world from the dead, Garcia’s 
fictional spirits, “import a charged strangeness into the place or sphere” they are 
                                                
4 Gus Garcia, “So Said the Dead.” N.D. Box 1, Folder 3. Gustavo C. (Gus) Garcia Papers, Benson Latin 
American Collection, University of Texas Libraries, the University of Texas at Austin. 
5 Kristin Ann Hass, Sacrificing Soldiers on the National Mall (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 2013), 19-20. 
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haunting, “unsettling the propriety…that delimits the zone of activity or knowledge.”6 
Garcia, an advocate for racial liberalism, called in a troubling vision of racial death on the 
eve of formal equality—the 1964 Voting Rights Act.  
Ostensibly having died for US values of equality, individual dignity, opportunity, 
and freedom, Longoria and company’s tormented presence unsettles, disrupts, and 
troubles Arlington National Cemetery’s solemn stature as the “nation’s most sacred 
shrine.”7 The cemetery derives its eminent, indeed sacrosanct stake in the national 
imaginary because it serves as the final resting place for fallen soldiers. As embodied 
symbols of the nation’s ideals, soldiers’ capacity for self-sacrifice and willingness to 
jeopardize their mortality offer reassurance to the nation’s subjects of their core beliefs.  
As Benedict Anderson observes, “dying for one’s country assumes...a moral grandeur” an 
act of sacrifice revered for its “purity.”8 Indeed, soldiers are reminders of a “deep 
horizontal comradeship” underwriting the imagined community of the nation-state.9 But 
                                                
6 Avery Gordon, Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 63. 
7 Formerly a plantation built by slave labor, the landscape that would become Arlington National Cemetery 
was formally demarcated in 1864. Micki McElya, The Politics of Mourning: Death and Honor in Arlington 
National Cemetery (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016); see also Robert M. Poole, On 
Hallowed Ground: The Story of Arlington National Cemetery (New York, NY: Walker & Company, 2010); 
For an overview of American commemorative practices see John Bodnar, Remaking America: Public 
Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1993); In her work on death, the Civil War and implementation of a national cemetery system, Drew 
Gilpin Faust argues that “the war’s staggering human cost demanded a new sense of national destiny, 
designed to ensure that lives had been sacrificed for appropriately lofty ends.” Drew Gilpin Faust, This 
Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008) 268; 
For an account of how Arlington National Cemetery’s most famous monument, the “Tomb of the Unknown 
Soldier” traces shifts in memorial practices and politics of care for fallen soldiers, see Sarah Wagner, "The 
Making and Unmaking of an unknown soldier," Social Studies of Science 43, no. 5 (2013). 
8 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. (New 
York & London: Verso, 1983). 7. 
9 “Finally, [the nation] is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and 
exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately, 
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when the threesome recounted the historical specificities of their respective ethnic 
groups, comparatively cataloguing practices of slavery, exploitative labor economies, 
racial discrimination, and physical brutality, they unanimously indicted facile tropes of 
American nationalism, contingent on the phantasm of cultural unity materially 
consecrated in spaces like Arlington. Conjuring their respective pasts, they invoked the 
violent genealogies of US racial formation, legal exclusion, and socio-political 
disenfranchisement constitutive of their status as second-class citizens. Discounted as 
racial “Others,” perpetual foreigners, and undesirable subjects residing outside the 
boundaries of normative citizenship, the ghosts’ insistent demands to be viewed “as 
Americans” subtends their steep cost of internment. 10  
Garcia did not live to see passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, prohibiting de jure 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origins, just one 
month later. The renowned civil rights advocate was found dead on a park bench in San 
Antonio, TX.11 But if this legislation marked an apogee in the domestic narrative of racial 
equality, within the year, another US war, waged in the name of preserving democracy 
and once again, reliant on the martial labor of racial minorities, accelerated the fault lines 
in easily contained visions of racial justice and enfranchised citizenship. The themes of 
                                                                                                                                            
it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries for so many millions of people, not so 
much to kill, as to be willing to die for such limited imaginings.” Anderson, Imagined, 5-7. 
10 For a tripartite analysis of US racial groups (Latina/os, African-Americans, and Asian Americans) 
exploring how regional trajectories informed US race relations and uneven terms of citizenship, see Evelyn 
Nakano Glenn, Unequal Freedom: How Race and Gender Shaped American Citizenship and Labor 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
 
11 UPI, "Latins' Defender, Gus Garcia, Dies," Dallas Morning News (Dallas, TX), June 5, 1964, 20. 
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corporeal expendability, symbolic inclusion and physical exclusion, patriotic allegiance 
and ideological ambivalence enunciated by “So Said the Dead” anchor the broader 
concepts of race and martial identity I explore in this dissertation. Longoria’s burial in 
America’s national cemetery traditionally signaled a flashpoint in the longer arc of 
Mexican-American civil rights, or a triumphant end point attesting to the promise of 
military service for overcoming racial exclusion, this dissertation proceeds 
chronologically and philosophically from Longoria’s afterlife: the unresolved 
contradictions of race, military service, and asymmetrical terms of belonging highlighted 
in the crucible of one war, succeeded by and entangled in the next. As American Studies 
scholar Amy Kaplan reminds us, "Wars continue each other ... Wars generate and 
accumulate symbolic value by reenacting, reinterpreting, and transporting the cultural 
meaning of prior wars."12 Rather than political equality following in Longoria’s wake, 
Martialing Latinidad argues that the status of Latina/os in the military represented the 
promise of racial democracy in the laboratory of equality in the AVF.  
I seek to examine the place of Latina/os within broader regimes of twentieth 
century US war-making. I consider how the cultural meaning of race, specifically 
Latinidad, accrued significance for the US Armed Forces between the years 1969-2006, 
the same decades witness to the dramatic demographic, political, and social ascension of 
the US Latina/o populace.13	   Martialing Latinidad foregrounds the racial and ethnic 
                                                
12 Amy Kaplan, “Black and Blue on San Juan Hill” in Cultures of United States Imperialism, eds. Amy          
Kaplan and Donald Pease, (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1993) 219.  
13 Michel Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (New York: Beacon Press, 
1997).xix.  
 6 
identity of Latina/o service members because these modalities offer productive ways of 
interrogating the larger project of post-1945 U.S. empire and global military hegemony. 
As a populace, US Latina/os’ genesis lay rooted in the violent practices of nineteenth 
century U.S colonial-imperial domination of Latin America, the Caribbean, and US 
Southwest; historical foundations underwriting their subsequent displacement and ethno-
racial subordination within the US.14  Thus, a particular tension pervades the logic of US 
Latina/o military service, in that a group so often historically subject to military 
intervention, control, and coercion, are simultaneously tasked with replicating such 
practices in the name of advancing US hemispheric and global ambitions. Implicitly, this 
work joins more recent scholarship on post-1965 histories of Latina/o community 
formation in the US, a period witness to the dramatic demographic, political, and social 
ascension of the US Latina/o populace. This dissertation investigates how the raced, 
classed, and cultural identities of Latina/os enter into the post-Vietnam managerial 
discourse and national imaginings of the state vis-à-vis the US armed forces.  
RACE & MARTIAL CITIZENSHIP 
Since the Revolutionary era, the US military has relied upon non-white service 
men and women to conduct its wars, even as those same actors were denied equal 
citizenship rights on the basis of their non-white status.15 Thus, the US military has been 
                                                
14 Ramón A. Gutiérrez, "The Latino Crucible: Its Origins in 19th-Century Wars, Revolutions, and Empire," 
American Latino Theme Study, accessed August 5, 2016 
<https://www.nps.gov/heritageinitiatives/latino/latinothemestudy/pdfs/Empires_web_final.pdf.> 
 
15 On the symbolic importance of black service-members and their ideological impact on white Union 
soldiers, see Chandra Manning, What This Cruel War Was Over: Soldiers, Slavery, and the Civil War (New 
York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007).  
 7 
a critical ideological and material site by which US racial minorities, as well as sexual 
and gender minorities, have staked their claims for equal rights.16 In his diary, World 
War I Mexican-American veteran José de la Luz Sáenz explicated how participation by 
Mexican-American soldiers in the Great War could serve to inspire “respect, dignity and 
equal rights at home” for Mexican-origin communities.17 Calling attention to the 
hypocrisy of racial violence enacted against returning World War I African-American 
soldiers, in May 1918, W.E.B. Dubois proclaimed “We return from the slavery of 
uniform which the world’s madness demanded us to don to the freedom of civil 
garb.…We return. We return from fighting. We return fighting!”18 DuBois’s edict 
anticipated the launch of the “Double V” campaign during the Second World War, when 
                                                                                                                                            
 
16 Feminist historian Claire Snyder argues that the corollary between military service and citizenship in 
18th and early 19th century Western democracies was so entrenched such that the “citizen-soldier” became a 
“conceptual cornerstone of the nation-state.” Claire Snyder, Citizen-Soldiers and Manly Warriors: Military 
Service and Gender in the Civic Republican Tradition (Lanham, MD: Rowan& Littlefield, 1999); 
According to Francine D’ Amico, the model of martial citizenship “suggests that real citizens are soldiers, 
and, conversely, that only soldiers are real citizens.” Francine D'Amico, "Citizen-Soldier? Class, Race, 
Gender, Sexuality in the US Military," in States of Conflict: Gender, Violence, & Resistance, ed. Susie 
Jacobs, Ruth Jacobsen, and Jennifer Marchbank (New York, NY: Zed Books, 2000), 105. For a history of 
how sexual minorities have attempted to attain equal rights on the basis of martial service, see Margot 
Canaday, The Straight State: Sexuality & Citizenship in Twentieth Century America (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton, 2009).  
17 Emilio Zamora, ed., The World War I diary of José de la Luz Sáenz (College Station, TX: Texas A&M,  
 2014), 10. Sáenz’s  diary appeared nearly a decade after US acquisition of Puerto Rico in 1898, when the 
extension of citizenship rights to non-white,  colonial “alien races” took center stage in US politics and 
jurisprudence.  In particular, the 1900 Foraker Act officially established a colonial government, setting the 
stage for US governance of Puerto Rico. See Edgardo Melendez, "Citizenship and the Alien Exclusion in 
the Insular Cases: Puerto Ricans in the Periphery of American Empire," Centro Journal XXV, no. 1 
(Spring 2013): 109-110.  
 
18  W.E.B. DuBois, The Crisis (New York, NY), May 1919, 19. 10. DuBois publically backed US efforts 
in World War II. After being contacted by the Office of War Information (OWI) in June 1942, DuBois 
offered his support to the OWI and later participated in “Victory through Unity” tours, speaking alongside 
veteran civil rights activist A. Phillip Randolph. See Eric Foner, The Story of American Freedom (New 
York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999). 
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editors of the nation’s largest African-American newspaper, The Pittsburgh Courier, 
demanded victory over the forces of domestic racism, alongside “victory over our 
enemies on the battlefields abroad.”19 Likewise, World War II had profound civil rights 
implications for the ethnic Mexican community and other Latina/o groups such as Puerto 
Ricans and Cubans who enlisted in the military in record numbers, despite some being 
forced to serve in racially segregated units.20  Out of a population of nearly 2.7 million, as 
many as 500,000 immigrant and U.S. born ethnic Mexicans were engaged in active-duty 
military service.21 Military duty, as well as laboring in defense plants and selling war 
bonds (as many ethnic Mexican women did), fostered the integration of the largely first 
generation Mexican-American youth into the economic and social mainstream.  
According to Maggie Rivas-Rodriguez, the significance of WWII for Mexican-
Americans, “was that it would be the first time that they were participating fully in 
mainstream society, even working alongside Anglos as equals.”22 Paradoxically, this 
participation followed on the heels of nearly two decades of hardening racial and social 
boundaries between Mexican-Americans and Anglos. The massive migration of Mexican 
nationals into the U.S. Southwest during the 1920’s, coupled with their concentration in 
low-wage agricultural production, dramatically racialized the ethnic Mexican community 
                                                
19 Quoted in John Mortan Blum, V was for Victory: Politics and American Culture During World War II 
(New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace, Javonovich, 1976), 208. 
20 On this point, see Silvia Alvarez Curbelo, "The Color of War: Puerto Rican Soldiers and Discrimination 
during World War II " in Maggie Rivas-Rodriguez and Emilio Zamora, eds., Beyond the Latino World War 
II Hero: The Social and Political Legacy of a Generation (Austin, TX: University of Texas, 2009), 110-
124. 
21 Manuel Gonzalez. Mexicanos: A History of Mexicans in the United States. (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1999). 162. 
22 Maggie Rivas-Rodriguez. Ed. Mexican-Americans in World War II. Introduction. xi. 
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leading to discriminatory legal policies and public segregation including schools, parks, 
theatres, neighborhoods, community centers, cemeteries, and even barbershops.23  
However, the large numbers of Mexican American men and women in uniform 
and related defense industries, did not easily mitigate both systemic and isolated strains 
of anti-Mexican racism, including the near fatal, racially motivated beating of Mexican 
American G.I. Benigno Aguirre in September 1941 or a July 1941 incident in Lockhart, 
Texas during which “Spanish” people were told to “leave the block” and barred from 
participating in the town’s Independence Day festivities, because as an American 
celebration, it was “for white people only.”24  Following their tours of service, many 
returning veterans used their platform as citizen-soldiers to leverage a powerful critique 
against entrenched racial discrimination directed at Mexican-Americans and other 
Latina/os. Organizations such as the League for United Latin American Citizens 
(LULAC) and the G.I. Forum rhetorically coupled narratives of wartime experience and 
patriotic sacrifice with demands for full and inclusive citizenship.  
The post-war logic of democratic-racial liberalism, while facilitating the rise of a 
Mexican-American middle-class, did not fundamentally change the endemic poverty of 
the Southwest region, especially when accounting for persistent structural racism and the 
continued migration of Mexican laborers into California, Texas, Arizona, and even some 
                                                
23 Nearly 1.5 million Mexican immigrants—approximately 10% of Mexico’s population—migrated to the 
U.S. between 1900 and 1930. George Sanchez, Becoming Mexican-American: Ethnicity, Culture, and 
Identity in Chicano Los Angeles, 1900-1945 (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 18.  
24 See David Montejano,"The Beating of Private Aguirre: A Story about West Texas during WWII." 
Mexican-Americans in World War II. Ed. Maggie Rivas-Rodriguez. (Austin: University of Texas, 2005) 
41- 66. Regarding the Lockhart incident, see Oropeza, Raza Si, Guerra No!, 13-14. 
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parts of the mid-West.25 This poverty was especially contradictory given post-war 
economic affluence, characterized by unprecedented levels of consumer spending and the 
development of post-war industries in aviation, chemicals, and electronics.  
By 1960, the median income of a Mexican American family was only 62 percent 
of the median income of a family in the general population.26  Moreover, according to 
U.S. Census Bureau reports,  “Spanish surnamed people” were much poorer than the 
general U.S. population, including, African-Americans, were overall less educated, and 
more likely to live in poor housing conditions.27 It is this younger constituency of 
Mexican-Americans and Latina/os that comprise my study of the late 1960’s onward.  
The popular appeal of race, rights, and wartime service reached its official zenith 
in 1948, when President Harry Truman signed Executive Order 9981, banning racial 
segregation in the US armed forces. To civil rights leaders, the act constituted a major 
advancement in the generations long battle for equal rights. Indeed, both academic and 
social studies frequently cite Truman’s de-segregation of the Armed Forces as evidence 
of the military’s commitment to racial equality, placing it at the vanguard of civil rights 
ahead of other U.S. institutions.28 But a number of scholars have since re-evaluated this 
                                                
25 On this point, see Emilio Zamora. Claiming Rights and Righting Wrongs in Texas: Mexican Workers 
and Job Politics During World War II. (College Station: Texas A&M University, 2009). 
26 George Brown Tindall and David E. Shi (eds) America: A Narrative History. (New York:  W& W 
Norton & Company, 1999). 1564. 
27 Oropeza, Raza Si, Guerra No, 51. 
28 The vast body of literature examining race and the U.S. military focuses on either race-relations between 
African Americans and whites or the desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces. Bernard McNalty, Strength 
for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military (London, UK: Free Press, 1986); Sherie 
Mershon and Steven Schlossman, Foxholes and Colorlines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed Forces 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 2002); Gerald Astor, The right to fight: a history of African 
Americans in the military (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1998); Gail Lumet, American Patriots : The Story of 
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abbreviated narrative of civil rights gains, instead foregrounding the international 
political and cultural demands of the Cold War as the specific pretext for implementing 
such legislation.29 In point of fact, African-Americans continued to serve in racially 
segregated units on the frontlines and in military bases throughout the Korean War 
(1950-1953).30 As crucial as this scholarship has been for conceptually re-assessing easy 
corollaries between race and martial citizenship, too often they fall short of directly 
addressing the impact of subsequent conflicts abroad (ie Vietnam) and their domestic 
impact on the military’s conceptions of race and soldiering. 
The trajectory of U.S. race relations in the Vietnam-era that serves as the 
chronological starting point for this dissertation was determined in the years following 
World War II.  As sociologist Howard Winant observed, this period constituted a “racial 
break” when the governing philosophy of white supremacy came to a permanent and 
spectacular end, disabled by a “global accumulation of sociopolitical forces.”31 After 
1945, powerful currents of anti-colonial sentiment swept through the Third World, 
mounting trenchant critiques against the system of Euro-Western domination that had 
geographically indexed, mapped, and organized the globe for four centuries.  In clashing 
for the allegiance of the “darker nations of the world” –Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America—the U.S. and Soviet Union, embroiled in the Cold War, were ideologically 
                                                                                                                                            
Blacks in the Military from the Revolution to Desert Storm (New York, NY: Random House, 2001).  
29 Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2000); Penny Von Eschen, Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anti-
Colonialism, 1937-1957 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997). 
30 Kimberley L. Phillips, War! What is it Good For?: Black Freedom Struggles & the U.S. Military from 
World War II to Iraq (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2012),152-187. 
31 Howard Winant, The World is a Ghetto: Race and Democracy since World War II (New York Basic 
Books, 2001). P. 141. 
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bound to a politics of anti-racism. According to literary critic Jodi Melamed, the continued 
formalization of anti-racist doctrine within practices of U.S. governmentality, characterizes 
one of several “race liberal orders” emerging in the aftermath of World War II.32 
Emphasizing racial ‘inclusion,’ this new social formation required accounting for and 
accommodating non-white subjects whose very ‘exclusion’ was historically central to white 
supremacy-based systems of power in the U.S. 
“A DECADE OF NIGHTMARES” 33 
In recent years, historians have demanded greater scholarly attention towards the 
1970s focusing less on nostalgia for the era’s astonishing flourish of cultural production 
familiar to contemporary generations through disco, shag carpeting, bellbottoms, 
polyester suits, pet rocks, Donnie and Marie, and Star Wars.  Often caricatured for a 
garish excess and seeming insouciance, the seventies are depicted as a quiescent decade 
during which “nothing really happened.” On the contrary, as scholars have argued this 
period accounts for transformative changes that shaped modern systems of capitalism and 
political organization far more than its frenetic, romanticized predecessor.34 Derided as a 
“kidney stone of a decade” in a Doonesbury comic strip from 1980, the painful, tragic, and 
aching legacy of the 1970’s was marked by two contradictory, yet powerful undercurrents 
                                                
32  Jodi Melamed, Represent and Destroy: Rationalizing Violence in the New Racial Capitalism 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2011) 
33 I am consciously referencing Phillip Jenkins’s work on the pervasive currents of cultural anxiety or 
“nightmares” marking the years between 1975-1980. Phillip Jenkins, Decade of Nightmares: The End of 
the Sixties and the Making of Eighties America (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
34 Beth Bailey and David Farber, eds., America in the Seventies (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas 
Press, 2004); Andreas Killen, 1973 Nervous Breakdown: Watergate, Warhol, and the Birth of Post-Sixties 
America (New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 2006); Bruce J. Schulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift in 
American Culture, Society, and Politics (Da Capo Press, New York, NY).2001. 
 13 
throughout American society: on the one hand, an impulse for racial inclusion fostered by 
federal and state initiatives, and on the other, the emerging political philosophy of 
neoliberalism with its emphasis on free-market egalitarianism stressing individuality, 
privatization, and self-affirmation.35 Of the 1970’s zeitgeist, one could say it was a period 
convulsing against the limitations of an ambitious agenda, its hopefulness tempered by 
shifting global, political, and economic concerns. As Jefferson Cowie aptly notes, the 
seventies bracketed the “post-scarcity politics” of 1960’s prosperity and confidence, “without 
post-scarcity conditions.”36 
The year 1969 marked a pivotal one for the US military; one of the darkest 
chapters in its recent history known as the “time of troubles,” the late 1960s and early 
1970s were difficult for the armed services who were facing not only defeat in Vietnam, 
but political and cultural implosion from within. In January, Melvin R. Laird, an eight-
term U.S. Congressman from Wisconsin succeeded Clark Clifford as Secretary of 
Defense. A longtime Nixon associate, Laird’s appointment would have profound 
implications for military organizational structure. In April, US troop strength in South 
Vietnam peaked at 540,000. By July and August, endemic racial violence swept across 
military bases in Germany, Southeast Asia, Canada, and throughout the US, further 
eroding public support for the armed forces, whilst intensifying anti-war feelings anew. 
The dissident tenor of the counterculture and anti-war movement gave rise to a vibrant GI 
resistance movement peaking between 1970-1972. Throughout 1971, over 60,000 
                                                
35 Thomas Borstelmann, The 1970s: A New Global History from Civil Rights to Economic Inequality 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
36 Jefferson Cowie, Stayin' Alive: the 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class (New York, NY: The 
New Press, 2010) 10. 
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soldiers attended actors Jane Fonda and Donald Sutherland’s “FTA” vaudeville show 
conducted outside military bases and GI coffeehouses. Rebuking the pro-military stance 
of USO tours, “FTA” drew its moniker from the Army recruiting slogan, “Fun, Travel 
and Adventure”, instead standing for “Free the Army”, “Free the Americans”, and in its 
most biting political form, “Fuck the Army.” An underground press of 300 G.I. 
newspapers including We Got the brASS, Liberated Barracks, and All Hands Sink the 
Ship published contemptuous indictments of the Armed Forces. Though it received little 
media attention, the three day Winter Soldier hearings of 1971 in which returning 
veterans recounted atrocities committed during war, marked a watershed moment in US 
veteran history.  
Although 1975, the period I explore in chapter three, marked the beginning of the 
country’s bicentennial celebrations, there was little to revel in nationally: President Richard 
Nixon’s resignation following the Watergate scandal a year earlier was trailed by two 
separate assassination attempts of President Gerald R. Ford. In April, South Vietnam came 
under control of the communist Northern National Liberation Front (NLF) unifying the 
country as U.S. military forces retreated, ending a bitterly contested war that unhinged 
certainty in American global supremacy. Expenses related to the U.S. war in Vietnam and 
social welfare programs under the Johnson administration combined to increase federal 
deficits, expansion of the U.S. money supply, and price inflation.  Accordingly, the economic 
recession that began in 1973 with an oil embargo by members of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), intensified as the annual inflation rate rose to nearly 
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13% by the end of 1975.37 Unemployment rates for whites hit a historic high of 8%, while for 
African Americans and Latinos they were almost double at 15% and 13% respectively.38 A 
massive labor strike by Pennsylvania state employees in June typified the growing labor 
unrest among American workers, a movement marked by work stoppages, demonstrations, 
and mass mobilizations across the country. For many whites, perceptions of “encroachment” 
by Great Society reforms, especially court-mandated busing plans in public schools systems, 
provoked intense political and cultural backlash. President Richard Nixon’s “Silent 
Majority,” an amalgamation of working and middle-class whites, expressed support for tax 
cuts, arguing public welfare programs primarily benefitting racial minorities unfairly came at 
their expense. Further, the 1975 publication of Donald Covington’s Soldiers in Revolt not 
so much protested the war in Vietnam, as much as it did critique core values of American 
foreign policy, U.S. global standing, and histories of American military intervention.39  
Indeed, the years 1969-1975 marked the height of internal tumult, threatening to 
unhinge the military as it stood on a precipice: the enduring troubles of Vietnam, the 
toxic legacy of the draft which had compelled so many underprivileged groups into its 
ranks, and the impending future of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF). All of these factors 
                                                
37 George Brown Tindall and David E. Shi, America: A Narrative History. (W.W. Norton & Company, 
New York, NY 1999). 1581. 
38 Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
39 Fonda and Sutherland were joined by singers Holly Near and Lenn Chandler, as well as comedian Paul 
Mooney. The FTA show toured in the U.S., Philippines, and Guam throughout 1971 and was later made 
into a short documentary film with limited release in 1972. Barbara L. Tischler, “Anti-War Activism and 
Emerging Feminism in the late 1960’s: the Times they were A’Changing.” Against the Current, April 30, 
2000. 24; see also Sir! No Sir!, dir, David Zeiger, Displaced Films, 2005. 
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came to bear on the way the military would revise itself in the decade to come and serve 
as the backdrop for the policy developments I investigate throughout each chapter. 
LATINIDAD & “SOLDADOS AMERICANOS” 
Scholars of the Vietnam War have consistently called attention to the uneven 
racial and class dimensions of the armed forces during that conflict.40 Within this vast 
corpus of scholarship, accounts of Latina/os in the Vietnam War have served to disrupt 
the dominant black-white racial dyad traditionally informing most analyses of race 
relations and militarism during the Vietnam-era. Writings such as Charley Trujillo’s 
Soldados: Chicanos in Viet Nam (1990), Jorge Mariscal’s Aztlán and Vietnam: Chicano 
and Chicana Experiences of the War (1999), Lea Ybarra’s Vietnam Veteranos: Chicanos 
Recall the War (2004) and Lorena Oropeza’s ¡Raza Sí! ¡Guerra No!:Chicano Protest and 
Patriotism During the Vietnam War Era (2005), have lent critical insight into the 
complex racialized experiences of Mexican-origin/Chicano soldiers and their 
communities during the Vietnam-era. Primarily social histories, based on individual 
veteran testimonies and Chicana/o authored literary texts, these scholarly projects have 
proved pivotal to the historical recovery of Chicana/o Vietnam-era wartime service.41  
                                                
40 Christian G. Appy, Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1993); James Westheider, The Vietnam War (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007); On African-American wartime service in Vietnam, see Wallace 
Terry, Bloods: An Oral History of the Vietnam War (New York, NY: Random House, 1984); Isaac 
Hampton II, The Black Officer Corps: A History of Black Military Advancement from Integration Through 
Vietnam (New York, NY: Taylor & Francis, 2013); on Native Americans in Vietnam, see Al Carroll, Dog 
Tags and Medicine Bags: American Indian Veterans from Colonial Times to the Second Iraq War (Lincoln, 
NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 147-172. 
 
41 Charley Trujillo, Soldados: Chicanos in Viet Nam (San Jose, CA: Chusma House, 1990); Jorge 
Mariscal, Aztlan and Viet Nam: Chicano and Chicana Experiences of the War (Los Angeles, CA: 
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Yet my work departs from this scholarship in two ways. First, as their respective titles 
suggest, these texts are principally concerned with chronicling the affairs of Mexican-
origin/ Chicana/o subjects. By contrast, my analysis takes into consideration Vietnam 
War participation by other national-origin Latina/o groups, principally Puerto Ricans, to 
widen the scope of Latina/o identity, US military service, and empire.42 Second, I 
foreground the role of state actors, namely federal officials and military policy-makers, in 
discursively shaping, articulating, and theorizing a pan-ethnic notion of Latinidad. 
According to Agustin Lao-Montes, “Latinidad is both a category deployed within 
a variety of dominant spaces and institutions…to label populations as well as a form of 
self-identification used by individuals, movements, and organizations to articulate a sense 
of community.”43 At its most basic level, Latinidad, means a shared identity. In the 
chapters that follow, I investigate how objectives by military officials to harness Latina/o 
manpower interfaced with the complexity of US Latina/o cultural identities. By 
examining efforts by military policy-makers to accurately label Latina/os, Martialing 
                                                                                                                                            
University of California Press, 1999); Leah Ybarra, Vietnam Veteranos: Chicanos Recall the War (Austin, 
TX: University of Texas Press, 2004); Lorena Oropeza, Raza Si! Guerra No! Chicano Protest and 
Patriotism During the Viet Nam era (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2005). 
42 I am defining Latina/os as individuals tracing their national origins to the Spanish-speaking countries of 
the Caribbean, Mexico, Central America, and South America. I readily acknowledge that this designation 
flattens the diverse, heterogeneous histories of migration, racialization, economic marginalization, 
residency, etc. that distinguishes these populations from one another. For the most part and owing to their 
numerical dominance as the largest U.S. Latino group, this project concentrates on the ethnic Mexican 
population in the U.S. Southwest.  I use the term “Latinos” to encompass this group and explicitly 
underscore how dominant discourse (ie U.S. media, political leaders, military officials, etc) deploy this 
term when making national generalizations, without respect to racial, class, gender, and regional 
differences. 
 
43 Agustín Laó-Montes, “Mambo Montage: The Latinization of New York City,” in Mambo Montage: The 
Latinization of New York, eds.,Agustín Laó-Montes and Arlene Davila (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 2001), 7-8.  
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Latinidad mines the tensions they encountered when it came to effectively homogenizing 
and addressing disparate issues of race, national-origin, and Spanish-language adherence. 
Because most scholarly studies of Latinidad foreground its circulation and 
commodification in the domains of cultural production, media consumption, 
entertainment, and mainstream journalism, my dissertation represents an intervention in 
so far as it charts the early trajectory of Latinidad as consolidated in federal policy.44 By 
examining research reports, government studies, memos, Congressional hearings, 
personal and official correspondence, military periodicals, and military authored race 
relations training guides/ teaching syllabi, this project contributes to on-going efforts to 
understand the institutional history of Latinidad. For example, in chapter three, I look 
closely at policy debates over representative terminology, including conflicts over the 
application of the term “Hispanic” versus “Latina/o” within military policy. In this 
respect, my work joins and builds on scholarship by Cristina Beltran, Suzanne Oboler, G. 
Cristina Mora, and Clara E. Rodriguez accounting for the utility of Latinidad as a 
discursive political formation.45 
                                                
44  On Latinidad in popular culture see Frances R. Aparicio, "Jennifer as Selena: Rethinking Latinidad in 
Media and Popular Culture," Latino Studies 1, no. 1 (2003); Arlene Davila, Latinos, Inc: The Making and 
Marketing of a People (Los Angeles, CA: University of California, 2001; Marta Caminero-Santangelo, On 
Latinidad: U.S. Latino Literature and the Construction of Ethnicity (Miami, FL: University of Florida, 
2009); On Latinidad in performance studies, see Deborah Paredez, Selenidad: Selena, Latinos, and the 
Performance of Memory (Raleigh, NC: Duke University Press, 2009).  
 
45 Cristina Beltran, The Trouble with Unity: Latino Politics and the Creation of Identity (London, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 2010); Suzanne Oboler, Ethnic Labels, Latino Lives: Identity and the Politics of 
(re)Presentation in the United States (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1995); G. 
Christina Mora, Making Hispanics: How Activists, Bureaucrats, and Media Constructed a New American 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2014); Clara E. Rodriguez, Changing Race: Latinos, The 
Census, and The History of Ethnicity in the United States (New York: New York University Press, 2000).  
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“MARTIALING/MARSHALING” 
In this dissertation, I use the conceptual framework of “martialing” to trace how 
from the period 1970 to the present, the US military increasingly looked to and 
deliberately invoked (ie martialed) Latina/o ethno-racial and cultural difference in 
tandem with its broader shift towards an ethos of neoliberal multiculturalism. Whereas 
the U.S. military long worked to assimilate and integrate minority difference under the 
rubric of mid-twentieth century racial liberalism—the philosophy of extending equal 
rights to racial minorities—by the early 1970s, military officials began embracing a 
nascent form of neoliberal multiculturalism, which in effect, incorporates racial 
difference as a good or commodity to be celebrated, utilized, and deployed, but which 
simultaneously disavows the systemic legal, economic, and political structures that 
“produce racially unequal outcomes.”46  
“Martialing” draws its etymological origin from the concept of “martial races,” a 
mid-nineteenth century colonial trope employed by the British Imperial Army, 
designating certain ethnic groups as having a natural inclination for combat.47 According 
to this doctrine, particular ethnic groups like Nepalese Gurkhas and Punjabi Sikhs, were 
assumed to possess the necessary “spirit” for military service—inherent racial and 
cultural attributes that made them uniquely suited for war and/or combat, thus enabling 
the exercise of British colonial rule and administration. Since widely discredited as a 
biologically and culturally determinist perspective implicit to colonial logics of power, 
                                                
46 Melamed, Represent and Destroy: Rationalizing, 140. 
47 This doctrine was first adopted in British India after the Sapoy Mutiny of 1857.  Daniel Horowitz, 
Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1985).  
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within civil-military relations, the theory has retained some traction for how it frames the 
military and its use of conscription as a “successful vehicle for nation-state building in 
the post-colonial context.”48 In her study of ethnic soldiering, noted feminist scholar 
Cynthia Enloe explicates how state elites in Britain, the US, and Canada viewed military 
conscription “an integrative process…a form of mass mobilization that would increase 
each citizen’s affiliation with the political system and his stake in the maintenance of that 
system.”49 In other words, military service was a key site of instilling national loyalty 
among those ethno-racial groups on the ideological and legal margins of the nation-state. 
Enloe further argues, state elites urged ethnic minority groups “to see military service as 
a vehicle for gaining respect, legitimacy, and protection in the larger social order.”50  My 
use of “martialing” draws on this body of scholarship to call attention to the US 
military’s attempts, particularly in the domain of recruitment, to strategically utilize or 
“martial” Latina/o ethno-racial subjectivity. In so doing, I also use the term “martialing” 
in a semantic register evocative of its homonymic cousin, “marshaling,” defined by the 
Oxford English Dictionary as “1) to arrange or assemble (a group of people, especially 
soldiers) in order 2) Correctly position or arrange 3) guide or direct the movement of.”51  
In this way, martialing/marshaling highlights how racial and cultural difference, 
                                                
48 Subhasich Ray, "The Non-martial Origins of the 'Martial Races': Ethnicity & Military Service in Ex-
British Colonies," Armed Forces & Society 39, no. 3 (2012). 561; In his work on Chicano soldiering during 
the Vietnam War, Jorge Mariscal indicts a similarly analogous concept in Mexican nationalist ideology--
“warrior patriotism” or the explicit linkages between masculinity and a willingness to fight for and die on 
behalf of la patria (the nation). Jorge Mariscal, Aztlan and Viet Nam: Chicano and Chicana Experiences of 
the War (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1999), 27. 
49 Cynthia Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies (Athens, GA: University of Georgia 
Press, 1980), 53. 
50 Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers: State Security, 27. 
51 Oxford English Dictionary (OED), s.v. “marshal.” Accessed 15 June, 2016. 
<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/marshal> 
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particularly that of Latina/os, becomes mobilized and aligned with state apparatuses to 
render the US military as a uniquely egalitarian space, supposedly exempt from the racial 
inequities beleaguering civil society.  
METHODOLOGY 
 Noted Haitian anthropologist and historian Michelle-Rolph Trouillot, once 
queried “If history is merely the story told of those who won, how did they win in the 
first place?”52 Trouillot’s question served as an impetus for the methodological 
approaches I employ in this dissertation.  As typified by military historians’ Charles C. 
Moskos and John Butler’s study All That We Can Be: Black Leadership and Racial 
Integration the Army Way (1996) the dominant “story” of post-Vietnam military race 
relations is characterized by optimistic messaging lauding the armed forces as a 
colorblind, merit based institution that exalts interracial collegiality. Mirroring popular 
social observations, Moskos and Butler contend the U.S. military, “contradicts the 
prevailing race paradigm” of the U.S., arguing that it is “unmatched in its level of racial 
integration.”53   
But if the current prevailing “race paradigm” in the US is one predicated on 
black-white relations, how should military historians, Latina/o Studies scholars, and 
American Studies practitioners figure in the place of Latina/os?  More importantly, how 
did the US military configure Latina/os racially, culturally, and ethnically? To answer 
                                                
52 Michel Rolph-Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (New York: Beacon 
Press, 1997). 6. 
53 Charles C. Moskos and John Butler, All That We Can Be: Black Leadership and Racial Integration the 
Army Way (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1997).  
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this question, in my first three chapters I turn to a range of primary sources to evaluate 
military race relations policy during the early 1970s, examining many previously 
overlooked military archives: research reports, government studies, memos, 
Congressional hearings, personal and official correspondence, military periodicals, and 
military authored race relations training guides/ teaching syllabi. In so doing, I elucidate 
how a variety of policy actors, pressure groups, civil rights advocates, families and 
conservative officials debated, discussed, and developed military policies towards 
Latina/os during an intensely volatile period of race-relations. The wide-ranging scale of 
the military debate paralleled and overlapped with the emerging visibility of Latina/os as 
a pan-ethnic political formation.    
To supplement this analysis, I also make use of a broad ensemble of non-military 
primary texts including oral histories by black and Latina/o service members, plays, and 
newspaper articles. In my fourth chapter, I shift my attention to a close reading of a U.S. 
military advertising campaign, the “Yo Soy El Army” initiative, directly targeting 
Latina/os. Amidst both scholarly and popular preoccupations with the military as a 
laboratory for racial integration there has been insufficient attention given to the role 
played by recruitment initiatives. This signals a major scholarly oversight because since 
the shift to the AVF, the military has increasingly relied on strategic recruiting 
emphasizing educational opportunities, job skills training, and personal development that 
I argue, not only reflect the military’s transition to a neoliberal based logic and the rise of 
foreign born parents among Latina/o youth, but also one that directly relies on militarized 
conceptions of racial identity. In this regard, the “Yo Soy El Army” campaign marks both 
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the military’s adoption of neoliberal multiculturalism, but also the rise of a majority of 
children with immigrant parents or actual migrant children among Latina/o volunteers to 
the military.  
CHAPTER OUTLINE 
In chapter one,  “From “Same Mud, Same Blood" to “Not All Green” I 
underscore the place of racial violence in spurring military policy to address race 
relations.  Specifically, Martialing Latinidad adopts a micro-historical approach to 
analyze the governance crisis facing the draft army. The “Camp Lejeune Incident,” a fatal 
racial encounter between black, Latina/o, and white Marines serves as a starting point for 
subsequent military policies on race relations that resulted in a Congressional hearing, as 
well as two military research reports: The Randall Report and Render Report. I used 
these documents, in addition to oral histories and press accounts, to identify the 
racialization of Latina/os during the Vietnam-era. My account of the Camp Lejeune 
incident tracks the crisis that led military officials to look to Latina/o recruitment and 
training as a way to address deeply entrenched racial divides by making Latina/os and the 
military a model of racial democracy. 
In so doing, I also offer an analysis of nascent pan-Latino/a identity formation 
engendered by the physical spaces of war. I argue that spaces such as military barracks, 
cafeterias, combat frontlines, and service clubs, served as sites for provisional pan-Latino 
identification and mutual recognition.  
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In chapter two, “Getting There”: Military Multiculturalism, the Defense Race 
Relations Institute (DRRI), and the Biggest Minority,” I analyze the development, 
implementation, and infrastructure of the Defense Race Relations Institute (DRRI), a 
mandatory race relations training center established by the USAF in 1970 in response to 
outbreaks of racial violence. This chapter is principally concerned with discursively 
deconstructing the military’s role in shaping racialized military subjectivity. That is, I 
examine how military race relations’ instructors, influenced by contemporary ethnic 
nationalist movements and critiques by the Global Left, sought to contain, assuage, and 
ultimately incorporate (ie politically neutralize) conceptions of ethno-racial identity 
congruent with its own domestic vision of race and national belonging.  
In chapter three, “El Soldado Americano”: Latina/os, Racial Arithmetic, & the 
American Dream” I continue with my analysis of the DRRI and its subsequent role in 
shaping military policy with regards to addressing racial discrimination against Latina/o 
military personnel. Further, I explicitly look at the ways military officials confronted the 
challenges of homogenizing Latina/o military personnel under pan-ethnic terminology. 
Cognizant that Latina/os represented an emerging and important demographic for the 
future of the armed forces, military officials conducted several internal studies and 
research reports, including the 1972 report by the “Task Force on Military Justice” and 
1973 “Study of the Spanish Ethnic Soldier.” I closely examine both documents to expose 
how military officials attempted to redress systemic neglect, racial bigotry, and cultural 
insensitivity (ie English language classification tests) towards Latina/o military 
personnel. Finally, I situate these efforts to respond to Latina/o military personnel within 
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the USAF’s broader shift towards the All-Volunteer Force in 1973. I argue that given the 
post-Vietnam tumult of race relations in the US and market-based demands of the AVF, 
Latina/os constituted an important imaginary cultural proxy for the US national polity—a 
racially and ethnically diverse group, eager to advance economically and socially, and 
thus, early avatars for the form of neoliberal citizenship the military would embrace, 
advance, and promote in later decades.  
Finally, in chapter four, “Advertising Patriotism: The “Yo Soy El Army” 
Campaign, Neoliberal Citizenship, and Strategizing Latinidad” I shift forward in time to 
the early years of the Global War on Terror, when the US Army utilized a multi-media 
bilingual-based marketing campaign to appeal to young Latina/os.  In this section, I build 
on earlier chapters by examining how ethnically specific advertising to Latina/os 
transmitted and/or conveyed notions of racial and ethnic military inclusion.  As noted in 
chapter three, the Army began Spanish language print ads in the late 1970’s, beginning 
with slogans such as “Unete a la gente que está en el Army” (Join the People Who’ve 
Joined Army), an early template for how it would market to Latina/os in subsequent 
decades. If the first three chapters chronologically explicate the military’s “encounter” 
and formal recognition of Latina/o service personnel, this final chapter serves as an 




From “Same Mud, Same Blood" to “Not All Green”:  Vietnam, Racial Violence, and 
the Render Report, 1969-1970 
 
When they put us in a room, people from different groups, all in one room, its like a dog 
and cat in the same room—they’re never going to agree.~ Rueben54 
 
Introduction 
In September 1969, President Richard Nixon received a peculiar gift in the mail. 
Accompanying a neatly folded single-page letter, lay a U.S. Navy Silver Cross--the 
U.S.’s second-highest medal for valor bestowed on members of the Armed Forces.  Its 
owner, Guy Gabaldón, a well-known Mexican-American Marine veteran, had been 
awarded the decoration nine years earlier for combat actions performed during World 
War II.55  In his letter, Gabaldón fumed: 
“I was very proud of the Navy Cross as a symbol of my country’s regard for my 
services. I had always hoped things would get better for my people, the Mexican 
Americans, and for all minorities for that matter. But as far as I can see, under 
your administration, bigotry is gaining ground. Therefore, since I’m considered a 
second class citizen by you and your fellow WASPS; and I have been refused a 
hotel room, because of my ethnic background, in the country that I fought for; 
and that my people, the Mexicans, are consistently treated in an undignified 
manner; for these reasons and for so many more, I feel that I no longer desire to 
have in my possession an award from your CORRUPT, IMMORAL, 
DECADENT, and BIGOTED government…”56 
 
                                                
54 Video Recording No.381-F-20. “Farmersville, CA: Dos Veteranos, 1968”. Motion Picture, Sound, and 
Video Records Section, Special Media Archives Services Division. Record Group 381; National Archives 
at College Park, MD. 
55 Gabaldón was originally awarded the Silver Star Medal in 1944, but in November 1960, Secretary of the 
Navy William B. Franke upgraded Gabaldón’s medal to a Silver Cross.  
56  Letter; Guy Gabaldon to Richard Nixon. 28 September 1969. Pre-presidential Papers of Richard M. 
Nixon, General Correspondence, 1946-1962, Series 320, Box 278, Folder “Gabaldon, Guy.” Richard Nixon 
Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA. See also, reprint. “Chicano Vet Returns Medal” El 
Grito del Norte, 15 November 1969. 1. 
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Gabaldón was certainly not the first, nor the last American service-member to publicly 
surrender a medal as a register of dissent.57 By fall 1969, mounting frustration over 
America’s war in Southeast Asia, intensified by recent disclosures of US Army atrocities 
at Mỹ Lai, propelled dramatic expansion of both the GI resistance and anti-war 
movements with numerous veterans likewise discarding their service medals.58 But 
Gabaldón’s gesture represents a distinct entry in the otherwise proverbial tale of Vietnam 
War era protest culture.59 By remitting the Navy Cross, a hard-won badge of the nation’s 
“regard for his [my] services” amidst allegations of racism and “second-class” 
citizenship, Gabaldón’s symbolic treason tells a complex story about the failed promises 
of full democratic citizenship for racial minorities between the end of World War II and 
the late 1960s when this chapter commences.  
                                                
57 For example, in 1956 a WWII veteran displeased with President Dwight Eisenhower’s use of National 
Guard troops to racially integrate Little Rock high school sent his medal to the president, writing, “I am 
ashamed I ever wore them.” David Nichols, A Matter of Justice: Eisenhower and the Beginning of the Civil 
Rights Revolution.  (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2008) 205; On the significance of medals for valor 
see Mary Dudziak, Wartime: An Idea, its history, its consequences (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2012). 28.  
58 The most famous and largest demonstration of remitting service medals came on April 18, 1971 when 
between 600-2,000 veterans from several U.S. wars assembled at the U.S. Capitol in Washington D.C. to 
protest the Vietnam  War. Organized by Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) under the moniker 
“Dewey Canyon III”  veterans hurled medals, uniforms, discharge papers, and even a prosthetic leg into a 
“garbage heap of honor.” Andrew Hunt, The Turning: A History of Vietnam Veterans Against the War 
(New York: NYU Press, 1999). 113-114.   
 
59 Gabaldón opposed the US war in Vietnam, but did not support anti-war efforts because his eldest son, 
Guy Jr., also a Marine, was on active duty during the war reasoning that doing so detracted from troop 
morale. Of anti-war demonstrators, Gabaldón observed, “When my son was fighting I say ‘don’t tie one 
hand behind his back…whether right or wrong…back our boys.” Guy Gabaldón interview by Maggie 
Rivas-Rodriguez and Charlie Ericksen, Washington, DC, June 7, 2003. Folder 34, VOCES Oral History 
Project Archive, Benson Latin American Collection, University of Texas Libraries, the University of Texas 
at Austin. 30.  
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To begin, Guy Louis “Gabby” Gabaldón made for an unlikely radical. Born in 
New Mexico in 1926, Gabaldón entered lifelong fame as a war hero and avowed patriot 
after appearing on a June 1957 episode of the NBC program, “This is Your Life” 
profiling his wartime exploits.60 At 18, he set a still unmatched military record by single-
handedly capturing over 1,000 enemy combatants from the Japanese island of Saipan 
during the Allied campaign for the Mariana Islands in 1944.61 Acting alone, Gabaldón 
spent weeks conducting nightly patrols seeking out enemies then shrewdly bribing them 
with cigarettes, Lemon soda, and a smattering of Japanese phrases, he eventually coaxed 
several hundred beleaguered Imperial Army troops, laborers, and frightened civilians into 
peacefully surrendering. Nicknamed “The Pied Piper of Saipan” by commanding officer 
Col. John L. Schwabe, Gabaldón humbly told reporters: “I guess it was because I spoke 
Japanese that I convinced them.”62 Television viewers charmed by Gabaldón’s tale likely 
also found appeal in his distinctly “all-American” background. A self-described 
“wayward youth” who scraped by on the streets of Depression-era East Los Angeles, at 
twelve, Gabaldón found refuge with Masato and Sumi Nakano, a sympathetic Issei 
                                                
60 Airing weekly, the half-hour show’s key gimmick involved surprising an unsuspecting guest or 
“honoree” whose biography unfolded before live audiences, using friends, family members, co-workers, 
and other figures to tell the recipient’s life story.  Edward K. Welch, “This is Your Life, Oscar Howe.”  The 
Journal of Popular Culture, Vol. 47, No. 2, 2014.  
  
61 This is Your Life, "Guy Gabaldón: Marine War Hero," episode YLN251, NBC, June 19, 1957, hosted by 
Ralph  Edwards. 
62  Hedda Hopper, “Hero Shows What Holiday Means” Los Angeles Times. 4 July 1960, C6.  
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couple who ran a small grocery store in neighboring Boyle Heights, who adopted him, 
and taught him Japanese.”63  
Gabaldón’s feat may have impressed postwar audiences, but it was his biography 
that proved irresistible to Cold War era state officials and cultural producers alike. The 
“Pied Piper of Saipan’s” triumphant, yet sentimental saga of battlefield bravado, 
interracial accord, and humanitarian compassion neatly replicated the idealized discourse 
of American race and democracy crafted by US policy-makers as a Cold War cultural 
imperative. According to historian Mary Dudziak, federal leaders portrayed America’s 
civil rights narrative as a “story of progress, a story of the triumph of good over evil, a 
story of U.S. moral superiority.”64 As the geopolitical rivalry between the US and Soviet 
Union deepened, with each superpower vying for the sovereign affiliation of over forty 
newly non-aligned nations, US policymakers placed their faith in culturally scripted 
narratives like Gabaldón’s, an exemplary ethno-racial minority and exceptional citizen-
subject, towards consolidating the ideological (“hearts and minds”) and political 
                                                
63 Gabaldón was raised alongside the Nakano’s five children: Frank, Francis, Lucy, and twins Lane & Lyle. 
Reflecting on his large surrogate family, Gabaldón noted affectionately, “They taught me Japanese. But 
mostly, they taught me how to love.” With the advent of U.S. entry into World War II, Gabaldón’s time 
with the Nakanos came to an abrupt end. Following President Franklin Roosevelt’s issuance of Executive 
Order 9066, the Nakanos were interned at the Heart Mountain Relocation Center in northwest Wyoming. 
Of their departure in early September 1942, Gabaldón bitterly recalled, “they sent my family to a 
concentration camp.” Within months of their arrival at Heart Mountain, foster brothers, Lyle (Masaya) and 
Lane (Tastuhiko) volunteered for military service becoming members of the famed 442nd Regimental 
Combat Team, a segregated combat unit composed entirely of Nisei soldiers. Nicknamed the “Purple Heart 
Brigade” the 442nd would go on to become one of the most decorated units of World War II. Guy 
Gabaldon, East L.A. Marine: The Untold True Story of Guy Gabaldon, directed by Steven Jay Rubin, Fast 
Carrier Pictures, 2008. For more on the role of “adoption” in narratives of post-war racial integration and 
the family unit, see Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-
1961 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003) 146-147. 
 
64 Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2000), 13. See also, Penny Von Eschen, Race Against Empire: Black 
Americans and Anti-Colonialism, 1937-1957 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).  
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allegiances of the world’s “captive peoples”—the formerly colonized inhabitants of Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America (“the darker nations of the world”). Gabaldón’s morally 
unambiguous tale of do-gooder heroism, American ideologues held, could bear powerful 
sway in exporting the gospel of Western democratic liberalism, whilst also mitigating the 
“uneasy dimensions of postwar US race relations.”65 At a time when Jim Crow 
segregation brutally governed African-American life in the US South, discrimination 
against Mexican-Americans persisted throughout the Southwest, and US national security 
ambitions extended militarily to the Asia-Pacific Rim, Gabaldón’s non-white identity, 
transnational pan-Latin-Asian upbringing, and benevolent wartime act supplied a 
comforting fantasy of domestic racial unity, international fraternity, and benign (non-
imperial) foreign policy aspirations. In multiple ways, Gabaldón affirmed America’s 
image of itself as a colorblind modern liberal capitalist democracy.66  
                                                
65 Thomas Borstelman, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003) 28. For more on the use of multiculturalism and projects 
of neocolonialism, see also, Nikhil Pal Singh, Black is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for 
Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005) 
 
66 An indispensable symbol of American anti-racism with an extravagant personality to boot, Gabaldón 
made for a pitch-perfect cinematic protagonist. To this end, in 1960 Allied Artists released From Hell to 
Eternity, a highly fictionalized adaption of his life story, albeit starring television actor Jeffrey Hunter, an 
Anglo-American, in the title role. Part combat film, part biopic, Eternity blended gritty displays of warfare 
with melodramatic scenes of racial persecution and redemption, earning praise by The Los Angeles Times 
for its sensitive portrayal of “racial amity, inspiration, and dignity.” Phillip K Schuer, “War Film Tells it 
Straight” Los Angeles Times, August 7, 1960, F1. Hell to Eternity, directed by Phil Karlson, Allied Artists, 
1960. Fresh off the heels of the Cuban Revolution, the United States Information Agency (USIA) wasted 
little time capitalizing on the feel-good parable, or of its leading man’s ethnic Mexican heritage. During fall 
1961, USIA agents sponsored Eternity during an “anti-reds” film drive that toured Mexico and Central 
America in concert with its massive anti-communism campaign throughout Latin America. An unofficial 
“cultural ambassador,” Gabaldón routinely made public speaking appearances, delivering Spanish-language 
speeches to Mexican military personnel and “rural dwellers” touting the film’s anti-communist message “of 
equality treatment in the US, and that rewards are not exclusively for top echelon personnel.” Belinda L. 
Rincon, "Media, militarism, and mythologies of the state: The Latino Soldier in WWII films," Journal of 
Latina/o Studies 9, no. 2-3 (July 2011): 296. For more on US sponsored anti-communist propaganda efforts 
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Of course, by 1969 Gabaldón’s views, like those of the generation succeeding 
him, were not quite so singular. But his trajectory from a symbol of Cold War 
liberalism’s emphasis on multi-racial pluralism to political recusant offers an important 
allegory for this chapter, tracing the shifting nexus of racial identity, military service, and 
liberal inclusion during the late Vietnam War-era. Gabaldón’s repudiation of his Navy 
Cross might have struck some, particularly fellow veterans, as a disgraceful, even violent 
betrayal of his military legacy. But by his logic, the “bigotry” and “undignified manner” 
of treatment American racial minorities were perpetually subject to, despite the glow of 
civil rights reforms, constituted the real violation of democratic principles he spent years 
“fighting for” through bodily sacrifice and later, as a public spokesman for multiracial 
tolerance. Gabaldón’s act, then, offers a productive point of departure for three major 
themes animating this chapter. 
First, if Gabaldón embodied the promises of state sponsored domestic anti-racism 
promoted through martial citizenship, his disavowal of the Navy Cross over racist 
treatment and subjugation exposed the limits of military service to ensure equality of 
treatment. As scholars Ronald Krebs, Cynthia Enloe, Kimberly Phillips, Mario T. Garcia, 
Al Carroll, and others have amply demonstrated, through much of the twentieth century, 
                                                                                                                                            
in Latin America see Seth Fein, "Producing the Cold War in Mexico: The Public Limits of Covert 
Communication," 2008, in In from the Cold: Latin America's New Encounter with the Cold War, ed. 
Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spencer (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 173.  Ever the 
consummate patriot, Gabaldón continued his Latin American anti-communist crusade well after completing 
his time as a USIA spokesperson, going on to found the “Drive Against Communism” (DAC), an LA based 
organization “formed for the purpose of soliciting the enlistment of former combat veterans of anti-Castro 
rebel forces.” The self-proclaimed president and founder, Gabaldón’s mission statement for DAC attested 
to his profoundly loyal nationalist sentiments: “I live in the best country on God’s green earth, and I mean 
to keep it that way, so help me God.” SAC, Los Angeles 100-437548 to Director, FBI, U.S. government 
memorandum, "Drive Against Communism," September 9, 1961, Box 2, Fldr 4, Phillip Kerby Papers, 
UCLA Special Collections, Los Angeles, CA.  
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soldiering functioned as the symbolic hinge upon which ethno-racial, sexual, and gender 
minorities’ accessed real and symbolic membership within the national polity. By 
rejecting his medal, Gabaldón disrupted the linearity of a liberal rights-based model 
embraced by conservative post-war civil rights organizations like LULAC, the American 
GI Forum, and NAACP who long correlated military service with enhanced rights and 
prospects of first-class citizenship. On the contrary, by looking at discrimination 
experienced by GI’s of color, this chapter foregrounds Gabaldón’s critique of American 
liberalism, thus contesting the military’s claim “as the original torchbearer of civil 
rights.”  
Second, Gabaldón’s transition from identifying as an assimilated “hyphenated 
American” to self-proclaimed “Mexican” parallels the changing ethno-racial formation 
and/or politicization of US Latina/os throughout the mid-late 1960’s. Prior to 1965, 
alluding to Hispanic/Latina/os, frequently meant making reference to Mexican origin 
peoples, the largest Spanish speaking ethnic group in the US. However, beginning in the 
early 1960s and particularly after passage of the 1965 Hart-Celler Act, the ethno-racial 
composition of the US Latina/o populace flourished owing to widespread and sustained 
migration from Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Central America.67 The influx of racially 
ambiguous and/or mixed race Latina/os augured new racial formations, challenging 
                                                
67 Tomas Almaguer, "Race, Racialization, and Latino Populations," 2012, in Racial Formation in the 21st 
Century, ed. Laura Pulido, Daniel Martinez Hosang, and Oneka Bennett (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 2012), 146;  
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prevailing US racial paradigms hewed within a black-white binary.68 At the same time, 
the evolving heterogeneity of the US “Spanish-speaking” demographic proceeded apace 
with American foreign policy developments in Vietnam. Dog tags embossed with Latin-
origin surnames of “Dimas” and “Lebrón” (Puerto Rican), appeared alongside “Garcia” 
and “Rodriguez” (Mexican-American), “Núñez” (Dominican), and “Alfaro” 
(Salvadoran)—material affirmations of the MACV-era military’s role as a site of pan-
ethnic Latina/o subjectivity. It is one of the central conceits of this chapter that inter-
ethnic relations between Mexican-American, Cuban, Caribeño, and Central American 
GI’s, often through the shared idiom of Spanish, fostered broader cultural awareness 
among GI’s of Latin-American descent, in effect cultivating a nascent form of Latinidad 
that would be of significant interest to the US military in later years. In his study of 
Puerto Rican soldiers’ modes of self-representation during wartime, media scholar 
Miguel Aviles-Santiago contends the Vietnam War acted as a “contact zone” defined by 
critical theorist Mary Louise Pratt (2008) as “the space of colonial encounters, the space 
in which peoples geographically and historically separated come into contact with each 
other and establish ongoing relations, usually involving conditions of coercion, radical 
inequality, and intractable conflict.”69  Pratt employs “contact zone” in four registers: 
exploring the intersection of spatially and historically differentiated subjects; frontloading 
                                                
68 Racial formations are defined as “the socio-historical process by which racial categories are created, 
inhabited, transformed, and destroyed.” Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United 
States: From the 1960’s to the 1990’s (New York: Routledge Press, 1994). 55. 




the interactive dimensions of colonial encounters; explicating how subjects are 
constituted in and through their relationships to one other; and examining asymmetrical 
power relations and interaction between colonizers and the colonized. Following Pratt 
and Aviles-Santiago, this chapter situates the Vietnam War as a “diasporic contact zone,” 
where disparate national and geographically distinct ethnic Latina/os encountered each 
another and other ethno-racial groups, many for the first time.  
Finally, mirroring Gabaldón’s own internationalism, this chapter travels between, 
within, and through the Vietnam War’s multinational terrain to consider the transnational 
circuits of labor constituting the MACV-era military empire. From Puerto Rico to West 
Germany, from Da Nang to Guam, America’s war in Vietnam operated on a global scale. 
Its labor force, more than a “working-class” army, was sutured from a complex 
constituency of actors whose racial, ethnic, and national backgrounds would play an 
important role in distinctly challenging traditional modes of citizenship, patriotic duty, 
and US practices of imperial warfare. Along these same lines, this chapter underscores 
the significant ways in which GI’s of color underwrote anti-war movement efforts. In so 
doing, I offer an expanded discussion of the relationship between non-white soldiers and 
Third World Leftist proponents including groups such as the Black Panther Party (BPP). 
This chapter takes up the question of how soldiers of color, specifically Latina/os, 
experienced race and racialization during the latter years of the Vietnam War. In 
examining the distinct and disparate experiences of Latina/o service members as 
racialized and/or necolonial subjects, this chapter joins historian Natalia Molina’s call for 
a “relational treatment of race” recognizing that “race is a mutually constitutive process 
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and thus attends to how, when, where, and to what extent groups intersect.”70 For 
example, this chapter examines the specificity of ways in which Black Power movements 
resonated with Afro-Latino soldiers, namely Puerto Ricans, in fostering a collective ethos 
of dissent. 
Much of the scholarship about military race relations during the Vietnam War era 
coheres around one event—a single brutal incident that eventually spurred a 
Congressional investigation, a court-martial, and a host of institutional reforms. One 
evening in late summer 1969, during a series of racially motivated brawls at Marine 
Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, a white Marine was beaten to death by several minority 
soldiers in what came to be known as the “Rumble at Camp Lejeune.” Yet no historical 
accounts of the incident address the presence of and participation by numerous Puerto 
Rican GI’s, two of whom faced court-martial on charges of murder, rioting, and assault. 
To do so, is to recognize the ethno-racial complexity of the MACV-era military in ways 
heretofore unaddressed. It is also to contest the erasure of Latina/o experiences of racism 
during the war, historically subsumed under scholarship focusing on African-American 
wartime experiences. 
To understand why Camp Lejeune erupted in fatal violence requires 
understanding how precarious, complex, and entangled military race relations had 
become by late 1969. The mid-1960’s racial and class composition of the armed forces 
was the most diverse of its time, with the Vietnam War serving as the most racially 
                                                
70 Natalia Molina, How Race is Made in America: Immigration, Citizenship, and the Historical Power of 
Racial Scripts (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 2014), 3.  
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integrated conflict in US history. “For the first time in the nation’s military history,” Time 
Magazine boasted in a cover story from 1967, “its Negro fighting men are fully 
integrated in combat, fruitfully employed in positions of leadership.”71  That same year, 
journalist Frank McGee produced an hour-long documentary, Same Mud, Same Blood 
chronicling the month he spent embedded with the 101st Airborne division in the 
Republic of Vietnam.  Concentrating on experiences of African-American soldiers, Same 
Mud, Same Blood turned its lens towards an optimistic portrayal of racial integration.72 
Of race in wartime conditions, McGee highlighted one soldier’s response--“it doesn’t 
exist. We’re all soldiers. The only color we know is khaki and green, the color of the mud 
and the color of the blood is all the same”73	  By fall 1969, however, hundreds if not 
thousands of outbreaks of racial violence had become a consistent feature on military 
installations across the US and throughout Western Europe, Southeast Asia, Korea, and 
Canada threatening to rend the United States Armed Forces (USAF) in half. In response 
to the outbreaks of violence, the military initially settled on a “fact-finding” mission led 
by Robert Render, a top Pentagon official, tasked with investigating the causes of “racial 
hostility” within the Armed Forces. The “Render Report” (1970) remains an overlooked, 
but key document in understanding the complexity of military race relations during an 
intensely volatile moment in American military history. More importantly, it remains one 
of the few documents of the era articulating the concerns of  “Spanish-speaking” soldiers, 
revealing insights into explicit forms of discrimination facing Latina/o military personnel. 	  
                                                
71 “Democracy in the Foxhole,” Time, May 26, 1967.15. 
72 NBC Special Report, "Same Mud, Same Blood," NBC Universal, 1967, narrated by Frank McGee. 
73 (quoted in Westheider, Fighting in Vietnam, 186).   
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 In the pages that follow, I look at a constitutive moment in the history of the 
military, during which “revolution was in the air” for the diverse set of soldiers that came 
to comprise MACV-era forces.74 Drawing from scholar Laura Pulido’s work on the 
history of the Third World Left, I consider how distinct experiences of racialization led to 
resistance, mobilization, and opposition by these soldiers. Conversely, this chapter also 
concerns how the military responded to such actions, using bureaucratic mechanisms to 
contain, absorb, and assuage frustrations over race relations. Ultimately, such changes 
would foster the implementation of new apparatuses for racial discourse—a subject I will 
address in the following chapter. 
 
A RACIAL PROBLEM OF CONSIDERABLE MAGNITUDE”75:  THE “RUMBLE AT CAMP 
LEJEUNE”  
It should be said that today’s marines are not “all green.” There are white marines and 
black marines, and each has his identity.76 
 
The Area I Service Club had long been a hub of social life among enlisted 
members of the First Battalion, 2nd Marine Division stationed at Marine Corps Base, 
Camp Lejeune, N.C.77 Housed in a faded white cinder-block building that more closely 
                                                
74  Laura Pulido, Black, Brown, Yellow, and Left:  Radical Activism in Los Angeles (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2006) 19. 
75 House Committee on Armed Forces, “Inquiry into the Disturbances at Marine Corps Base, Camp 
Lejeune, N. C.”, on July 20, 1969, 91st Congress, 1st Session. 5055.	  
76 Ibid.  According to a long popular Marine slogan, “there are only Green Marines.”  
77  Built in 1941, the 110,000-acre garrison is situated along the coastal shoreline of southeastern North 
Carolina, several miles outside of Jacksonville. In late July 1969, the base housed four commands: Marine 
Corps Base (MCB); 2nd Marine Division; Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic; and the Marine Corps Air Station 




resembled a matchbox than Lejeune’s signature two-story Georgian style red-brick 
barracks, the club’s modest outward appearance signaled it as an enlisted men’s club 
[EM], or slop chute.78 Furnishings inside were utilitarian; a sea of mismatched swivel 
chairs and small, round Formica cocktail tables tidily fanning across a beer-soaked 
concrete floor. A motley assortment of vending machines, faded billiards tables, and 
magazine racks brushed against bare stucco walls. From the rear corner, an aging jukebox 
blaring country and soul music vied for space against a bar dishing out skinny ham 
sandwiches, pretzels, cigarettes, and 25-cent cans of watered down 3.2 beer, usually 
Hamm’s or Falstaff’s. Only a mammoth life-size poster of sultry starlet Raquel Welch, 
bikini-clad and lustfully pouting beside an empty beach added any embellishment. Dark, 
dank, and crowded, it shared little in common with the genteel atmosphere of most NCO 
and Officers’ (O) Clubs. Designed for social rendezvous, closed-door meetings, and 
hobnobbing between career officers such stately venues usually brandished a more 
dignified décor. The Paradise Point Officers’ Club aboard Lejeune boasted dark oak 
paneling, polished brass railings, plush carpets, leather sofas, etched glassware, and an 
impressively stocked bar of fine liquors, imported beer, and wine served alongside steaks 
with pommes frites. Other amenities included a golf course, swimming pool, and bowling 
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alley.79   
The service club’s interior set into sharp relief disparities between enlisted service 
members and the officer corps. Far from arbitrary, such distinctions in creature comforts-
-even as minor as alcohol selection—helped preserve a rigid military caste system long 
resented by enlistees and the subject of growing polarization within the Vietnam 
generation’s ranks. As the war progressed and casualty counts mounted to their highest 
numbers yet—over 500 a week-- discrepancies in treatment assumed greater meaning for 
those carrying its burden on less exalted shoulders.80 In particular, strict policies 
prohibiting socializing (“fraternization”) between officers, NCO’s, and enlistees had 
become especially irksome, and so well known, a 1973 episode of the popular television 
show M*A*S*H even addressed the subject. Expressing a commonly held sentiment 
among GI’s, a soldier identifying himself as “Ned from Na Trang” groused to Rolling 
Stone magazine, “Officers aren’t allowed to associate with us lowly, peon, scum bag 
EM’s--that’s ‘enlisted men’…what a fucking label.”81 However insistent military maxims 
were about the democracy of the uniform, the fact remained that rank dictated all aspects 
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of a GI’s life. Even what clubs one could enter. Where, how, and with whom soldiers 
casually mixed mattered and mattered greatly. For E-4’s and below, such regulations 
exacerbated their limited social status within a hierarchy already deeply bound by 
conventions of class, race, and region. Not surprisingly, NCO clubs became acute 
symbols of MACV-era class-based apartheid that separated officers--largely white, 
college educated, and drawn from middle and upper class strata from enlistees, hailing 
from lower and working-class backgrounds, and more often than not, racial minorities.82   
Conversely, for EM’s pulling liberty, ready to blow off steam, drown their 
sorrows, or otherwise break away from the tedium of base life, the Area I served up a 
pocket-sized paradise.  Nicknames replaced nametags, where a mostly adolescent cohort 
of 18-20yr olds could enact all of the rites and rituals of military fraternity vital to unit 
cohesion; indulging in alcohol (often to excess), playing card games, billiards or crap 
games, sharing jokes, or even performing crude renditions of Marine Corps hymnals. For 
some, it was slogging through boot camp, where drill instructors hurled epithets of, 
“wop”, “bean bag”, “morons, “spics”, “rednecks”, “niggers” and “faggots” at recruits 
with brutal indiscriminancy, that created a sense of “mutual degradation, a solidarity of 
the despised.”83 For others, it was inside the service club’s walls that “much of the esprit 
de corps was welded together.”84 But perhaps more significant than a reprieve from 
mundane daily rigors or promoting organizational unity, was the Area I’s role as a 
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palliative against the stress brought on by fears of deployment. By 1969, Lejeune had 
become “a virtual transient facility” with most Marines stationed there either just 
returning from tours of duty in Vietnam or scheduled shortly to be deployed. In 1967 
alone, the 2nd Marine Division endured a turnover rate of 128 percent.85  According to a 
1969 pamphlet entitled “The Racial Situation” written by Major General Edwin B. 
Wheeler, the former battalion commander, 67 percent of the 2nd Marine Division’s 
members had just returned from Vietnam—a rapid turnover, Wheeler believed, was a 
principal cause of racial tensions within the unit.86 
Not surprisingly, when the time arrived for a farewell party three days ahead of a 
scheduled three-month deployment to join the Sixth Fleet in Rota Spain, the 2nd Marine 
Division looked to the Area 1 for its last hurrah. On the evening of July 20, 1969, while a 
global audience of 528 million marveled at a live broadcast of American astronaut Neil 
Armstrong taking his first step on the moon, an interracial crowd of two hundred Marines 
spilled into the Area I just after 8pm. Settling in for a night of roistering, accompanied by 
female Marines (WAVES), black Marines congregated near the band, while white 
Marines scattered throughout the club. Despite rumors the previous evening that “there 
was going to be some sort of trouble” the mood among partygoers remained upbeat, if 
short-lived. Just before 11pm, an “extremely bloody” white Marine charged through the 
club’s front entrance, claiming an attack by a gang of black Marines. For the next forty 
minutes, two-dozen black and Puerto Rican soldiers armed with bricks, broken broom 
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handles, chains, and a clasp-knife roamed the Hadnot Point Area surrounding the club. 
Shouting “call us niggers now”, “White beasts” and “we’re going to mess up some beasts 
tonight,” slogans associated with black nationalism, the “marauding marines” clashed 
with a handful of white soldiers along a 1.5-mile stretch of heavily wooded tracks 75 
yards from the club. Walking home from a movie theater along those same “lines of 
drift” or paths between the barracks, 20-year old corporal Edward Bankston knew little of 
the melee unfolding ahead. Within minutes, a small group of 30-40 assailants swarmed 
Bankston, kicking, punching, and wrestling him to the ground. Seconds later, someone 
wielding a tree limb bashed Bankston’s head with it, severely fracturing his skull. 
Bankston died at the naval hospital in Portsmouth, VA one week later. Two other 
soldiers, Pfc. James S. Young and Corporal Joseph E. Damn sustained serious stab 
wounds, concussions, and lacerations, requiring hospitalization, with Young’s jaw wired 
shut. By dawn, dozens of soldiers, sporting swollen faces, black eyes, bloody noses, 
bruises, and busted lips limped back to the barracks, their bodies a visual testament that 
the much heralded esprit de corps had vanished.   
The “Rumble at Camp Lejeune” swiftly drew national headlines. Even for a 
public roiled by violence, accustomed to weekly casualty tolls, urban uprisings, youth 
revolts, and daily encounters with other forms of bloodshed, the young Marine’s death 
struck a nerve, likely propelled by a bitter irony: Bankston, a thrice-wounded Vietnam 
veteran, survived combat abroad only to be slain by fellow soldiers at home on American 
soil. Left the unenviable task of explaining how behavior among Marines, a branch 
popularly venerated for its discipline, rigor, camaraderie, and that “enjoyed a reputation 
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as the most ‘elite and rugged of the nation’s armed forces’ had so rapidly disintegrated, 
Lejeune spokesman Captain Lawrence J. LePage hastened to frame the melee as an 
isolated incident.87 During an early press conference, LePage tempered public fears 
claiming, “I think too many people were drinking too much and a big party got out of 
hand.”88 Early interpretations varied, but quickly settled on notions of masculine 
prerogative, binge drinking, and libidinal urges, underscored by an insidious racial 
subtext conjuring foreboding images of angry, radicalized men of color wielding 
weapons and threatening violence against innocent white victims. Citing an anonyms 
source, The New York Times reported fighting erupted after “a Negro marine attempted to 
cut in on a white sailor dancing with a white girl.”89 Subsequent stories alleged the “girl” 
was in fact African-American, but nonetheless faulted her refusal to dance “with the 
Negro marine” as precipitating the dance floor scuffle (and eventual rioting).90 And still 
others disputed the skirmish’s racial overtones altogether, with eyewitness citing “white 
faces” among assailants as proof the fracas had not skewed along racial lines.91 That 
night’s lethal feuding, they insisted, was a tragic consequence of too much booze 
exacerbated by pre-deployment jitters. And finally, according to one GI’s sardonic 
assessment, Bankston had merely been a “shit trick”—Marine Corps parlance for “wrong 
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place, wrong time.”92 Among the 44 African-American and Puerto Rican soldiers 
arrested and charged in the disturbance that night, their presence in the Marines Corps. 
might well have been the real “shit trick.”  
MARSHALING MANPOWER: RACIAL PATERNALISM & THE GREAT SOCIETY 
  Since 1964, when the Gulf of Tonkin resolution escalated US military 
involvement in South Vietnam, the multiracial complexity of the military expanded, 
largely owing to an increased reliance on conscription.93 As a vast body of social, 
political, and military scholarship documents, the draft carried racialized and class 
dimensions from its inception. Under the leadership of General Lewis B. Hershey, 
Director of the Selective Service System, educational, medical, and social categories 
allowing deferment largely privileged middle and upper class men. Those with access to 
lawyers, doctors, and counselors could successfully manipulate the system’s exemption 
policies with far greater ease than could their less economically advantaged peers.94 After 
conducting research into the operations of the draft in Wisconsin in 1966, sociologists 
James W. Davis and Kenneth M. Dolbear, offered a sobering analysis: “…men with the 
advantages of income and education do not experience service at the same rates as their 
less-advantaged contemporaries.”95 
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Of the reasons one could receive service exemptions, educational deferments 
played the most critical role in determining draft eligibility. Hershey’s 1965 “Channeling 
Memo” instructing draft boards to provide status deferments to college students and post 
graduates paid little heed to the poor state of public education available to racial 
minorities.  At a time when only 5% of eligible African-American men were in college 
and when roughly half of the Mexican-origin population lacked even an eighth grade 
education with less than 1% enrolled in institutions of high learning, military service was 
all but inevitable for poor and working-class youth of color.96 Drawing on the connection 
between limited educational opportunities for Mexican Americans and obligatory 
military service, California Representative Edward Roybal queried, “Is not the loss of 
one’s life too high tuition to pay for an education?”97  
Tens of thousands of racial minorities serving in the Armed Forces soon reflected 
the impact of these draft policies. Between 1965-69, the height of U.S. involvement in the 
war, African Americans constituted nearly 12.6 percent of fighting forces even though 
they remained only 11 percent of the US population. By 1970, Spanish-surnamed 
individuals comprised roughly 11 percent of active-duty service members, while U.S. 
Latina/os represented less than 10 percent of the US populace. Though less is known 
about how conscription directly affected American Indian and Alaskan Native 
populations, it is known that 1 out of every 4 eligible Native American men served in 
Vietnam, compared to the general population’s number of one in twelve. Put another 
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way, at a time when the US Native American population constituted no more than 0.6 
percent, they constituted 1.4 percent of all US troops sent to Southeast Asia.98  
As with statistics on Latina/o soldiers in World War II, it is difficult to know with 
certainty how many Latina/o service members died in Vietnam because they were 
classified as “Caucasian” on U.S. death and casualty lists. According to Ruben Treviso, a 
Viet Nam war veteran, one in every five “Hispanics” was killed in action while one of 
every two served in a combat unit.99  In an early 1971 article, "Mexican American 
Casualties in Vietnam," Ralph Guzmán cited compelling evidence that Mexican 
American military personnel had very high death rates during the war in Southeast Asia. 
Guzman analyzed casualty reports from January 1961 to February 1967 and from 
December 1967 to March 1969, indicating that a high percentage of young men with 
Spanish surnames were being killed. According to other reports, Mexican Americans 
accounted for approximately 20 percent of U.S. casualties, although they made up less 
than 10 percent of the country's population at the time.100 Likewise, although Puerto Rico 
ranked nearly twenty-sixth in population among the U.S. fifty states, it ranked fourteenth 
in casualties and fourth in direct combat deaths during the Viet Nam era.101 
Compulsory service category exemptions were not the only factor determining the 
racial constituency of the Vietnam era military. As historians James Westheider, 
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Kimberley Phillips, and Christian Appy contend, the uneven racial composition of local 
draft boards heavily influenced the racial makeup of the MACV-era armed services. 
According to the 1966 presidential commission study, “In Pursuit of Equity: Who Serves 
when Not all Serve?” an October questionnaire revealed that of 16,632 local draft board 
members, 96.3 percent were white; 1.3 percent “Negro”; 0.8 percent Puerto Rican; 0.7 
percent “Spanish American”; 0.2 “Oriental” and 0.1 percent American Indian.102 As of 
1967, African-Americans constituted only 1% of nearly 4,000 local draft boards, even 
though African-Americans constituted roughly 13.4% of US draft calls. Furthermore, 
there were no black board members in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and South Carolina-states with significant African-American populations.103 
In 1968, veteran Mexican American civil rights activist and American GI Forum founder 
Hector P. Garcia penned a letter directly to President Lyndon Johnson, pointing out that 
in the Rio Grande Valley counties of Texas, where Mexican Americans constituted more 
than 50% of the population, not a single Mexican-American was represented on local 
draft boards.104 
Thus, the “little groups of neighbors” as local draft boards were colloquially 
referred to, were anything but. Comprised primarily of older, white military veterans, 
they held at their discretion the fates of hundreds of thousands of 18-26 year old men in 
whom they saw little potential, save for their ability to fill boots on the ground in the 
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distant jungles of Southeast Asia. For Julian Camacho, a Mexican American engineer 
from Salinas, CA and member of Santa Cruz County Draft Board #59, the draft’s 
inequitable allocations were soon too much to bear. Camacho publicly resigned in an act 
of protest not long after his appointment:  
“I saw the streams of the sons of clergy and business people and it was just 
unbelievable, that what I thought and what I’d read in papers was true. We were 
sending the children of the working families to die in the war. And the children of 
the privileged were being saved from that by this induction system. Well that 
upset me a lot.”105 
 
The same uneven processes of racialization underwriting the Selective Service 
System were more directly manifest in “Project 100,000” (POHT)—a controversial 
Department of Defense initiative intended to meet rising manpower needs by providing 
remedial training to recruits unable to pass the military’s physical requirements or the 
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT).106 In August 1966 Secretary of Defense 
William McNamara announced plans for the program, which aimed to enlist or induct 
40,000 men by June 1966, with a goal set of 100,000 men per year after that.  During his 
inaugural speech announcing POHT, McNamara touted the potential for inculcating self-
respect amongst America’s “subterranean poor” alluding to the program’s promise of 
curing the “idleness, ignorance, and apathy” marking their lives.107 Motivated by the 
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idealism of the Johnson administration’s Great Society Program and under the rubric of 
the “War on Poverty,” McNamara insisted that young men of color could be “salvaged”: 
 “These young men can be rehabilitated…both inwardly and out. They are men, 
we concluded, who, placed in an atmosphere of high motivation and morale, 
could be transformed into competent military personnel.  Many are poorly 
motivated when they reach us. They lack initiative. They lack pride. They lack 
ambition.108 
While McNamara’s original announcement did not specifically mention issues facing 
black Americans, it nonetheless echoed the language of the Moynihan Report rhetorically 
correlating “uplift” with “jobs” for black men vis-a-vis military service. Meanwhile, as 
legal scholar Lisa Hsaio observes, “the domestic policy of helping underprivileged blacks 
provided the troops necessary to carry out America’s foreign policy in Vietnam”109 
Described as “New Standards Men” (NSM), McNamara made four promises regarding 
his experimental program, assuring the public: new recruits would receive the same basic 
training as regular soldiers; would become trained in skills for useful military occupations 
(MOS); would acquire “discipline” through exposure to the military system; and would 
receive veterans benefits after time served within the Armed Forces. Whatever 
McNamara’s noble intentions, the racial paternalism of the program was clear: almost 
40% of NSM’s were African American. And most were drawn from abject poverty, as 
nearly one-third of recruits earned less than $60 a week. Poorly educated, most NSM’s 
were barely able to read at a sixth-grade level and nearly 53% had not completed high 
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school. Regionally, almost half (47.6%) came from the American South.110 From 1965 to 
1971, nearly 400,000 NSM’s were drafted into the military under POHT, with 38,000 
NSM soldiers drafted into the US Marine Corps alone.111  According to a 1970 DoD 
study, roughly one half of the 400,000 men inducted under POHT were sent to Vietnam, 
with a death rate twice as high as American forces in Vietnam—underwritten by the fact 
that forty percent were trained for combat, as compared to twenty-five percent for all 
enlisted men.112  Given that the military did not keep separate statistics on Latina/o 
service members, its difficult to know with accuracy how many entered service under 
POHT. However, according to the 1966 study In Pursuit of Equity data on men 
previously rejected by the services for failure to meet “mental” requirements (some 90% 
of POHT inductees) revealed that the largest percentage came from Puerto Rico, with a 
disproportionate percentage hailing from South Texas and other southern states. 
According to Jorge Mariscal, “many men whose first language was Spanish did not score 
well on the military qualification test, which placed them in the ranks of the new 
standards men.”113  
  Shortly after the Tet Offensive in January 1968, draft calls again rose, climbing 
steadily from 23,000 in February to 41,000 in March and finally to 48,000 in April—the 
largest draft calls since October 1966.114 With every summons, came new and an ever 
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more expansive presence of racial minorities. From American Indian urban enclaves in 
Chicago and Denver to Mexican American barrios in East Los Angeles or Southside San 
Antonio, to the countryside and urban centers of Puerto Rico, young men of color, many 
neocolonial subjects, came to labor within the MACV-era military as never before. In so 
doing, these young soldiers of color limned the boundaries between foreign and domestic, 
discomforting reminders of the asymmetries of power, empire, and modernity shaping 
America’s military system.  
MILITARISM AND THE “TENTACLES” OF US EMPIRE   
American studies scholars and post-colonial theorists alike contend that US 
imperialism operates discursively, through “seemingly benign forms of power that 
mobilize racialized and gendered notions of benevolence, protection, and uplift” 
alongside deploying more overt, coercive forms of state power.115 As Amy Kaplan, 
William Appleman Williams, Laura Wexler, and Matthew Frye Jacobsen have 
demonstrated, throughout the course of the late 19th and 20th centuries, US global empire 
has been maintained, expanded, and reliant upon a diverse range of practices merging 
together both direct apparatuses of state power (military intervention, settler-colonialism) 
with ideological narratives foregrounding US democracy, virtue, and compassion.116 At 
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the heart of American empire then reside discursive contradictions that work by 
disavowing and/or rendering absent the violent genealogies of US colonialism that 
brought constituents from Latin America, Africa, and Asia under US domain.  
Even as the US waged its war in Vietnam under a pretense of anti-colonial 
liberation, it nonetheless did so while replicating its own forms of colonial power. In 
many regards, the MACV-era military operated as a neocolonial formation, dependent 
upon and constituted through its use of foreign soldiers. As Simeon Man’s work 
illustrates, the MACV-era military directly utilized South Korean, Philippine, and 
Taiwanese nationals in its efforts to materially and ideologically consolidate US military 
presence throughout the Asia Pacific Rim.117  But the presence of “foreign” soldiers alone 
does not tell the whole story of America’s neocolonial military enterprise. Conscription, a 
coercive form of state power, inextricably linked American soldiers of color to their 
neocolonial counterparts originating from the American territories of Guam, Puerto Rico, 
American Samoa, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Canal Zone.118  
In so far as both neocolonial inhabitants and racial minorities alike existed on the 
periphery of the nation-state, geographically, culturally, socially, and economically 
tangential to the mainstream American polity, conscription served dual purposes. First, it 
delivered its primary role of ensuring the state could obtain sufficient manpower at a 
moment when that endeavor was in jeopardy. Second, and more importantly, conscription 
                                                                                                                                            
University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Matthew Frye Jacbosen, Barbarian Virtues: The United States 
Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876-1917 (New York, NY: Hill & Wang, 2001).  
117 Simeon Man, "Conscripts of Empire: Race and Soldiering in the Decolonizing Pacific" (PhD diss., Yale 
University, 2012). 
118 Soldiers from these territories were both drafted and/or volunteered. Appy, Working-Class War: 
American Combat, 15. 
 53 
ideologically levied heterogeneous groups—African-Americans, Latina/os, Chamorros, 
Samoans, etc—into a presumed horizontal standing within the nation.  
The case of Herminio Soto-Ramirez, one of the thousands of young men drafted 
in 1969 alone is suggestive. A native of Guaydia, a small neighborhood in Guyanilla, a 
southern municipality in Puerto Rico, Soto was a 22-year old college student at the 
Catholic University of Puerto Rico in Ponce, and a promising baseball player when he 
learned he would be shipped out to war in November 1969. In his memoir, Vietnam: La 
Terrible Verdad, Soto recounts how the draft impacted he and his friends: 
Recordaba con la tristeza, ahora rodeado de todos su amigos íntimos en un 
piedra cubierta de limo en mitad del rio, cuando en un salón replete de soldados 
en las temperaturas heladas de Fort Dix, como un sargento pronunciaba 
sarcásticamente el nombre de un compañero soldado e, inmediamente, como 
embargado  por un maléfico y morboso rancor, leía y volvía a señalar la odiada 
palabra….ordenes para Viet-Nam. Aquel día melancólico muchos de los 
compañeros soldados lloraron de rabia y dolor. Durante todo el período de 
entrenamiento, solamente pronunciaban la palabra maléfica de matar a 
Charlie.119 
I remember with sadness the moment I was sitting with my closest friends as we 
sat near a rock by the river, listening to our friend describe a packed room of 
freezing soldiers at Fort Dix, NJ and how a Sargent, sarcastically pronounced his 
name and then overcome by a malicious and morbid hatred, he would read and 
then signal the hated words, “Ordered to Vietnam.” That sad day, a lot of my 
friends would cry from rage, pain and sadness. All throughout their training, all 
they heard pronounced and screamed was the horrible phrase, “Kill Charlie!” 
El Servicio Militar Obligatorio, extendió sus tentáculos múltiples para desunirlos 
para siempre. Los muchachos de la Barriada Guaydia estarían siendo enlistados 
den el ejercito norteamericano, enviados a servir a lugares remotos por todo el 
mundo. Vidas jóvenes que a edad temprana vieron marchitarse sus ilusiones y 
esperanzas, por el capricho empecinado de un selecto grupo de personas; que 
escogieron para servir en Las Fuerzas Armadas; a los menos privilegiados 
económicamente.  
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The draft extended its multiple tentacles into us, separating us forever. The kids of 
Guaydia, they would be enlisted in the US Army, sent to serve in remote places 
all over the world. Young lives that at a very young age saw their desires and 
hopes squashed by the determined resolve of a select group of people; that 
selected the poorest of the poor to serve in their Armed Forces.120  
Obligated to fight for a nation whose elections he did not even possess the right to vote in 
despite US citizenship, Soto-Ramirez’s account elegantly documents the hegemony of 
US colonial governance over Puerto Rico and other “unincorporated territories.” 
Metaphorically likening the draft to “tentacles,” from whose grip he and his friends 
cannot escape, they are violently separated by the penetrating forces of US 
governmentality. As a Puerto Rican, Soto-Ramirez voices the conflict of identity 
experienced by thousands of Puerto Rican soldiers, but also shared by other soldiers of 
Latina/o descent. On the one hand, their citizenship transforms, compels, and marshals 
their bodies into soldiers for the US security State, obliging them to perpetrate violence 
against other neocolonial subjects—Vietnamese soldiers, abstracted through military 
phonetics into the dehumanizing racial slur, “Charlie.” On the other, their identity lay 
imbricated within national, regional, and culturally specific frames, forging for some, an 
oppositional consciousness to both military service and perhaps their own national 
identity.  
Drawn from diverse geographic regions, ethnic backgrounds, and language 
capabilities, Latina/o soldiers found themselves bracketed within a military racial 
hierarchy polarized along black-white lines. “The Whites, even the white supervisors 
were degrading the blacks and Chicanos,” recalls Ricardo, a Vietnam veteran. “You had 
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hard core white people in there that wanted to fight. They came from the South, and some 
blacks came from Alabama or Louisiana and they hated whites. They had been 
segregated back home and here they had to live together in this confined area.”121 Writing 
in a diary entry that was later published in LOOK magazine, 22-year old David Parks, the 
son of distinguished African-American photographer, writer, and activist Gordon Parks, 
highlighted parallel conditions of mistreatment shared by African-American and Puerto 
Rican soldiers. In Park’s estimation, soldiers of color were disproportionately chosen to 
be Forward Observers (FO’s), a dangerous combat assignment, by white officers and 
non-coms. “So far, it seems to me he (“Sgt. Paulson”) fingered only Negroes and Puerto 
Ricans. It’s a bitch. If only the souls (Negroes) and Puerto Ricans could tell the world 
what really happens to them in this man’s army.”122 
Marines assigned to Camp Lejeune throughout the spring and summer of 1969 
entered an especially corrosive milieu enveloped by Southern racial politics. As one 
young African American Army private from Newark, NJ remarked, “Look, we’re down 
South and they treat us [blacks] like we’re down South.”123 According to an April 1969 
report by the “Ad Hoc Committee on Equal Treatment and Opportunity,” an informal 
body established to document Camp Lejeune’s race relations problems, seething black-
white tensions threatened to boil over into “an explosive situation of major 
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proportions.”124  From January to August 1969, seven months prior to Bankston’s death, 
there had been 155 reported assaults, with the majority (136) involving African-American 
soldiers attacking white soldiers during muggings, robberies, and individual skirmishes, 
usually just after payday.125  One local newspaper described the atmosphere as so tinged 
with violence, the camp was “bathed in buckets of blood” from altercations between 
white and black GI’s. But if “violence is the language of the unheard” then such 
encounters, usually spontaneous, were not motivated by avarice alone. Rather, these 
outbursts resulted from long-held grievances of abuse, neglect, and systematic 
discrimination endured by African-American and minority soldiers, whose complaints, 
according to one non-commissioned officer “fell on deaf ears.”126  
Many white soldiers, themselves Southerners, openly resented newly adopted 
expressions of black pride by African-American GI’s. Emboldened by the Black Power 
movement then at its apex and inspired by charismatic leaders like Malcolm X, Amiri 
Baraka, and boxer Muhammad Ali, with rising frequency black soldiers embraced their 
African cultural roots. Stylistically, many began donning black beads, black gloves, 
“slave bracelets,” Afro hairstyles, and brandishing the Pan-African flag. Others employed 
the "dap," an elaborate handshake exchanged only with other black soldiers as a 
statement of brotherhood.127 Among white soldiers, minority soldiers appeared to be 
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advocating insubordination, or otherwise, demanding “preferential treatment” 
propagating their racial identity over the military’s insistence on interracial comity. Many 
whites viewed such actions as a pretense to harass, persecute, or otherwise mistreat their 
African-American and minority counterparts.  
Throughout military bases in the US South, but particularly at Camp Lejeune, 
racial slurs, taunts, and epithets were regularly hurled at non-whites, with KKK graffiti 
and Confederate Flags a common sight scrawled on buildings, latrines, and in barracks. 
As one young Latina/o soldier stated, "We all have name tapes on our uniforms. Yet we 
find people calling us 'Hey, you,' 'boy' or 'Jose.' Let them read the name and use it. We're 
men and want to be treated accordingly.”128 Meanwhile, older white Marines considered 
the Black Power salute of a clenched fist an egregious affront, symbolizing a direct 
challenge to authority; an endorsement of defiant behavior incommensurate with USMC 
values. For example, while he may have considered himself a sympathetic ally to African 
American soldiers, Major General Michael P. Ryan, Commander of the 2nd Marine 
Division, nonetheless reminded a local reporter, “if they play the National Anthem and 
someone puts his fist up in the air, I’ll put that man in jail.”129  
For ethno-racial minorities like Latina/os, traversing the complicated racial 
antagonisms between African Americans and whites required a careful negotiation of the 
color line. Sometimes, this meant avoiding interracial conflicts altogether. Recalls Tanis, 
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a Chicano Vietnam veteran, “The Mexicanos generally stayed out of the fights. Our 
attitude was, “Que se den en la madre los dos,’ we aint’ going to get involved. That’s 
their pleito [fight].”130 Other times, it meant deploying what historian Frank Guridy 
theorizes as “racial knowledge”-- the manner by which individuals draw on a personal 
archive of knowledge developed from everyday interactions of racial significance culled 
from “practices, acts, styles, images, etc.”131 According to Guridy, individuals employ 
racial knowledge when they survey their physical surroundings to make informed 
judgments about race and the racial climate they inhabit. In a telling example, several 
Mexican American marines newly arrived at Camp Lejuene in October 1969 reported on 
their strategy for navigating black-white tensions at the camp: “One white boy asked if I 
was Puerto Rican, but I told him I was Mexican so he didn’t do anything. I never go out 
anywhere though. I just stay with my unit.”132 Fresh from boot camp, the new recruit 
immediately recognized the value of claiming his Mexican identity, socially construed as 
a form of whiteness over and against solidarity with Puerto Ricans. Such a tactic also 
speaks to historian Molina’s insistence on understanding race and racial formation 
relationally. Though ethnic Mexicans in the US faced overt and institutionalized 
discrimination, legally and in this instance, relationally, whiteness prevailed in the black-
white dichotomy of the US South. And certainly to the sensibilities of the “white boy” 
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interrogating the new arrivals, Mexicans were simply “ethnic whites,” not potential 
troublemakers like their more supposedly politicized counterparts, Afro-Puerto Rican 
soldiers. However, on other occasions, Mexican identity presumed a relational scale to 
blackness. Of his penchant for listening to rolas mexicanas, traditional Mexican folk 
music, one Chicano soldier recalled, “In North Carolina, they used to call us [Mexicans] 
‘long-haired niggers.’ That’s the first time I ever heard anything like that, and so that 
racism made me take refuge in something that was familiar.”133 
According to Westheider, “the conditions at Camp Lejeune that led to violence 
were typical of the racial climate that existed throughout the military establishment.”134  
That is, pressures to navigate black-white tensions could be intense, even lethal and not 
exclusive to Lejeune. The case of Carlos Hernandez Rodriguez is telling. Rodriguez, an 
18-year old Army private faced court-martial on charges of attempted murder after an 
altercation with a fellow GI and alleged Ku Klux Klan (KKK) member in June 1970. 
Writing to his friend, Pvt. John Van Hook, Rodriguez recounted how the suspected KKK 
member threatened him, noting: “He belonged to the KKK and said he was trying to use 
me. He called me a nigger lover and all that. He even painted on my bed sheets this 
quote, ‘Nigger lover, stay away from them or you will be next, signed KKK’.”135  Such 
incidents emblematize the bigotry facing Puerto Ricans like Pvt. Raymond A. Rivera, 19 
and Cpl. Carmen Nunez, 23, two of the five soldiers court-martialed in Bankston’s death. 
Hailing from San Sebastian, Puerto Rico—a city boastful of its heritage as home to the 
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first Puerto Rican soldier drafted under the 1917 Jones-Shafroth Act--it is unclear if 
either were drafted, though their chronological timeline at Lejeune coincides with draft 
calls made by the USMC between 1967 and 1969.136  
THE BLOOD TAX: CONSCRIPTION, NEOCOLONIALISM, AND THE CASE OF PUERTO 
RICAN GI’S 
I was sent to Vietnam to do what good colonized people do: protect the economic, 
military, and political interests of the colonizer.-Oscar Lopez Rivera137 
 
Nunez and Rivera represented nearly 27,000 Puerto Rican youths from the island 
who were inducted into service by July 1970; 22,000 of whom were drafted and 5,000 of 
which had volunteered since 1964.138 Boasting of the morale of Puerto Rican troops, 
island Governor Luis A. Ferré noted they were less likely to engage in acts of civil 
disruption, and the biggest challenges they faced were simple cultural ones. Their only 
problems, the governor declared, were, “the rarity of native foods like pastelas (pork and 
squash wrapped in banana leaves) and ‘mondongo’ (tripe, pumpkin, potatoes and bananas 
stewed in tomato sauce) the scarcity of Puerto Rican flags in service centers, and the 
difficulty in understanding English.”139 But the issue of conscription on the island was far 
more complex and contested than Ferre conceded. Well before Puerto Rican young men 
entered into the MACV-era military, the “blood tax” or imposition of the draft had been a 
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politicized issue for decades and cause for denunciation of the island’s Commonwealth 
status.140  
The history of Puerto Rico’s modern colonial period began in 1898, when the 
United States garnered possession of the island following its short, bloody and “splendid 
little war” with Spain.  At the close of the century, Guam, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the 
Philippines were all that remained of the once powerful Spanish empire, which had 
variously ruled its insular colonies for four hundred years. In 1898, following decades of 
Cuban political unrest and armed insurrections, the US entered into conflict with Spain 
under the pretense of “freeing” Cubans from the tyranny of Spanish control, claiming it 
would usher in modern civilization and republican governance. The battle between the 
US and Spain lasted little more than four months, until the US declared victory in 
December 1898, though its military occupation of Puerto Rico had begun four months 
earlier. With the signing of the Treaty of Paris, the US procured these nations, but in the 
decades that followed both the Philippines and Cuba achieved their independence from 
the US. Puerto Rico (and Guam), however, remained in US possession as unincorporated 
territories, delineated as neither fully domestic nor completely foreign. That US 
sovereignty now extended beyond its continental borders gave rise to spurious 
Congressional debates about the racial fitness of colonial “alien races” that would unfold 
for several more years as politicians, policy-makers, and such high-profile statesmen as 
Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Samuel Gompers deliberated on whether 
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or not the “constitution followed the flag.” Proponents, like US Representative Sereno 
Payne (R-NY) described Puerto Rico’s inhabitants as “generally full-blooded white 
people” and thus, suitably qualified for citizenship.141 On the other hand, opponents, 
alluding to Puerto Rican mixed race identity and presence of African blood, claimed they 
were “inferior offspring of an already mid-level race.”142Attempting to resolve the 
anomalous political status of Puerto Rican nationals, Congress passed the Jones Act in 
1917, granting statutory citizenship to the island’s residents.143 Yet this provisional form 
of citizenship did not grant rights equivalent to that of US citizens, though it did enable 
Puerto Ricans to move without restriction between the island and mainland; created a 
system of government for which residents could elect their own legislature (though the 
US president retained the right to appoint a governor); and allowed Puerto Ricans 
exemption from paying federal income taxes, yet also denied them the right to vote in 
federal elections.  
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Notions of sacrifice, expendability, and loss, informed by this colonial history, 
directly catalyzed anti-war efforts anew by island youth, beginning in May 1965 when 
22-year old Sixto Rodriguez refused to swear allegiance to the U.S. flag after receiving 
his induction notice. Hundreds of island youth followed suit, registering their opposition 
to conscription by refusing induction, staging street protests, and even setting fire to the 
ROTC building at the University of Puerto Rico (UPR). According to Juan Garcia 
Pasalaequa, a former clerical aide to the governor and vocal draft opponent, the draft 
violated the rights of Puerto Ricans:  
“It is not due process, it is not equal protection, it is not true justice that the 
1949 Compulsory Military Training Act applies to Puerto Rico when our 
residents don’t take part in the election of Members of Congress nor the 
President and have no voting representative in Congress. The drafting is 
unjust.”144   
Both on and off the island, citizenship remained a deeply contested issue, splitting along 
geographic lines with island independentistas launching anti-draft initiatives rooted in 
notions of island nationality, voting rights, and desires for statehood, against mainland 
Puerto Ricans laying claim to rights abrogated by poverty, urban dislocation, and police 
brutality.145 Dennis Mora, one of three soldiers [“Fort Hood Three”] who refused to go to 
Vietnam as conscientious objectors in 1966, aptly summated this latter position: 
“As a Puerto Rican, the first war I knew was against the poverty of Spanish 
Harlem…I went to school where teachers counseled Puerto Ricans to forget their 
plans for higher education because they were Puerto Rican and therefore somehow 
inferior. The first uniform I knew was the cop on the corner. He was there to let you 
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know that you could only look at the clean world outside as a prisoner looks from 
his cell.”146 
 
That same year, five Puerto Rican youth from Washington D.C. launched a hunger strike 
protesting the draft. Setting up camp on a sidewalk across from the national Mall, they 
carried placards calling for an end to compulsory military service on the grounds that 
Puerto Ricans lacked representation in Congress. Read one picket sign, “End the blood 
tribute of our youth into the armed forces.”147  
The asymmetrical terms of citizenship, nationality, and belonging experienced by 
Chicanos and Puerto Ricans were more literally experienced by other Latina/os service-
members. Puerto Rican Frank Esquillin recalls being en route to basic training in Fort 
Benning, Georgia and encountering young men from Panama and the Dominican 
Republic. These young men disclosed to Esquillin, that according to their recruiters, they 
would become U.S. citizens if they joined the Army. As Esquillin recalls, “What they 
weren’t told was that they had to spend six years in the military….Sometimes I wonder 
how many guys died thinking they were citizens.”148  In April 1967, the death of 23-year 
old Peruvian draftee Eduardo Pablo Branes, highlighted the role of non-citizen soldiers 
serving in the MACV-era military. Branes’s death followed the casualties of three other 
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Peruvian immigrants and one Chilean immigrant, spurring proposed legislation by 
Peruvian government authorities against conscription of Latin American nationals.149  
 
“ESTÁS AQUÍ, YA NO ESTÁS ALLÁ”150: PROVISIONAL LATINIDAD IN THE CONTACT 
ZONES OF WAR 
Whether through conscription or voluntary enlistment, the MACV-era force 
brought together a constellation of Latina/o diasporic subjects representing distinct 
national-origins, regions, class backgrounds, racial identities, and cultural specificities. In 
the theater of war, an erratic space where different rules structured daily life, where 
friendships emerged among individuals not otherwise likely to have crossed paths, 
encounters between different national-origin Latina/os engendered possibilities for 
Latinidad, or a shared sense of Latino identity. In making this assertion, I draw from 
Frances Aparicio’s concept of interlatino sites, or “those sites where two or more Latinos 
from various national origins encounter, construct, and transculturate each other.”151  
The case of German Abadia-Olmeda, an Afro-Puerto Rican, illustrates the 
complexity of Latina/o subjectivity in Vietnam. Abadia-Olmeda, a native of Farjardo, 
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Puerto Rico was just 18 when he received his draft notice in the fall of 1967.152 Upon 
being summoned, Abadia-Olmeda believed he should “go into hiding” noting “he did not 
understand why he needed to go fight a war in Vietnam, one that he had no knowledge 
of.”153 After reporting to service on January 1st, Abadia-Olmeda arrived at Fort Jackson, 
South Carolina for basic training and was assigned to Charlie Company, Fifth Battalion, 
First Brigade.  With little knowledge of English, Abadia-Olmeda felt humiliated by 
American officials who mockingly repeated “no comprende?” to him “over and over 
again” when he was unsure of what they were saying—to him, “it felt like it was said out 
of malice.”154  Likewise, Abadia-Olmeda recalled the “constant division between whites 
and the rest” observing “he remembered feeling racism throughout the entire time he 
served.”155 As an Afro-Latino monolingual Spanish-speaker, Abadia-Olmeda 
encountered dual marginalization, differentiated and “Othered” because of both his 
language and racial identity. 
Abadia-Olmeda’s frustrating experience with linguistic racism corresponded with 
that of other Latina/os’. Writing home to his family, Mexican-American Army Private 
Adalberto Correa criticized his superior officers’ claiming, “Instead of helping me, they 
laughed at me and said that I was stupid. After that, they made me a cook.”156 Correa’s 
experience was hardly unique. Referring to fellow soldiers’, a Puerto Rican Vietnam 
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veteran recalled, “They just continually made snag comments, snag remarks. They’ll 
mimic you when they speak. They tried to speak like ’heymenospeakanoenglish’ with an 
accent or, try to make one up or say something about back home, or just make reference 
to Latinos being slow or lazy or stuff like that.”157  For Puerto Rican Marcelino Garcia, 
Spanish became not only a marker of identity, but also punitive retribution. Despite the 
fact that he spoke no English, Garcia claimed his superior officer refused to let him speak 
Spanish and when he refused to comply, entered into a physical confrontation with a 
sergeant that very nearly resulted in a court martial.158   
While conversing in Spanish might elicit insult, harassment, or formal reprimand, 
paradoxically it could also became a source of cultural affirmation; a means of producing 
an alternative ethno-cultural based affinity marking membership among and fortifying 
social relations between diverse national-origin Latina/os. According to oral histories 
conducted by Lea Ybarra with Chicano Vietnam veterans, a substantial number reported 
speaking Spanish among themselves and with other Latina/os. Remarking on his close 
friendship with two fellow Latinos--Rey Martinez, a Chicano and Freddy Hernandez, a 
Cuban-American--Mexican-American veteran Rudy Lopez recalls, “Rey and I palled 
around together because we were Chicanos….It was great speaking Spanish with another 
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guy.”159 For Lopez and others, Spanish provided an idiom of comfort, mutual 
recognition, and familiarity enabling a strengthening of bonds between Chicanos and 
other Latina/os hailing from different geographic areas. Miguel “El Mayque” Lemus, 
who served with the 25th Infantry in Vietnam from 1967 to 1968, remembers: “When I 
got to Viet Nam, they made a platoon of all the Chicanos there—all grunts. Órale, aquí 
estábamos hablando español y la chingada. Most of the platoon was from Arizona, New 
Mexico, Texas, and California. I met a lot of Raza overseas.”160 
By speaking Spanish, a verbal expression of their ethnic identity, Latina/o soldiers 
practiced a form of cultural citizenship—“a broad range of activities of everyday life 
through which Latinos and other groups claim space in society and eventually rights.”161 
Just as African-American soldiers professed cultural pride and fraternity through 
“dapping,” Latina/o soldiers could employ Spanish to reconstitute a sense of community 
and shared belonging, creating spaces of intimacy, kinship, and ethnic consciousness that 
equipped them with an affective safeguard under the fraught circumstances of war and 
broader racism of U.S. military culture. Of his “all Chicano unit” Lemus observes, “We 
got along well…We had to protect each other  ‘cause no one was going to protect us.”162  
Yet it would be false to presume that Spanish unilaterally contributed to a sense of 
pan-Latino identity formation and cohesion. While Spanish could and often did 
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successfully cultivate social interactions, exchange, and camaraderie among diverse 
national-origin Latina/os, it could just as likely precipitate intra-Latina/o divisions. The 
materialization of US-based ethnic nationalist movements embodied by groups like the 
Young Lords, a Puerto Rican revolutionary nationalist group or the Chicano-oriented 
Crusade for Justice, both of whom adopted anti-war platforms based on shared histories 
of US colonialism and conquest respectively, made apparent that many Latina/os 
privileged their national-origins and distinct cultural identities above expressions of pan-
ethnic Latina/o solidarity. Describing a physical confrontation with another Latina/o 
soldier, veteran Miguel “Rhino” Gastelo, a Mexican-American from Corcoran, California 
serving as an infantryman with the US Army’s Americal Division [Company B, 3rd 
Battalion, 196th Light Infantry Brigade] recalls: 
It was a little unusual because the Chicanos and Puerto Ricans would stick 
together. At times, the Puerto Ricans had some hassles with the negroes, and the 
Chicanos would back the Puerto Ricans. There were a lot of Puerto Ricans, about 
seven of them, and three Chicanos. And you know, Puerto Ricans speak Spanish a 
little differently than Chicanos do. Well, this one Puerto Rican dude who was 
drunk began to tell me that Chicanos didn’t speak Spanish right; in other words, he 
was telling me that they were superior to us. That’s when I told him he was sick 
from his culo.”163 
 
Gastelo and his adversary continued trading insults, until Gastelo terminated the skirmish 
by stabbing his opponent in the hand with a small knife and then exiting. This anecdote is 
striking in two registers. For on one hand, Gastelo invokes a shared Latino identity, 
evinced by his assertion “the Chicanos and Puerto Ricans would stick together.” In 
Gastelo’s framing, each group retains their autonomous appellations (“Chicanos” and 
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“Puerto Ricans”), but practice horizontal affinity (ie “stick together”) and are sufficiently 
linked enough culturally so that when “Puerto Ricans had hassles with negroes” Chicanos 
physically or ideologically supported their Puerto Rican brethren. On the other hand, this 
provisional Latinidad remains ambivalent, fractured by the retention of discrete national-
origin designations (“Puerto Rican” and “Chicano”) and contestations over Spanish 
language proficiency, a mode by which one group asserted cultural authenticity, 
disjuncture from, or “superiority” over others.164 
 As Latinos, both Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans “occupy racialized 
locations in an intermediary space between white and Black”—a reality significantly 
responsible for intra-Latino racialized distinctions and often enough, racial bigotry.165 
The racial ambiguity of Afro-Puerto Ricans, could be cause for intra-Latino tensions with 
Chicanos. “I couldn’t get along with the Puerto Ricans,” recalls Chicano Vietnam veteran 
Diego “Blind” Garcia. “I got in several fights with them. I had a mayate (Black) friend 
that used to call them imitation Chicanos and mayates. He used to call them that because 
he thought they were funny. He didn’t think they knew whether to be black or brown. 
‘Somebody fucked up when they made them,’ he would say. I had a problem with the 
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Puerto Ricans. I’d call them putos (fag), and they’d call me coño (pussy).”166 Implicit to 
Garcia’s narrative is his sentiment, like that of his African-American colleague, that 
Puerto Ricans were neither “black or brown.” That is, neither African-American or 
Latina/o. The vulgar misogynistic epithets (“puto” and “coño”) Garcia traded with his 
Puerto Rican opponents illustrates an intense level of mutual disdain that I would argue 
gestures towards anxiety over intralatino subjectivity produced from the geophysical 
displacement of both groups in Vietnam. 
THE RANDALL REPORT 
Structurally and socially, racism pervaded all levels of the military, from who 
received promotions to who endured epithets, insults, and demeaning treatment. Yet 
much of this fact was lost on the military establishment. One month after the Camp 
Lejeune Brawl, Hon. L. Mendel Rivers, chairman of the House Committee on Armed 
Services, appointed a Special Subcommittee to Probe Disturbances on Military Bases, 
ordering members “to determine the root causes of such conduct, the extent to which 
such acts have occurred on military installations, and what measures are being taken to 
stop such behavior.”167  Under the direction of Representative William J. Randall (D-
MO) the twelve-page report outlined nine initial points, noting first “the racial problem 
existing at Camp Lejeune is a reflection of the Nation’s racial problem” before making a 
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second assertion that “the average young black marine has racial pride, drive for identity, 
and sensitivity to discrimination characteristic of the young black in the United States.”168 
In a three-page “Background” section committee members highlighted the military’s 
historic 1948 desegregation of the armed forces, declaring, “there is no question that the 
military services have long been in the vanguard of integration of the races.”169 With this 
initial framing, the Randall report then juxtaposed the military’s esteemed reputation on 
race relations with the potential for “contamination” by militant African-American 
marines. Rich with metaphors of injury and allusions to substance abuse the committee 
observed: 
 Today, the enlistee has more racial pride, probably more bitterness, more 
sensitivity to real or fancied oppression, and as one black witness stated, ‘often 
with a chip on his shoulder.’…Because of this black self-awareness and self-
determination, the new black marine has absolutely no desire to lose his identity. 
This, then, seems to be the young marine who enters the corps fresh from scars of 
all the racial trauma that is prevalent in our society….As stated at the outset, our 
armed services carried the original torch of integration of the United States, but 
must now face an even greater challenge in the battle with black militants for the 
minds of these young marines who may well have been exposed to an overdose of 
militancy prior to enlistment, and enter the corps with a mistrust of the ‘white 
establishment.’ This brotherhood, pride, and togetherness have, alarmingly, led 
some from integration to polarization. 170 
 
The report’s logic held that threat to the military was not one of systemic racism. Rather, 
in its conclusion, the committee found the brawl did not result “from any specific 
provocation, but was generated by a few militant blacks who fanned the flames of racism, 
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misconceptions, suspicions, and frustrations.”171  When it came to black service 
members’ discontent, the Randall report, echoing the military establishment at large, 
operated with a closed aperture. Unwilling to acknowledge deeply embedded patterns of 
racial abuse, report authors defaulted to a narrative of infiltration by “militant blacks.” If 
the military had once enjoyed relative immunity from the civil unrest, racial strife, and 
political upheavals afflicting American society, it could no longer claim such inoculation.  
  By 1969, a new cohort of African-American men had entered the military. Unlike 
their predecessors who joined the service prior to 1965, this younger generation found 
little solace in promises of rights and respectability conferred by the uniform. The 
demographic shift from older, career-oriented black soldiers to largely draftees after 1965 
accounts for widespread transformations in social attitudes among black soldiers.172 
Often characterized as “militants”, this younger generation came of age during the height 
of the Civil Rights Movement. As the war in Vietnam escalated, with larger shares of 
black soldiers dying on the front lines, many younger draftees began to view the military 
as fundamentally antithetical to their racial identity. Black draftees confronted, 
challenged, and eschewed earlier paradigms of black military masculinity that previously 
compelled generations of African-American men into military service. Black military 
masculinity, which recognized that American society politically and economically 
marginalized black men, furnished symbolic and material means for escaping 
discrimination. By entering military service, black GIs could lay claim to an identity of 
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the citizen-soldier, upholding the tenets of US democracy through bodily sacrifice and 
struggle, even as their rights at home lay restricted by Jim Crow-style racism and white 
supremacy.173 
 However, changes in the timbre of the Civil Rights movement after 1965, 
alongside the emergence of Black Nationalism with its sharp critiques of the Vietnam 
War, altered the historical formulation between military service, black manhood, and 
citizenship. However promising, civil rights legislation passed since 1964 proved ineffectual 
against systemic, widespread, and seemingly insurmountable disparities in income, housing, 
education, healthcare, and the criminal justice system. Ironically, as the nation committed 
itself to legal de-segregation, new forms of racial apartheid replaced old ones. Urban areas, 
where increasing shares of black and Puerto Rican draftees hailed from, benefited little from 
the nation’s post-war affluence. The post-WWII shift in federal resources to white suburbs 
coupled with weakened domestic allocations in favor of war spending, underwrote poor 
infrastructural conditions in major American cities during the same period when tens of 
thousands of black and white southern migrants, as well as Puerto Rican migrants, arrived in 
urban areas of the West, Midwest, and Northeast.174 Teeming with influx populations 
malcontent over inadequate housing, limited employment, police repression, and continued 
racial segregation, American cities were soon engulfed in a torrent of urban revolts. 
Beginning in Cambridge, Maryland in 1963, urban disturbances erupted first in mid-Atlantic 
cities such as Harlem and Philadelphia in 1964 before spreading to the Midwest and 
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eventually West Coast. In August 1965, just five days after the signing of the federal Voting 
Rights Act, a brutal face-off between residents of the southern Los Angeles neighborhood of 
Watts and law enforcement resulted in a week-long spate of violence, in which 34 individuals 
died, 1,032 people sustained injuries, and more than 600 buildings were destroyed by burning 
and looting.175 The next summer, in June 1966, an urban uprising nicknamed “The Division 
Street Riots” occurred in the Humboldt Park neighborhood of Chicago following the 
inaugural Puerto Rican Day Parade. The shooting of an unarmed Puerto Rican youth by a 
white police officer touched off decades of pent-up fury by hundreds of Puerto Rican 
community members. Embittered by years of residential segregation, displacement from 
urban renewal programs, poor schooling, and police harassment, Puerto Rican residents took 
to the streets in violent protest against police officers, National Guardsmen, and white 
business owners. A year later, the “long, hot summer” of 1967 arrived bringing forth nearly 
160 urban rebellions in major cities such as Detroit, Newark, Atlanta, Boston, and Cincinnati. 
The inflammatory climate of American cities was in part, ignited by long simmering 
resentment against the failures of civil rights reforms. In turn, many young African-
Americans embraced a philosophy of Black Nationalism, defined as a tripartite ideology 
composed of three “orienting strategies”: self-definition (cultural), self-determination 
(political) and self-reliance (economic).176  Commenting to reporters in 1966, venerated 
civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr, remarked of Black Nationalism, “it is an 
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indication of deep discontent, frustration, disappointment, and even despair among the 
Negro community.”177 King’s observation came in response to the refusal by the Student 
Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), under Chairman Stokely Carmichael, to 
attend King’s White House Conference on Civil Rights slated for June 1966. Carmichael 
countered, “we see integration as an insidious subterfuge for white supremacy in this 
country. The goal of integration is irrelevant. Political and economic power is what black 
people have to have.”178 This seminal intellectual debate between King and Carmichael 
not only delineated a difference of political opinion on the matter of racial integration, 
but also laid bare a growing generational divide between old guard civil rights leaders 
and younger activists. In rebuking integration as the dominant stratagem for racial 
equality, Black Nationalists articulated a rejection of the dominant paradigm of racial 
liberalism defining civil rights strategy since before the postwar era. 
As the Vietnam War raged into the late 1960s, Black GI’s increasingly applied the 
radical critiques of Black Nationalism to their personal circumstances. The military, as a 
tool for the State, became the direct target of their criticisms, shattering previously held 
ideas about black military masculinity as an antidote to racial discrimination.179 In turn, 
new understandings of radicalized black masculinity privileging racial identity 
supplanted older notions of racial integration. More than simply adopting expressions of 
black pride, many Black GI’s, informed by the writings of Carmichael, the Black 
                                                
177 Austin C. Werhwein, “Dr. King  Disputes Negro Separatist.” The New York Times. May 28, 1966. A1. 
178 Ibid.  
179 Within the philosophy of Black Nationalism and Black Power, the State was the direct enemy of black 
liberation. See the Black Panther’s Ten Point Program. Huey Newton, Revolutionary Suicide (New York: 
Penguin Books, 2005). 123-124.  
 77 
Panthers, revolutionary leader Malcolm X, and the broader anti-war movement, drew 
explicit connections between the war’s colonial implications and their own subjugated 
status. Indeed, their critiques were inspired by a Black Nationalist agenda linking 
domestic desires for racial equality with liberation struggles emanating from Third World 
nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.180 Broadcasting over Radio Hanoi, Black 
Power advocate Robert F. Williams implored African-American soldiers to revolt, “you 
helpless GIs ordered by your white officers to die.”181 With greater frequency, Black GIs 
and other racial minorities viewed the conflict in Vietnam “as a white man’s war” for 
which they no longer aspired to be complicit.  
The dialectical process between Third World nationalisms and soldiers’ acts of 
disobedience received support from figures like Cuban revolutionary leader Fidel Castro, 
who in November 1966 broadcast over Havana radio inciting Latin American students to 
protest the U.S. armed forces, observing, “Puerto Ricans will be sent to Vietnam as 
cannon fodder of Yankee imperialism.”182 Likewise, in January 1967, SNCC Chairman 
Carmichael traveled to Puerto Rico where, alongside members of the Puerto Rican pro-
independence movement, he led 250 youths in a protest march against the Vietnam War 
and drafting of Puerto Ricans. Winding through the suburbs of Hato Rey and Santurce en 
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route to Fort Brooke, long a symbol of US military power in old San Juan, marchers drew 
attention to the US colonial occupation of Puerto Rico and its imperialist venture in 
Vietnam. For his part, Carmichael called for a “protocol of cooperation” between US-
based Black Power advocates and pro-independence Puerto Rican activists to “solidify 
their fight against colonial domination.” Added Juan Mari Bras, a San Juan based activist, 
both groups recognized each other “as being in the vanguard of a common struggle 
against United States imperialism.”183 
 
THE RENDER REPORT: CONTAINING “RACE MILITANCY” AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
DIMENSIONS OF GI RESISTANCE 
 
Most of our attention, although not exclusively so, has been focused on the black minority 
as representative of minority problems. Not to be disregarded are the problems incurred 
by the Services in dealing with Spanish-surnamed Americans ~Robert Render II184 
 
 
The task of addressing military race relations fell to Frank Render II, a 33-year 
old African-American educator and public servant who began his tenure with the Nixon 
administration in June 1970. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird personally tapped Render, 
then a senior research associate in urban studies at Syracuse University’s Research Corp., 
to become Deputy Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights. Within weeks, Render took the 
oath of office, replacing interim director L. Howard Bennett, a former Minneapolis 
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municipal court judge and veteran civil rights activist.185 In succeeding Bennet, Render 
simultaneously became the highest-ranking civilian official and African-American within 
the DoD.186 Considered the Pentagon’s top civil rights administrator, Render’s principle 
duties entailed crafting and enforcing equal opportunity compliance measures for civilian 
and military personnel, including 3.5 million active-duty troops scattered in nearly 130 
countries worldwide.  
Against the tide of what military brass saw as a reversion to segregation long 
thought over and amidst increasing levels of violence perpetuated by soldiers, Render 
held no less than the military’s very legacy in his hands. By all conceivable measure, he 
had his work cut out for him. If Render possessed qualms about the Gordion knot he just 
inherited, he made little effort at disguising them to the press. During his July swear-in 
ceremony, the young civil servant demonstrated as much when responding to reporters’ 
inquiries. With trademark candor, Render characterized the undertaking before him as an 
“awesome responsibility” whilst conceding, “total commitment is what I think is 
necessary to carry out the functions that lie ahead.” Seizing this rare chance for positive 
publicity, Assistant Defense Secretary Roger T. Kelley deftly added, "he will set a 
standard for those who do business with the Department of Defense, a total empire of 
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about 20 million people.”187 Kelley’s trim, but nonetheless powerful metaphor of “total 
empire” vividly captured the massive scale of U.S. military enterprise.   
By 1967, the DoD boasted 1,014 U.S. overseas bases, occupying over 100 
countries and principalities, and a budget of over $74 billion. It also served as the single 
largest employer of federal civilian officials. Under former Secretary of Defense Robert 
S. McNamara’s helm--the hawkish, if cerebral former president of Ford Motor Company 
who assumed office in 1961--civilian representation within the DoD rose from 169,000 in 
1960 to 1.3 million by summer 1969. Yet by the time Laird, an eight-term U.S. 
Congressman from Wisconsin and longtime Nixon associate succeeded Clark Clifford as 
Secretary of Defense in January 1969, the “empire of 20 million” was in jeopardy. With 
540,000 American troops stationed in South Vietnam and another 1.2 million providing 
support from U.S. naval carriers based in the Philippines, and Okinawa military resources 
were at their straining point. So were the troops.  
Just as Cold War containment logic gave rise to the “hot war” in South Vietnam, 
it likewise engendered radical anti-war critiques among MACV-era soldiers. The 
dissident tenor of the counterculture and domestic anti-war mobilization worked in 
tandem with a vibrant GI resistance movement flourishing aboard bases, ships, and posts. 
From an underground press of over three hundred GI newspapers including A Four Year 
Bummer, The Last Harass, Liberated Barracks, and All Hands Sink the Ship to the 
proliferation of GI coffeehouses in garrison towns, and individual instances of unit 
mutinies, with entire companies refusing to follow orders, discontent among soldiers 
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manifest in various forms, auguring for some, the potential collapse of American military 
empire from within. Writing in the pages of the Armed Forces Journal, Marine Col. 
Robert Heinle decried “morale, discipline, and battleworthiness of the U.S. Armed Forces 
are…lower or worse than at any time in the century or possibly in the history of the 
U.S.”188 America’s war in Vietnam, he exhorted, had left the American military “in a 
state approaching collapse.”189 Heinle enumerated a litany of problems including drug 
abuse, soaring rates of desertion, combat refusal, deteriorating discipline, and racial 
turmoil, before making a corporeal diagnosis of military malaise, “the trouble of the 
services is a crisis of the soul and backbone.”190 The rise in fraggings, or the intentional 
killing of commissioned or non-commissioned officers (NCO’s) by fellow soldiers 
epitomized the breakdown of military morale.191 A 1971 Pentagon report noted fragging 
incidents more than doubled between 1969-1970, from 96 to 209.192 Senator Charles 
Mathias (R-MD), added, “in all the lexicon of war there is not a more tragic word than 
‘fragging’ with all it implies of total failure of discipline and the depression of 
morale.”193   
Just one day after Render’s appointment, four major race-related uprisings 
erupted on military installations across the country. On July 22, over 250 African-
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American and Puerto Rican soldiers briefly wrested control of Fort Dix SPD in New 
Jersey.194 Roiled by poor living conditions, racist conduct by white officers, and the 
inhumane detention of a fellow soldier in a “cage”--a steel enclosure lacking bedding and 
basic necessities--the GI’s convened a town-hall style meeting to list grievances, but their 
assembly was cut short when armed MP’s forcefully dispersed them.  Following a week 
of isolated skirmishes, military authorities began a comprehensive crackdown, 
dispatching a 175-man riot control unit from a neighboring base to patrol the camp, 
issuing a 6pm curfew, and arresting 21 African-American “organizers” confined to the 
stockades, each facing between 2-8 years in prison for allegedly “assaulting five white 
GI’s.”195 Four days later, two hundred mostly African-American and “Spanish-speaking” 
soldiers initiated a rebellion at Fort Hood, TX seizing a six-block area of the base and 
brawling with MP’s for several hours, resulting in structural damage to multiple 
buildings. On August 6, fifty African American soldiers at Fort Belvoir, VA marched to 
MP headquarters objecting to the arrest of a fellow African-American soldier. One week 
later at Fort Ord, CA minority soldiers initiated a dramatic confrontation with MPs when 
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dozens rallied against the arrest of two non-white soldiers by pelting MP’s with rocks and 
later burning two mess halls to the ground.196  
Render’s first order of business came in the fall of 1970, when he was tasked with 
leading a three-week tour of military bases in West Germany, a site of intensely violent, 
racially tinged disturbances between white and non-white U.S. military personnel, as well 
as local civilian populations. In fact, Render’s visit came on the heels of a vicious brawl 
between white and minority soldiers at the Army McNair Barracks in West Berlin. In an 
all too familiar occurrence, a fray erupted after a white soldier referred to an African-
American soldier as a “nigger.” The melee intensified quickly from a personal dispute to 
a large-scale altercation during which twenty-five GI’s beat each other with wooden 
planks, clubs, rocks, and pipes.197 Under the auspices of the joint Department of Defense-
Military Services, Render and his 14 member-team visited U.S. Army and Air Force 
installations in Ramstein, Heidelberg, Mannheim, Karlruhe, Berlin, and the USECOM 
headquarters in Stuttgart.198 Their mission was two-fold: assess the effectiveness of 
extant DoD policies relating to equal opportunity and race relations. And second, to 
provide recommendations for Secretary Laird as to which programs or policies should be 
“eliminated, instituted, modified, expanded, or changed.”199  
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Over the next several weeks, Render and his staff followed the same basic 
itinerary during their three-day stopovers at each site. On the first day of their visit, team 
members held morning meetings reviewing DoD equal opportunity compliance measures 
with senior staff, NCO’s, inspector generals, judge advocate generals, and local 
chaplains. Afternoon briefings with general staff were followed by seminar discussions 
with a cross-section of soldiers representing different grades, racial and ethnic 
backgrounds, and genders, with soldiers given the opportunity to provide feedback on 
interracial relations and Departmental policies and programs. “To stimulate and provoke 
discussion” during forums, Render’s team screened the 35 minute film “Black and White 
Uptight” (1969). Narrated by Robert Culp, star of television’s “I Spy”, the short program 
addressed “hidden prejudices” among whites, exploring historical origins of racial 
bigotry, white attitudes against African-Americans, and general state of race relations in 
the US. Satisfied with the film’s success in spurring “lively discussion” Render observed 
that once initiated, “the dialogue the men entered into with zest and constructive 
criticism.”200 In the evenings, Render and his team made “low profile” visits to on- and 
off-post clubs, bars, and other recreational facilities frequented by US troops.201 During 
their second day, Render’s team focused on meeting with troops, eating lunch with them 
in mess halls, providing open session dialogues with groups of fifty soldiers each, 
emphasizing how the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense (DASD-CR) 
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could be of support to “interested troops of any race, creed, color.”202  In total, Render 
and his staff met with more than 5600 military personnel and their dependents from 
September 12th to October 7th.  
If Secretary Laird and other defense officials desired an expedient solution to the 
problem of racial violence, Render’s subsequent report did little to appease expectations. 
Instead, the 17-page “U.S. Military Race Relations in Europe—September 1970” offered 
a candid assessment and to the annoyance of many commanders, far too accurate 
portrayal of systemic racial abuse, volatile attitudes, and “a higher level of frustration and 
anger than was anticipated.”203 In particular, Render enumerated thirteen areas of concern 
regarding incidents of racism, including unfair treatment in work assignments 
disproportionately given to minorities, harassment of black and Latina/o soldiers by 
military police (MP’s), a lack of black officers and NCO’s, and a shortfall of visible 
minority staff in related support activities (ie PX, commissary). An eyebrow raising 
section titled “Export to Europe of American Racism Which Affects the Local Populace” 
emblematized the globalizing character of American racism. Render detailed how white 
military personnel--the vast majority of troops in Western Germany--threatened 
economic sanction against local businesses and women if “they allow blacks to frequent 
their establishments or associate with them” after which Render soberly concluded, 
“Many nationals decided to do just as requested for fear of their own economic and social 
salvation.” With this frank conclusion, Render effectively conveyed the lived social 
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realities for GI’s of color, for whom dating, patronizing businesses, or merely pursuing 
leisure off-post had become a circumscribed experience. 
 The transmission of US racial hierarchies and indeed, American-style racism to 
West Germany was hardly new. As historian Maria Höhn’s work on post-World War II 
Germany demonstrates, US military occupation of West Germany under the Marshall 
Plan had long provoked anxiety over interracial encounters between black GI’s and 
German women.204 However, by the end of the decade, a number of factors accelerated 
the pace of racial tensions among US troops, whilst also inciting friction with civilian 
populations.  Beginning in 1967, the Pentagon began using West Germany as a material 
and personnel reserve for Vietnam. The war’s protraction resulted in a dwindling 
command structure, with troops stationed in West Germany guided by less than 50 
percent of majors and 37 percent of captains and lieutenants.205 Moreover, officers 
serving in West Germany frequently rotated every four months, weakening unit 
leadership and detracting from unit cohesion. Exacerbating already difficult conditions, 
military bases in West Germany served not only as layover sites for troops returning from 
Vietnam, but also as points of deployment.  Bored GI’s, isolated in small towns, forced to 
live in deteriorating barracks primarily built during the late nineteenth century or circa 
WWII, and still brutalized by the effects of wartime service frequently turned to drugs 
and alcohol. Several military studies of the era indicated that drug use among troops 
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stationed in West Germany surpassed that of GI’s in the US, with some 46 percent 
smoking hashish regularly and nearly 10-15 percent abusing heroin daily. Likewise, by 
1972, the DoD was operating 84 detox centers in West Germany to address excessive 
alcohol consumption by GI’s. Paralleling many of the conditions that led to violence at 
Camp Lejeune, racial tensions in West Germany proceeded apace with rising 
consciousness among GI’s of color drawing connections between imperial US foreign 
policy in non-Western countries, the Vietnam War, and their own racialized subjectivity. 
Indeed, Render’s arrival in West Germany coincided with the height of African-
American and minority soldiers’ involvement with radical internationalism and Third 
World anti-colonial struggles sweeping the globe. In West Germany, the years 1969-1970 
represented the collaborative apex between German Leftists college students, the Black 
Panthers, and African-American GI’s.206 Galvanized by the Vietnam War, failures of the 
American Civil Rights Movement, assassination of Martin Luther King Jr., and 
crackdown on the Black Panther Party (BPP) in the US, student activists took 
unprecedented steps working with Black Panther GI’s stationed in Germany, eventually 
organizing Black Panther Solidarity Committees in German university towns also host to 
US military bases. Collaborating with Black GI’s, they published several underground 
newspapers including Voice of the Lumpen, hosting rallies and teach-ins at German 
universities, and on the Fourth of July in 1970, organizing a “Call for Justice Meeting” at 
the University of Heidelberg attended by over 1,000 Black Panther GI’s and hundreds of 
German supporters “indicting America for the war in Vietnam and for its unfulfilled civil 
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rights agenda.”207 As Höhn argues, German students “helped black GI’s get a platform 
that they otherwise would not have had.”208  African-Americans were not the only group 
visibly engaged in demands for an end to the war and racist treatment. As Marjorie Cohn 
and Kathleen Gilbert remark, “at a number of bases, Latinos supported and were 
supported by radical black soldiers and white troops” in their own quest for dignity.209 
During winter 1969, Variety magazine reported on the efforts of Newsreel, a New York 
based activist film distribution group, in reaching out to Latina/o GI’s. In late December 
of that year, nine Newsreel members conducted a tour of “major American troop areas” 
throughout West Germany, screening “The Case Against Lincoln Center”, a short 
documentary showcasing the displacement of nearly 20,000 Puerto Rican families 
evicted from their homes because of the construction of Lincoln Center on Manhattan’s 
upper West Side.210 Working with the Socialist German Student Association, the 
Newsreel team also printed several editions of We Got the Brass, an underground GI 
newspaper distributed alongside Venceremos (We Shall Overcome), a Frankfurt based 
bilingual GI newspaper printed in English and Spanish “for the benefit of minority 
groups in the Army.”211 In collaboration with the Newswreel team, military objectors—
GI resisters, student activists, and local civilians—thereafter founded The First 
Amendment Café, the first GI coffeehouse in Europe.  
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Taken in aggregate, such demonstrations revealed how deeply racism suffused the 
various branches of the services. Render’s findings supported the complexity of racism’s 
grasp in a section titled, “Universal Cry of Blacks and Other Minority Personnel to Be 
Treated with Respect, Dignity, and Equality.” Here, Render dryly remarked that minority 
soldiers, including “Spanish surnamed individuals” longed “only to be treated equally 
was what the minorities told us.”  Such declarations departed from prevailing attitudes 
among senior military personnel insistent that the “Race Problem” illustrated attitudes of 
a vocal minority of radicalized black soldiers. Rather, Render suggested in his analysis, 
racial discrimination against soldiers of color was widespread, systemic, and a 
fundamental aspect of how the services functioned. Moreover, Render held military 
leaders accountable for casting a wide net when referring to opinionated African-
Americans soldiers, noting ““Too often white leadership personnel refer to any black 
who asserts himself in any way as militant. It must be understood that a person who is not 
docile and unobtrusive is not necessarily a “militant.”212 In another section titled, 
“Alienation and Rebellion: A New High Level of Black Frustration and Anger” Render 
came to the defense of “a small corps of alienated blacks who could not be reached”, 
situating their anger [“they told us they wanted guns, ammunition, and grenades because 
they felt “whitey” understood no approach other than that of violent confrontation”] as an 
expression of black revolutionary fervor misunderstood by military leaders and 
aggravated by wartime service [“they angrily told us they had no reason to be fighting in 
a white man’s Army, in a white man’s war”].   
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In reporting his findings to Secretary Laird, Render faced a vexing problem. On 
one hand, military leaders had recognized the degree to which racial violence had 
crippled the armed forces. In May 1969, Laird had even issued a plea in the Air Force 
Times entreating military personnel to “reject divisive and fragmenting forces and 
influences in our society which seek to diminish the integrity, unity, and strength of our 
armed forces. We must not permit any irrelevancies of race and color, nor any other 
factor, to divide and weaken us." 213   On the other, Render felt it incumbent to hold senior 
brass, including Laird himself, accountable for allowing racial discrimination to persist to 
the degree it had.  In his principle conclusion titled “Failure of Command Leadership” 
Render minced few words: 
Perhaps the most overriding single factor about which there can be 
generalizations regarding the visible shortcomings of the Military Services in 
dealing with the present human relations-race relations problem is the failure in 
too many instances of command leadership to exercise its authority and 
responsibility in these areas. There certainly have been enough documents written 
and statements circulated that give commanders on all levels the authority and 
responsibility to provide for equal treatment and equal opportunity as these two 
methods of behavior relate to all personnel in a command. There is hereby 
recognized the failure of some men on various levels to provide for and monitor 
the equal opportunity provisions which are already part of our regulations and 
procedures.”214 
 
Within months of Render’s report, Secretary Laird ordered the DOD to issue the 
following orders in December 1970:215 
1. To establish an “equal opportunity” or human relations officer and a human 
relations council at major units. 
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2.  To develop numerical goals and timetables to increase utilization of 
minorities in occupations, 
3.  To remove or reassign officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilians who 
fail to act against discrimination, and  
4. To give base commanders power to declare housing within the US “off limits, 
“ without prior Pentagon approval, if landlords practiced racial discrimination. 
By July 27, 1971, twelve officers from company commanders up to generals, had been 
relieved of command, transferred or reprimanded because of Render’s findings, including 
General James H. Polk who served as Commander in Chief of US Army Europe 
(USAREUR) since 1967. But Army officials were not the only casualties of Render’s 
report. Two months after Polk’s forced retirement, Render tended his resignation under 
pressure from Secretary Laird, who according to a DoD spokesperson, had been angered 
by the aggressive tone of Render’s findings. According to this same spokesperson, Laird 
“and some opponents of Render’s were ready to lower the boom on him” angered that his 
investigation resulted in the dismissal of so many top key military aides.216  In total, 
Render spent 14 months with the DoD, unearthing racial abuse so profound among some 
troops of color, they had been reduced to “verbal paroxysm” in his presence, unable to 
articulate how thoroughly entrenched their experiences of discrimination were. Though 
his time with the Pentagon was brief, Render had made clear that the Army could no 
longer continue to hold steadfast to its colorblind policy of purposefully disregarding 
racial discrimination.  
 In June 1971, Secretary Laird published DOD Directive 1322.11 the "Department 
of Defense Education in Race Relations for Armed Forces Personnel” policy codifying 
                                                
216 “Top Pentagon Official Quits; Says Laird Angered by Probes of GI Abuses.” Jet.  September 1971.5.  
 92 
many of Render’s recommendations, and establishing the Defense Race Relations 
Institute (DRRI), a mandatory training center for education in race relations, the creation 
of race relations/equal opportunity (RR/EO) staffs, and the formulation of new policies 
regarding equality of treatment in the Armed Forces designed to prevent “racial unrest, 
tension, or conflict”  from disrupting “combat readiness and efficiency.”217  
CONCLUSION 
The racial violence that peaked in the military between 1968-1970 dislodged 
official narratives heralding the USAF as a racially egalitarian institution.  Outbreaks of 
racial violence, as this chapter has demonstrated, emerged against the intransigence of 
military bureaucracy towards effecting meaningful change in the domain of race 
relations.  For GI’s of color, contradictions between the professed equality of the military 
and their own subordinated status within it, speaks to the larger failures of democratic 
racial liberalism Guy Gabaldón diagnosed when repudiating his Silver Cross in 1969 and 
further confirmed by Robert Render’s 1970 report. As domestic and internal confidence 
in the US military waned, the DOD grew intent upon bettering its tarnished record on 
race relations whilst also addressing the significant ideological fissures engendered by GI 
protest.  As we will see in the following chapters, shifting U.S. military manpower needs 
demanded new kinds of racial work; a more expansive racial framework that can be 
traced via the USAF’s evolving treatment towards and reception of Latina/o GI’s.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
“Getting There”: Military Multiculturalism, the Defense Race Relations  
Institute (DRRI), and ‘the Biggest Minority’, 1971-1973 
 
 




             Speaking on “Hispanics” in the September 1975 issue of Soldiers magazine, Army 
SPC Carmen Laboy, a Women’s Army Corps (WAC) member from Bayamón, Puerto Rico, 
observed, “I’ve seen a lot of advancement—like the Black people are getting ahead now. I 
think the Spanish people are a little behind because we didn’t use as much force. But we’re 
getting there.”219 Laboy’s statement encapsulates a principal theme of this chapter. Following 
the social change movements and global political upheavals of the late 1960s, reaching 
“there”— an elusive, fabled point of parity in US race relations looked promising, but not 
inevitable. If the dissolution of de jure racial segregation just a decade earlier signaled 
national resolve towards consigning racism to the past, it likewise meant constructing, 
engendering, and instantiating new social paradigms, infrastructures, and modes of thought 
for addressing legacies of racial inequality.  
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At the dawn of the 1970s, race, and its corresponding socio-material effects 
reverberated throughout the U.S. military in unprecedented ways. Still ailing from a torrent of 
race-related riots emanating from the Vietnam War and with its own increasingly multiracial 
future in mind, the Department of Defense established the Defense Race Relations Institute 
(DRRI) in September 1971. Opening its doors at Patrick Air Force Base in eastern Florida, 
the DRRI operated under a mandate of ameliorating racial tensions. It began with a staff of 
thirty military personnel: eight from the Army and Navy, nine from the Air Force, and 
nineteen civilians. Its initial class of 100 students, drawn from all branches of the armed 
services and all ranks, would concentrate on achieving “a more harmonious relationship 
among all military personnel” through an intensive six-week regimen of racial and ethnic 
studies courses concentrating on “Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, American Indians and 
the impoverished whites of Appalachia.”220 The institute aimed to train 1400 military 
instructors each year. Known as “equal opportunity advisors” (EOA’s) they would then be 
tasked with teaching an eighteen-hour a year program in their respective command units 
required of all future military personnel.  
Histories of the DRRI generally traffic in triumphantalism, depicting it as “the 
manifestation of a benevolent DoD heeding the concerns of black personnel and the larger 
civil rights movement.”221 Though the DRRI attracted interest by “many military researchers 
during the 1970s,” its place within the broader history of US race relations remains under-
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examined.222 By contrast, this chapter takes a more critical approach to examining the 
DRRI’s role as an architect of racialized military subjectivity. Racialized military 
subjectivity refers to an analytical category at the intersection of three social forces: 
legacies of racial liberalism that sought to institutionalize minority racial difference; 
distinctions between civilian and military identity; and materio-symbolic associations 
between “enhanced citizenship” and military service. Racialized military subjectivity is 
constituted through its subjects, and thus, imbricated within a sense of self, linked to 
techniques of governing that shape subjects in accordance with how they are and have 
historically been positioned within hierarchies of citizenship and the nation-State. 
On the eve of an impending transition to an All-Volunteer Force in July 1973, 
military officials grudgingly acknowledged that the face of the military was changing, 
with a growing proportion of African-Americans and to a lesser extent, Latina/os joining 
the ranks in the years to come. But Third World de-colonial movements and freedom 
struggles in the US fractured the historical alliance between citizenship, military service, 
and racial incorporability once central to post-war narratives of uplift, respectability and 
equality for racial minorities. The ideological dissonance between race and martial 
citizenship, imbued by ambivalence toward the state, obliged military authorities to 
intensify those practices which would ensure compliance to and belief in the Armed 
Forces as an exceptional site of liberal multicultural pluralism.  
Following Foucault, governmentality comprises subjectification or subject 
formation, whereby the ‘art of governing’ utilizes tactics to arrange things or individuals 
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into useful Subjects as a means of ensuring the interests of and efficient management by 
the State. Subjectivity emerges as an effect of discursive regimes of power/knowledge 
predicated on the art of governing. Foucault‘s interest in the discursive production of the 
subject explicates how subjects come to be and which discourses are involved in that 
formation. For Foucault, discursive power: “Applies itself to immediate everyday life” 
and works by how it “categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, 
attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth in him that he must recognize and 
others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power that makes individuals subjects.”223 
In “The Discourse on Language,” Foucault states, “education may be, as of right, 
the instrument whereby every individual, in a society...can gain access to any kind of 
discourse. But we well know that in its distribution, in what it permits and in what it 
prevents, it follows the well-trodden battle-lines of social conflict. Every educational 
system is a political means of maintaining or of modifying the appropriation of a 
discourse, with the knowledge and the powers it carries with it.224 Here, Luis Althusser’s 
concept of interpellation and the creation of identity based on one’s engagement with 
agents or apparatuses of the nation-state becomes useful. Althusser contends, “the school, 
but also other State institutions like the Church, or other apparatuses like the Army 
teaches ‘know how,’ but in forms which ensure subjection to the ruling ideology or the 
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mastery of its practices.225 The institution is an apparatus for (re) producing power 
relations, inscribing particular discourses onto the experiences of the bodies that inhabit 
these spaces.  
This framework allows for an analysis about what types of discursive knowledge 
took precedence at the DRRI. This chapter argues the DRRI inscribed a particular type of 
racialized military subjectivity that simultaneously affirmed racial difference, whilst 
attenuating oppositional currents underwriting calls for social and epistemological change 
that directly confronted, challenged, and disrupted those modes of hegemonic power 
operated and maintained at the level of the nation-state.226  In his study of the origins of 
interdisciplinary and/or ethnic studies programs enacted on university campuses during 
the 1970s, Roderick Ferguson argues such efforts worked to “simultaneously activate and 
disenfranchise minorities, subjects, and communities, forming and re-forming institutions 
according to the advancement and regulation of minority difference.”227 In the aftermath 
of race related riots, the DoD established the DRRI to: “develop doctrine and curricula in 
education for race relations, conduct research, perform an evaluation of the program 
effectiveness and disseminate educational guidelines and materials for utilization throughout 
the Armed Forces.228 This chapter is thus concerned with how the DRRI utilized racial 
discourse (marshaled race) emerging from antiracist, anti-colonial, and black liberationist 
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social movements of the late 1960s. It argues, that much like university systems during the 
era, the DRRI selectively appropriated and co-opted the grammar of racial difference (ie 
“cultural pluralism”) in service to three broader aims: bolstering the military’s image as an 
emblem of multiracial tolerance; mitigating structural critiques against the military’s 
utilization of soldiers of color; and advancing a platform of liberal racial inclusion aligned 
with the State’s need to ensure adequate manpower for the military.  
Regarding Latina/os, the DRRI acted as one of the earliest sites of Latina/o 
Studies pedagogy. In so doing, it mimicked broader federal preoccupations with 
consolidating and addressing the diverse heterogeneous composition of the US Latina/o 
populace—an amalgamation of disparate national-origins, ethno-racial identities, 
language proclivities, cultural traditions, immigrant/generational statuses, socio-
economic conditions, regional concentrations, political orientations, religious affiliations, 
etc. The DRRI’s “La Raza” program of study proceeded apace with early attempts by US 
policy-makers at formally recognizing the political demands and claims for historical 
redress by US Latina/os. In this chapter, I argue that the DRRI’s “La Raza” studies 
course, informed by the era’s broader groundswell of cultural nationalist movements and 
embrace of Third World anti-colonial struggles by US racial minorities, operated as an 
informal template for organizing federal response to US Latina/os. Likewise, the “La Raza” 
course plan helped augur the development of a Latina/o demographic profile that would 
directly impact outreach, recruitment, and treatment of Latina/o military personnel 
throughout the 1970s and following decades during which the USAF transitioned to an All-
Volunteer Force (AVF).  
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DRRI: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY TRAINING SCHOOL, 1971-1973 
“Education in the dynamics of difference is one of the most important stages the Department 
of Defense has undertaken. Most people enter military service with insufficient knowledge of, 
and appreciation for, the culture, history, experiences, and sensitivities of other races to 
enable them to function well in a multiracial environment.”229 
 Among residents of Cocoa Beach, Florida an affluent beachside resort town twenty 
miles south of Cape Canaveral and the John F. Kennedy Space Center, the DRRI was not a 
welcome addition. Local inhabitants, mostly white and conservative, took to calling the new 
facility “Razor Blade Tech” and “Watermelon University”—derisive terms intended to let 
DRRI staff, half of whom were non-white, know just how little their presence was cared 
for.230  Such epithets were a common indicator of the era’s racial climate, particularly in the 
aftermath of violent racial turbulence within the Armed Forces. Still, institute directors were 
hopeful that their experiment, the most ambitious race relations program of its time, would 
stem the tide of racial violence that had rocked the services in recent years.  
Under DRRI Director, Air Force Col. Russell L. Ryland, the institute held six 
objectives (see Appendix A) with educational programs concentrating on two specific areas: 
Minority Studies and Behavioral Sciences. During their six weeks of training, students would 
spend up to seventy-three classroom hours studying psychological, social, and cultural 
factors directly related to race relations; forty-two hours to community involvement activity; 
and twenty-four hours for orientation, testing, and evaluation. The heart of the program rested 
on close-knit seminars of approximately twenty students led by faculty advisors acting as 
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liaisons during seminar sessions, and also as faculty advisors to individual pupils. Instructors 
placed emphasis on “heterogeneous cohorts” with members ranging from mid-rank to senior 
officers, educational levels from high school to doctoral degrees, ages from 19-40, and of all 
races and ethnic backgrounds, all with the aim of fostering “growth, understanding, and 
awareness through association and interaction.”231 According to Dr. Frank Montalvo, a DRRI 
faculty supervisor and clinical psychologist, “These people [students] were recruited from 
the field, anything from cooks to infantrymen, they weren’t people with academic 
backgrounds. So it was very much a grassroots, bootstrap program we were creating.”232 
The “equal status contact” dimension of seminar classes, including use of first names, 
constituted a radical departure in military practice, traditionally defined by a rigid hierarchical 
structure. It was one of many such innovations designed by Director of Research and 
Evaluation, Dr. Richard O. Hope, an African-American sociologist on leave from Brooklyn 
College who believed in fostering student engagement through rigorous small group 
discussion sessions. Born into a family of academics, Hope’s grandfather, John Hope, 
served as the first African American president of Morehouse College, after whom the 
historian John Hope Franklin was named. Richard’s father, John Hope II, an economist at 
Fisk University throughout the 1940s, played an instrumental role in developing Fisk’s 
Race Relations Institute upon which the DRRI would later be modeled.  Working with 
sociologist Dr. Charles Johnson, the first African-American president of Fisk, in 1944 
Hope II helped launch an annual three-week conference called the Race Relations 
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Institute that brought together leading northern and southern liberal scholars of race 
relations. As the younger Hope recalled, “I nearly ate and slept things regarding this 
institute before I left for college at Morehouse.”233 Having grown up in the company of 
notable African-American leaders, including A. Phillip Randolph, Thurgood Marshall, 
and Johnson, Richard Hope brought years of practical experience and knowledge to the 
DRRI. As a youth, he helped organize several chapters of the Student Non-Violent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in Atlanta, alongside close friends Julian Bond and 
Marian Wright Edelman. While in Georgia, Hope formed a close relationship with civil 
rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., with whom he participated in several freedom 
marches. Later, while a student at the Highlander Folk School in Monteagle, Tennessee, 
Hope served as King’s chauffeur when King visited in 1957.234 Deeply influenced by his 
training at Highlander and Fisk, Hope recalled, “The Race Relations Institute at Fisk 
University became the Defense Race Relations Institute in the military.”235 
An opponent of the Vietnam War and suspicious of the military’s commitment to 
racial sensitivity, Hope had to be convinced to take the position at DRRI. In the end, it 
was former DoD Assistant Secretary of Defense, L. Howard Bennett, a close colleague of 
Johnson’s that persuaded Hope: 
Hubert Humphrey came to him [Bennett] and said, “solve this problem.” First 
thing he did was call me on the phone. He basically recruited me to be the 
                                                
233  Quoted in Isaac Hampton II, The Black Officer Corps: A History of Black Military Advancement from 
Integration Through Vietnam (New York, NY: Taylor & Francis, 2013), 126. 
234 Founded in 1932, the Highlander Folk School was an adult community-learning center based on Danish 
folk schools of the 1900s. Throughout the 1950’s and early 60’s, it served as a leadership-training center 
for southern civil rights activists, including Rosa Parks, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., John Lewis, Ralph 
Abernathy, and members of SNCC. 
235 Quoted in Hampton II, The Black Officer Corps, 127. 
 102 
intellectual organizer of this thing. To my mind, the solution to the systemic 
nature of the problems of race and ethnicity and the riots as it were, is education. I 
came there and started listing ridiculous things. Meaning that one, there had to be 
universal inter-group training of military personnel throughout the world and that 
it should be compulsory. And it should start from top down and to my surprise, 
they said, “fine.” That showed the level of desperation. The race riots were in fact 
destroying the bases and it almost destroyed a battleship carrier. The level of 
problems at that time were pretty severe. The riots would start over simple 
things…For instance, if a person from West Virginia wanted to play hillbilly 
music and a fellow from Mississippi wanted to play blues, you’d have a fight.236  
  
Hope’s unorthodox curriculum, and emphasis on small group contact sometimes yielded 
“awfully heated” confrontations.237  According to Air Force Lt. Col. Ken McDonnell, an 
instructor alongside Air Force Sgt. Bob Stitt, “We often walk a thin line between what’s a 
reasonable emotional argument and what’s a transgression on military discipline. We’ve seen 
arguments where a black or Chicano enlisted man might call a high ranking white officer a 
‘honky.’ That can be a sticky situation.” But Hope discouraged intervention, instead 
suggesting students air their grievances openly and without fear of reprimand. “Bob and I just 
sit quiet and let the problem solve itself, because the participants recognize the arguments as 
honest expressions of feelings and let a lot of things go by the board they wouldn’t outside of 
class.” According to Hope, the confrontational style of seminar courses could result in the 
“isolation” of an individual, enough for them to reflect upon the “impact” of their own 
prejudices.238  As Hope recalls, “If you look at the early curriculum, I began the training 
with a discussion of the self and social interaction. I pushed hard for that, to link what 
they were about to hear in more practical terms with what we know about social 
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interactions.”239 But Hope also anticipated student resistance, acknowledging “Even if 
someone goes in with a chip on his shoulder because the course is mandatory, it won’t hurt. 
Pretty soon he’ll start arguing about being forced to be there, then about the reasons why he 
has to be there, and once he does that, you’ve got him. He progresses from argument to 
taking part because he gets interested in spite of himself.240  
Much of the DRRI’s early curriculum focused on reviewing procedural aspects of 
military equal opportunity policies, directives, and regulations. Among military authorities, 
the prevailing consensus held that enough mechanisms were already in place for addressing 
race relations and racial inequality. But former Petty Officer 3rd class Alan Canady, then a 
student at DRRI, disagreed: “There was just no wheel for the higher echelons to have 
better race relations across the forces. Why? Well, there wasn’t a need to understand 
other races, because we all wanted to conform to this one standard.  The belief was that 
we didn’t need to understand everyone else.”241 As Canady’s quote reveals, “conformity” 
entailed racial assimilation as a precondition for military identity—a presumed 
homogenous, proto-nationalist orientation absent of divergent political convictions, class 
variance, or ethno-racial distinctiveness.   
The DRRI curriculum’s second phase concentrated on interpreting, affirming, and 
understanding US histories of race and race relations.  In her study of the DRRI, Say Burgin 
argues the institute’s racial framework “had a surprisingly radical bent” for its emphasis on 
white complicity in perpetuating racism, but also accentuating how whites could be involved 
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in the process of transformative racial justice.242 As Burgin documents, one of the most 
influential texts required by course instructors was Robert Terry’s 1970 book, For Whites 
Only, an anti-racism manual emerging from Terry’s work organizing antiracism training 
events with the Detroit Industrial Mission (DIM), a non-profit, Christian based consulting 
group working towards racial justice in the aftermath of the Detroit race rebellion of July 
1967. The DIM openly adopted from the language of Black Power activists like Stokely 
Carmichael and Eldridge Cleaver. In effect, “Terry’s book provided a backdoor into Black 
Power for DRRI”—a way to incorporate tenets of Black Nationalism without incurring 
opposition from conservative military authorities who feared the radical dimensions of 
pedagogy informed by controversial figures like Carmichael.243  As demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, understanding and interpreting “black militancy” was a key motivator for 
DRRI officials, who surreptitiously integrated Black Nationalist writings into their 
curriculum.  In addition to For Whites Only, students were required to read Eldridge 
Cleaver’s Soul on Ice (1968), the best-selling collection of writings by the former Black 
Panther Party (BPP) leader and Minister of Information.244 Consisting of 
autobiographical vignettes, social and political critiques, and riffs on popular culture, 
including jazz and the fictional character of James Bond, in searing prose, Soul explored 
topics of sexuality, prison life, race, black masculinity, interracial relations, and anti-
colonialism. Considered a primer on Black American identity, white liberals and New 
Left activists embraced Cleaver’s memoir in large part for its rhetorical appeal to white 
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youth, situating them as allies within the Black Revolutionary imaginary:  “That growing 
numbers of white youth are repudiating their heritage of blood and taking people of color 
as their heroes and models is a tribute not only to their insight but to the resilience of the 
human spirit.”245  The use of both Terry and Cleaver’s texts attest to the DRRI’s early 
emphasis on problematizing whiteness and their advocacy of what Terry termed “new 
white consciousness”—the belief that whites had to come to terms with their individual 
and collective culpability in perpetuating racism.  
Students were required to take Race Relations Instructor (RRI) Course 3260, 
“New White Consciousness” a three-hour seminar whose lesson objective was “to have 
each student understand that the race problem must be shifted from minorities to 
whites.”246 Desired learning outcomes for the course, taught by instructor Walter Healey 
Jr, included: 1) for each white student to understand that he is ‘white’ 2) to understand 
the role the “white liberal” has played 3) to understand the goals of the individual in the 
race relations program 4) to understand the viciousness portrayed through the racism 
cycle. In addition to reading excerpts from For Whites Only and The Rightness of 
Whiteness: The World of the White Child in Segregated Society (1969) students in RRI 
3260 read from Terry’s short essay, “Active New Whiteness: Lighting a Damp Log” in 
which Terry articulated the primary tenets of white consciousness:  
One of the positions most frequently encountered in whites is the individualistic 
response—‘I’m not a racist, I never intentionally did anything to harm black 
people. And don’t try and make me feel guilty for the past. I’m not responsible for 
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what others did or do today.’ This atomistic view of the self, ignoring rootage in 
and interdependence with culture and social institutions, is of course, inadequate. 
New consciousness and behavior are possible and become a power force when 
individuals are united in active collectivities. One can be an active racist or bigot. 
This is one who aggressively tries to keep white power and privilege in place. 
Once can be a passive racist or a conformist. This is the person who says that 
he/she has never personally done anything wrong but in fact does nothing to fight 
the status quo. Finally, one could be an active racist anti-racist or a new white. 
The reason for the racist anti-racist designation is to acknowledge the hard reality 
that while one is trying to eliminate white skin privilege one is also receiving 
short term benefits from it. It is also stated that the way to remind us that new 
white consciousness is not a state of being but rather a process of becoming. No 
one is a total new white, but one is on the way toward new whiteness. There is no 
such thing as a passive antiracist. They do not exist because to be passive in 
America is to be racist. Most whites want to be passive anti-racists. I used to think 
my task in race was to get bigots to move to a neutral or non-destructive stance. I 
now feel that the more urgent task is to get conformists in motion on an active 
anti-racist agenda. It seems more politically possible and more fruitful.247 
In embracing Terry’s philosophy, the DRRI emphasized that white service personnel had a 
direct role to play in confronting racism within the military. Informed by Black Power 
ideology, DRRI officials charged white supremacy had been maintained by whites and 
white-dominated institutions and thus, the onus of responsibility for changing racist patterns 
of behavior and systems of race-based oppression, lay primarily with whites themselves. 
Lesson plans were designed utilizing a “disruptive” pedagogical framework. For example, 
students in RRI 3260 participated in the “Drawbridge Exercise” wherein they read aloud 
from the short story of a Baroness who - despite orders by her husband (the Baron) not to 
leave their castle - pays a servant so that she can leave the castle to visit a lover one night. 
En route back to the castle, she is killed by a madman after she unsuccessfully pursues 
help from her Lover, a boatman, and a friend. An allegory, each character symbolized a 
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social entity: The Baron represented white society; the Baroness depicted racial 
minorities; The Boatman personified Institutions; the Friend portrayed White Liberals; 
The Lover embodied white materialistic values; the Madman stood as an expression of 
law enforcement/military.248 To critically engage with the story’s main themes, students 
were asked to rank the characters (1-6) in “the order of their responsibility for the death 
of the Baroness” and then discuss the story’s broader implications. 249 Course instructors 
were encouraged to explain how white society becomes “the hero” with the role of the 
madman. 
In adopting “new white consciousness” as a central analytical platform, DRRI 
course instructors directly challenged widely held preoccupations with “black militancy” 
as the constitutive factor for much of the violent outbreaks the armed forces experienced 
between 1969 and 1972. While military leaders consistently reacted with apprehension 
towards Black Power ideology, DRRI espoused many of its principle claims. For 
example, though DRRI officials did not explicitly use Stokely Carmichael’s and Charles 
V. Hamilton’s Black Power: The Politics of Liberation (1967) in their curriculum, they 
nonetheless drew heavily from Carmichael and Hamilton’s analysis of institutional 
racism, or the ways in which racism was deeply embedded within US social 
conventions.: “Racism is both overt and covert. It takes two, closely related forms: 
individual whites acting against individual blacks, and acts by the total white community 
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against the black community. We call these individual racism and institutional racism.”250 
In The Commanders Notebook on Race Relations a March 1972 booklet distributed by 
the DRRI to Commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Force Units (regular and reserves), 
DRRI invoked Carmichael and Hamilton’s distinction between individual and 
institutional racism. In section III “THE PROBLEM: Use of violence as a solution to 
racial grievance,” the DRRI held firm that “Racial Discrimination, intended or not, does 
exist in the United States Armed Forces today. There is evidence of this at all levels and 
it takes two general forms: A) Personal Racism and B) Institutional Racism.” Rebuking 
the still popularly held stance that military desegregation had ended racism within the 
armed forces, the booklet’s authors asserted, “it failed to reach the roots of covert 
institutional racism and this is where the heart of the problem lies.”251 Because much of 
the military racial violence experienced within the tumultuous late 1960s had been 
blamed on “militant blacks”, the DRRI made it a point to invert such claims: “The whole 
question of race relations in our country pervades so much of social life that is not 
possible to have been brought up in America without having learned some unconscious 
as well as conscious behavior toward minority groups that is offensive to them and 
evokes negative reaction.”252 The Commander Notebook went on to provide a 
comprehensive annotated bibliography of suggested readings that included the U.S. 
Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968); Racism in 
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America and How to Combat It (1970), noting “it will lend to a clear understanding of 
Racism, and how white society has profited from it”; The Autobiography of Malcolm X 
(1964); labor historian Ernesto Galarza’s Mexican-American People (n.d.) and Native 
American historian Vine Deloria Jr.’s Custer Died for Your Sins (1970).  
Black Power ideology suffused the early DRRI curriculum beyond Terry’s focus 
on “new white consciousness.” Addressing misunderstandings about what constituted 
Black Power, several other courses featured writings by prominent African-American 
intellectuals as a way of presenting the cultural ethos of Black Nationalism, with its 
emphasis on black pride, Afro-American history, and black aesthetics. Course 3230, 
“Signs and Symbols” a three-hour seminar taught under the Minority Studies Division, 
was designed to foster greater awareness about black culture, identity, and practices that 
were seemingly misinterpreted by white dominant culture. In the introduction to the Signs 
and Symbols Reference Book, DRRI authors noted, “Whether we agree with different 
value systems or not is irrelevant. What is relevant to our mission is that we get an 
understanding of as many cultures and value systems as possible so that we can transmit 
this knowledge to others.”253 Readings for this course included African-American 
sociologist Adrian Dove’s “Soul Story”, a short story wherein Dove challenged a white 
employer who would not hire an “unqualified black.” Laced with brief paragraphs 
describing facets of black culture, such as “Dozens—playing the A contest to see which 
young brother can remember or make up the greatest number of obscene, rhymed 
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couplets reflecting on the opponent’s parents,” Dove’s essay served as an early template 
for his infamous “Chitling Test”—an aptitude test designed to expose cultural bias in IQ 
testing, privileging familiarity with black cultural practices and which the DRRI later 
used in several other courses. The Signs and Symbols reference book also featured a 
reprint of “The Trouble With” an article by SP5 Tom Bailey from Soldiers magazine, 
wherein Bailey dissected the “signs, symbols, and myths” of black culture: 
BLACK POWER 
Whites hearing this term associate it with riots and turbulence in the cities. I’m 
sure it frightens them. They become uptight because they feel that any two 
individuals giving and returning the black power salute might be connected with 
some movement that might lead to the overthrow of the established order. The 
definition of black power, however, is black empowerment and political power: 
economic power where blacks control the flow of money and trade within their 
own community, and political power to elect individuals who will speak for all 
their people. Black power connotes the opportunity to participate in everything 
that goes on this country on an equal basis.  
 
In similar fashion, Bailey’s five-page article proceeded to describe the: “Black Power 
Salute”; “Black Power Handshake”; “Bracelet”; “Afro Haircut”; “The Unity Thing”; 
“Black is Beautiful”; “Nigger”; “Honky”; “Uncle Tom”; “Negro Men are Studs”; 
“Blacks are Violent”; and “Blacks are Lazy.” Bailey’s article was followed by African-
American writer and poet Amiri Baraka;s essay, “A Black Value System” illustrating the 
seven principles of Kawaida (Swahili for “tradition”) a quasi-religious pan-African 
philosophy advocated by Malauna Karenga, a prominent black nationalist and founder of 
US—United State/United Slaves.254  
                                                
254 See Michael Simanga, Amiri Baraka and the Congress of African People: History and Memory (New 
York, NY: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2015).  
 111 








Owing to its intellectual engagement with Black Nationalism, the DRRI curriculum 
utilized the work of Frantz Fanon, the Martinique-born psychiatrist and philosopher 
whose writings on anti-colonialism provided an informal blueprint for international 
liberation movements throughout the mid-1960s.255 In his seminal work, 
Wretched of the Earth (1965) Fanon explored developments in the Algerian battle for 
independence against French colonialism, using a Marxist analysis of colonial revolt 
against European imperialism and concentrating on the psychic effects of colonialism. 
Black Power advocates, anti-war activists, and Third World nationalists employed 
Fanon’s writings in Wretched to analyze institutional racism in the US. Drawing on 
Fanon, they argued the US paralleled European colonial powers, through its 
implementation of hierarchies of racial difference as an edifice upon which US social 
structures were built. Institutional racism operates as a colonial apparatus, establishing 
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and authorizing racial demarcations as the basis for social relations of power. According 
to cultural nationalists, the persistent racism Americans of color were subject to 
constituted them as internally colonized subjects—de facto second-class citizens, 
excluded by poverty, segregation, de-territorialization, and social marginalization. Of 
course, Fanon was not the first scholar to diagnose or even coin the term, “internal 
colonialism.”  
As an analytical model for systems of racial domination and subordination, internal 
colonialism had its origins with Latin American development economists in the 1950’s 
who sought the context behind asymmetrical terms of trade between Third World and 
First World nations. In this sense, internal colonialism emerged as a corollary to 
dependency theory, in its preoccupation with uneven economic development and 
domestic poverty.256 Academically, the internal colonialism paradigm became 
widespread after publication of sociologist Robert Blauner’s 1969 article, “Internal 
Colonialism and Ghetto Revolt”, later refined for a chapter in his 1972 book, Racial 
Oppression in America.257 In it, Blauner contested the popularly received post-WWII 
American paradigm privileging European sociological thought, along with its attendant 
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focus on analogies of immigration and cultural assimilation. Instead, Blauner described 
the historical conditions by which American racial minorities constituted an internal 
colony:  
The third world perspective returns us to the origins of the American experience, 
reminding us that this nation owes its very existence to colonialism, and that along 
with settlers and immigrants there have always been conquered Indians and black 
slaves, and later defeated Mexicans-that is colonial subjects on national soil.258  
 
Blauner linked the domestic colonized status of American racial minorities—African-
Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans--to the dependence of American culture and 
social structure on highly racialized definitions of [White and other] identity categories, 
noting that “racism as a system of domination is part of the complex of domination.”259 
While DRRI officials did not explicitly use Blauner’s essay, they nonetheless emphasized 
Blauner’s point about the “enormous fatefulness of the historical factor.”260 To this end, 
courses in the Minority Studies Division bloc (66 hrs) emphasized the distinct historical 
experiences of US racial groups as separate and unique from European-American history.  
As Hope noted, “Much of our curriculum was not that based on traditional theories of 
race relations or ethnic relations. We had to make sure that the curriculum linked to what 
individuals would be seeing back at their installations. For example, we couldn’t talk 
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The Black Studies component consisted of twelve hours of study dedicated to 
Afro-American history, reviewing the trajectory of slavery, Jim Crow Era, and the 
“Separate but Equal” period, followed by six hours of instruction titled “With All 
Deliberate Speed,” surveying major civil rights events between 1954 and 1968, including 
civil rights legislation, the rise of Black Power Movements, and urban disturbances. Nine 
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hours were dedicated to “Black Servicemen” chronicling the history of African-American 
service personnel from the colonial era to Vietnam, and “the emergence of the black 
soldier’s identity.”262 The final six hours of instruction concentrated on “Contemporary 
(Continuing) Black Thought” providing instructional information on Black leaders and 
movements from the early 1960s through the contemporary period, “exploring the Social 
and political issues, affecting the thinking, values, and attitudes of young Black men and 
women.”263 Notable readings for “Black Contemporary Thought” included: Black Rage 
(1968) by psychiatrists William Grier and Price Cobbs; Harold Cruse’s The Crisis of the 
Negro Intellectual (1967); Franz Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth (1961); Maya Angelou’s 
I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings (1969); Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man (1952); Alex 
Haley’s Autobiography of Malcolm X (1965) and former SNCC chairman H. Rap 
Brown’s Die Nigger Die! (1969). 
LA RAZA STUDIES/ LATINO STUDIES 
The development of the Minority Studies second division of instruction, “La 
Raza” studies occurred during a highly charged, critical politico-historical juncture for 
US Latina/os. In the mid-1960s, nationally publicized campaigns by the United 
Farmworkers Union (UFW) under charismatic labor leader César Chavez, along with the 
founding of Reies Lopez Tijerina’s Alianza Federal de las Mercedes in 1963, the Los 
Angeles Blowouts of 1968, the first meeting of the Crusade for Justice in 1969, and the 
                                                
262 Minority Studies Division, Selected Readings Volume 2. p. i. Box 3, Required Readings. DEOMI, 
Patrick AFB, FL.  
263 Ibid.  
 116 
Chicano Moratorium of 1970, collectively formed the crest of the Chicana/o Movement. 
In April 1969, the New York Times reported on the emerging ethnic-based activism by 
Mexican-Americans: “Five million Mexican-Americans…are stirring with a new 
militancy.  The ethnic stereotype that Chicanos are too drowsy, too docile to carry out a 
sustained fight against poverty and discrimination is bending under fresh assault.”264  
Likewise in 1969, the Young Lords Organization (YLO), a Puerto Rican 
revolutionary nationalist group who led militant, community-based campaigns drawing 
attention to police brutality, chronic unemployment, substandard housing, racism, and 
public health failures in poor urban communities of color “reinvigorated and elevated 
barrio consciousness.”265 Nationwide, the Young Lords “sparked the imaginations of 
young Puerto Ricans and Latinos.”266 The national prominence of Latina/os in public and 
political culture even spurred a Congressional Research Report in 1970. Titled Spanish-
Americans: The New Militants, the report noted with minor alarm, “the nation’s second 
largest minority group is stirring from a century of lethargy and political impotence” 
before detailing how new leadership, attempting “to weld unity among the diverse group 
of Spanish-Americans—Puerto Ricans, Mexican-Americans, Cuban exiles, and other 
Latin migrants” were responsible for waves of “riots and disturbances in several cities” 
and “strikes in farm fields.”267 
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At a federal level, President Richard Nixon 
announced establishment of the Cabinet Committee on 
Opportunities for Spanish-Speaking People (CCOSP) in  
December 1969. The CCOSP developed out of President 
Lyndon B.  Johnson’s Interagency Committee on 
Mexican American Affairs (IMAA) created by 
presidential memorandum in 1967. On December 18, 
1969, Congress passed a bill (S. 740) changing the 
IMAA’s title to CCOSP, reflecting its “expanded 
scope” encompassing “affairs of all Spanish speaking Americans; i.e., Mexican 
Americans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, etc.” President Nixon signed the bill into law on 
December 30, 1969, declaring “I sign this bill con gusto-with the enthusiasm and 
determination to make equal opportunity a reality in these United States.” An advisory 
body meant to represent the voice of an emergent pan-ethnic group, the CCOSP was 
comprised of Cabinet members, as well as twenty-five heads of agencies whose activities 
directly related to the “Spanish-speaking populace.”268 As argued by sociologist G. 
Christina Mora, the decision to employ “Spanish-speaking” reflected desires by the 
federal government to “co-opt and defuse threats from nationalist Puerto Rican and 
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Mexican activist groups”, whilst also pressuring activists to present a national identity 
that also included Cubans.269 
 The CCOSP’s mission entailed promoting federal responsiveness to “all Spanish-
speaking groups”; assuring that federal programs “provide assistance that Spanish-speaking 
people need” and “seeking out new programs that may be necessary to handle problems that 
are unique to such groups.”270  Major areas of concern included economic and manpower 
development, housing and community development, legislative and legal affairs, and 
government placement services. Remarking on the CCOSP’s role, Chairman Martin Castillo 
observed, “the decade of the Seventies is perhaps the most crucial period for the American 
people to reaffirm the virtues on which this nation was founded. For the Spanish speaking 
American, it is the dawn of achievement and progress.”271 Highlighting disparities in equal 
opportunity for “Spanish speaking Americans,” Castillo further noted, “If reform and 
brotherhood are to be achieved through concern and understanding, then this effort must 
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include recognition of the problems and increased opportunity for a group of original 
Americans who up to now have existed as tenant citizens of this country.”272   
Purposely coupling “original Americans” with “tenant citizens,” Castillo’s choice 
phrasing underscored how entrenched ideological and institutional processes of racialization 
historically excluded Latina/os from the broader US polity. Consistently branded “the 
forgotten minority” in social policy publications, mainstream media, and government reports 
during the era, “Spanish-speaking Americans” physically inhabited the US (some for 
centuries) but remained economically, politically, socially, and culturally peripheral to 
normative conditions of citizenship. Usually defined as conferring a set of political rights, 
citizenship, as political theorist Judith Shklar reminds us, also constitutes “public standing”—
acknowledgment of one’s place, indeed legibility, within a democratic society.273 As Shklar 
further argues, “people not granted these marks of civic dignity feel dishonored, not just 
powerless and poor.”274 In ensuing years, dignity and affirmation defined much of the 
CCOSP’s language, both towards developing an acceptable, culturally palatable pan-ethnic 
identifier for “Spanish-speaking Americans” as well as obtaining a precise accounting of this 
underserved population’s numbers. 
Accordingly, the CCOSP’s first and most urgent task involved preparations for 
the 1970 decennial census: “because no accurate national statistics had been developed by 
any private or public census, there was a great need to move aggressively in this area.”275  In 
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early January 1970, CCOSP policy meetings were arranged with Secretary of Commerce 
Maurice H. Stans and Bureau of the Census Director, George H. Brown. At the CCOSP’s 
request, the Census Bureau also appointed a planning group of Mexican-American advisers 
to develop specific questions for Spanish-speaking Americans, utilizing surnames, mother 
tongue, and birthplace. In areas with large Spanish speaking populations, a Spanish-
language version of the instruction sheet was also enclosed. However, this represented 
only a 5 percent sampling of the population. According to the census, at nearly ten 
million, Latina/os were officially recognized as the second largest minority population in the 
U.S. Although the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights later accused census takers of 
undercounting Latina/os in their 1974 report, “Counting the Forgotten” this census marked 
growing recognition of the nation’s Latina/o population--a group with growing political 
clout. 276  
In tandem with the rising political profile of US Latina/os, the DRRI’s La Raza 
Studies course developed alongside the institutionalization of other Chicana/o and Puerto 
Rican Studies programs nationwide. In the aftermath of student organizing and calls for 
more racially inclusive curricula, in 1968, California State College, Los Angeles founded 
the first Chicano Studies Department in the country. The following year, a Mexican-
American Studies center was founded at Claremont College and a Chicana/o Studies 
research center established at UCLA. In his historiography of Chicano Studies, social 
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scientist Michael Soldatenko observes of early Chicano Studies advocates, “Critical of 
social science research and skeptical of academic work, these scholars sought to establish 
an oppositional epistemology rooted in the process of Chicano identity formation.”277 
Similarly, in 1973, students at City University of New York (CUNY), working with 
community activists and Puerto Rican Studies scholars established the Center for Puerto 
Rican Studies (Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueño) at Hunter College with the aim of 
creating “a foundation for the intellectual field of Puerto Rican studies” and fostering 
“understanding of the Diaspora and for the incorporation of Puerto Ricans into 
communities across the United States.”278 For its part, the La Raza Studies course 
adopted much of this pedagogical framework, with readings and instruction oriented 
around memoirs, personal essays, and studies highlighting the disparate socio-economic 
conditions experienced by US Latina/os and foregrounding perspectives by movement 
activists. 
DRRI students from the 1971 cohort were required to take eighteen hours of 
instruction in La Raza Studies. According to the preface for “La Raza Studies” compiled by 
USAF Sgt. Ron Gonzalez and USAF Command Sgt. Major Fred Silva: 
“Literally translated, La Raza” means “The Race.” However, it cannot be 
identified as such and restricted to this definition. The concept of La Raza is a 
philosophy of life and is strongly identified with by Latinos. BASICALLY, 
THIS PHILOSOPHY IS: “THAT ALL LATINOS ARE UNITED BY 
CULTURAL AND SPIRITUAL BONDS AND HAVE A COSMIC 
DESTINY.” The spiritual aspect is perhaps more important than the cultural. 
The Latino recognizes regional variations in behavior and realizes that customs 
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change….The Chicanos and Puertorriqueno movements are not of recent 
development. Their thrust at racism extends back into the early development of 
the Americas. The forms and methods of oppression may have changed, as well 
as the oppressor, but the “La Raza” opposition to racial and cultural 
discrimination has not waivered.” 
 
Silva and Gonzalez’s emphasis on “Raza” as a philosophy of life reflected the contested 
and complex meanings of the term’s contemporary usage within the Chicano and Puerto 
Rican movements respectively. Their reference to a “cosmic destiny” most certainly drew 
on Mexican philosopher José Vasconcelos’s La raza cósmica (1925), an influential proto-
evolutionary essay on Mexican national ethnicity and identity, highlighting what 
Vasconcelos regarded as the beneficial results of racial and ethnic miscegenation. 
According to Vasconcelos, two of the strongest bloodlines, Mexico’s indigenous 
inhabitants and its Euro-Iberian heritage came together in the Americas to produce a 
powerful new cosmic race—embodied in the Mexican mestizo. Mestizaje or “racial” 
mixture formed a central premise of identity for many Chicano movement activists who 
embraced an ethnic-based nationalism, though as Jorge Mariscal notes, the extent to 
which Vasconcelos’s essay influenced Movement activists remains subject to 
investigation.279  
Nonetheless, mestizaje offered a powerful symbolic metaphor for articulations of 
racial hybridity, cultural difference, and social liminality Chicano Movement activists 
adopted to diagnose their political subjectivity. Within Chicano nationalist discourse 
from the late 1960s and early 1970s, Rodolfo (Corky) Gonzales’ epic poem, Yo Soy 
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Joaquín/I Am Joaquín, which “traces Chicano struggle through a historical overview of 
Mexican/Chicano history” provided a template by which Chicano activists laid claim to 
their interstitial status between dominant U.S. and Mexican identifications.280 Gonzalez’s 
affirmation of the indigenous pretext for mestizo identity subtended a powerful counter-
narrative to older assimilationist narratives privileging the Spanish foundations of 
Mexican culture, heritage, and identity. As Christina Beltran observes of Joaquin, 
“through its emphasis on familial unity and community, Mexican-American subjectivity 
was politicized and reconfigured into a Chicano identity, defined by both resistance and 
cultural pride.”281   
Claiming Chicano as self-referent identification as many younger Mexican-
American activists did signified a radical transformative political agenda that broke with 
earlier accomodationist models that sought inclusion under the rubric of American 
liberalism. As an intellectual strand, embrace of chicanismo, asserted a politically 
charged identity of collective consciousness, emphasizing dignity, self-worth, pride, and 
a rejection of status quo politics that had failed the full enfranchisement of Mexican 
origin communities for generations. According to Thomas Martinez, chicanismo was 
“about spirituality, honest self-examination, a complete love of life, and consciousness of 
the here and now. Chicanismo is a variant of the larger humanist tradition missing from 
mainstream America.”282 
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In noting the “spiritual aspect is perhaps more important than the cultural”, Sgt. 
Gonzalez and CSM Silva also invoked the mythopoetics of poet Alurista’s El Plan 
Espiritual de Aztlán (The Spiritual Plan of Aztlán) first introduced and read aloud at the 
Denver “National Chicano Youth Liberation Conference” in March 1969. In El Plan, 
Chicanos are compelled to acknowledge their Aztec origins and lay claim to Aztlán, a 
pre-Cortesian genesis myth, as the geographic region of the American southwest Mexico 
ceded to the US in the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo. Discursively, Aztlán operated 
as a visionary paradigm for Chicano unity. According to Elyette Andouard-Labarthe, 
“Aztlán …was a compensatory symbolic mechanism, fusing poetic-symbolic unity to 
sociocultural concerns. The Chicanos who were divided by history, found in it an 
ancestral territory and a common destiny.”283  Yet in their introduction, Gonzalez and 
Silva collapsed the spiritual elements of Aztlán, a cultural nationalist invocation used by 
Chicanos, within a pan-Latino framework also encompassing Puerto Ricans.   
Gonzalez and Silva too may have also been channeling Cuban intellectual and 
revolutionary José Martí’s1891 essay, Nuestra América (Our America) wherein Martí 
articulated a transnational pan-hemispheric logics of solidarity between the colonized 
inhabitants of Latin America, the Caribbean, and the US.284  In this sense, Gonzalez’s and 
Silva’s claim that “ALL LATINOS ARE UNITED BY CULTURAL AND SPIRITUAL 
BONDS AND HAVE A COSMIC DESTINY” reflected contemporary language of 
Movement activists that as diasporic subjects, their fates were linked, forged within a history 
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of Spanish and Euro-American colonization, capitalist penetration/exploitation, and centuries 
long oppression. Gonzalez’s and Silva’s declaration that “the Latino recognizes regional 
variations in behavior and realizes that customs change…”directly addressed the incredibly 
variegated, disparate traits of both the Chicano Movement and Puerto Rican activism of the 
mid-1960s to late 1970s. While both movements protested conditions of poverty, educational 
disparity, police brutality, and social marginalization respectively, they also diverged 
according to the regional, national, and international concerns of their respective 
constituencies.  
As a whole, the reader for “La Raza” studies combined texts from both Mexican-
American and Puerto Rican authors, offering a broad overview of conditions facing US 
Latinos. The first text consisted of an essay by well-known Puerto Rican writer and 
community activist Piri Thomas, author of Down These Mean Streets (1967). In “It’s the 
decent people vs. the rip-offs, in and out of uniform,” Thomas explicated on the plight of 
African-Americans and Puerto Ricans in “Ghetto communities”: 
 All my life in one way or the other I’ve lived in the Ghetto and ever since I can 
remember there was always some sort of violence going on—fights, muggings, 
rapes, junkies...and prostitutes—and to enhance the ghetto world of violence 
around me, to help bring out its message of fear, hopelessness, and despair was the 
embellishment of hot and cold running cockroaches and king size rats, of 
exploitation beyond compare, of pride and prejudice. But lest the people in the 
pretty Pleasantville suburbs think we of the ghetto dig violence and crime, let it be 
known that the criminal element represents a comparatively small percentage of 
the total community.285 
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The inclusion of Thomas’s essay ostensibly served two purposes. First, it familiarized DRRI 
students with the day-to-day life struggles of Puerto Ricans, African-Americans, and other 
minority groups clustered in US urban locales and the structural racism they faced as 
denizens of the “ghetto”, far removed from the “Pleasantville suburbs.” By the second half of 
the twentieth century, the nation’s long-festering urban crisis dramatically unfolded, 
precipitated by a national recession, deindustrialization, suburban “white flight,” municipal 
neglect, and discriminatory housing policies. New York, a major site of Puerto Rican 
settlement since the mid-nineteenth century, reflected racialized patterns of concentrated 
poverty, marked by blighted public housing sites, the exodus or demolition of vibrant retail 
sectors, shift to a two-tier low-wage service economy, chronic unemployment, and erosion of 
education and basic public safety services.  
The postwar departure of manufacturing jobs produced a depressed urban 
environment that left Puerto Rican communities particularly vulnerable. According to a 1970 
study by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the unemployment rate for Puerto Rican men ages 
25-54 in New York City was five times the national rate.286  However, the rising presence of 
Puerto Rican and other Latin American immigrants soon created social and political 
preoccupations with Puerto Ricans as a dangerous “underclass.” As reporter Kevin Phillips of 
The Washington Times noted of Puerto Rican immigrants in New York, “they are crowding 
into unsafe housing, swelling the crime rate, collecting welfare payments, and holding down 
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jobs into which US born welfare recipients could be placed. It is one thing for New York to 
be the cultural meeting place of the Western Hemisphere and another for it to be its 
flophouse.”287  Phillips’s remarks echoed the pejorative tone of print publications like the 
New York Times and Life magazine, which during the 1940s published sensational accounts 
of Puerto Ricans “swarming” communities like East Harlem, describing such neighborhoods 
as “reeking of migrants.”288 Beginning in the mid 1970s, popular press accounts stigmatized 
Puerto Ricans as indigent, disorganized, irresponsible, lazy, drug-addicted, violent, and 
sexually aggressive. In the social sciences, Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan’s 
Beyond the Melting Pot (1963) posited that Puerto Ricans lacked “both a rich culture and 
strong family system.” Owing to this supposedly weak, non-nuclear family structure, 
Glazer and Moynihan argued Puerto Rican culture was to blame for their stagnated 
economic progress, intergenerational dependence on welfare, and presumable delinquent 
behavior ensnaring them in a “cycle of poverty.” Likewise, anthropologist Oscar Lewis’s 
La Vida (1966), attributed Puerto Ricans’ poor economic standing to a pathologized 
subculture premised on inadequate domestic arrangements (i.e. deficient family units). 
According to Lewis, the Puerto Rican poor had “no knowledge of their own history…and 
are far more deviant by virtually any standard.”289 The social narrative of Puerto Rican 
criminality and their depiction as possessing negative cultural attributes, values, and 
behaviors undoubtedly underwrote Thomas’s desire to rectify such portrayals, with his 
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assertion that “the criminal element represents a comparatively small percentage of the total 
community” and “in the ghettos are decent law-abiding citizens, regardless of race, creed, or 
color who despise the criminal element.”290 Second, Thomas’s essay eloquently laid bare the 
sense of disaffection racial minorities felt towards law enforcement and generalized mistrust 
of establishment: “What I am saying is that our people in the ghetto complain to the police on 
crime, graft, drugs and like nothing happens. It is hard for a community to place trust in 
policeman who they see as constantly on the make, taking bribes or monthly payoffs from 
known criminals.” 291  
The La Raza Reader’s second two articles featured excerpts from the New York 
Times reporting on the poor state of education for US born Latinos, including a chart 
indicating that 75.6 per cent of Chicanos and 77.8 percent of Puerto Ricans had less than four 
years of high school education. As reported in “The Unfinished Education” a 1971 study 
conducted by the US Commission on Civil Rights, “minority students do not obtain the 
benefits of public education at a rate equal to that of their Anglo classmates.”292  The study, 
which focused on 532 school districts in five southwestern states (Arizona, California, 
Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas), found that almost half of Mexican-American students or 
47 percent dropout before they finish high school.  Further, the study blamed lack of bilingual 
education and historically relevant Mexican-American studies courses for the poor 
achievement levels of Mexican origin students: “the schools in the Southwest use a variety of 
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exclusionary practices which deny the Chicano student the use of his language, a pride in his 
heritage, and the support of his community.”293 In a statement by the commission’s director 
John Buggs, he described California as “the best in a group of losers.” Texas, on the other 
hand, was described as the worst. The La Raza Reader then abruptly shifted to an essay by 
Chicano activist, José Angel Gutiérrez, “Aztlán: Chicano Revolt in Winter Garden” 
detailing the 1969-1971 campaign by members of the Mexican American Youth 
Organization (MAYO), to create a “model city for Chicano activists” in Crystal City, Texas. 
According to Gutiérrez, “we were not misguided and mal-informed VISTA volunteers; 
nor were we white-knight Latin Americans that sought to manage the affairs of the gringo 
for the gringo. We were young Chicanos who saw and felt things like Chicanos should. 
We loved and accepted our Mexicanismo and saw brighter things for La Raza.”294 
Gutiérrez’s essay situated Chicano movement activism against educational disparity in 
states like Texas, along with entrenched poverty and efforts at electoral political 
reform.295  Amidst widespread community and student protest in support of their efforts, 
in January 1970, members of MAYO filed for party status as “El Partido de la Raza 
Unida” in LaSalle and Dimmit counties, focusing on school board and city council seats.  
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The La Raza Reader concluded with a short essay by Armando Rendón, “El 
Puertorriqueño: No More, No Less” which describes the racial, political, and social 
ambiguity of Puerto Rican identity in the US: “I’m not black; I’m note white; I’m not in-
between. I’m Puerto Rican…The words of the “Newyorican” can tell American many 
things about the political and philosophical aberrations stemming from its color 
blindspot.”296 Rendón’s essay elaborated on the racial heterogeneity of Puerto Rican 
ethnicity, and their racialized status between the polarities of black and white underlying 
dominant conceptions of US race relations. Rejecting classifications of Puerto Ricans as 
“immigrants” Rendón noted that Puerto Ricans are migrants, but “fully American citizens” 
whose migration to the US was not that unlike previous generations of immigrants. 
Nonetheless, according to Rendón, Puerto Ricans faced racial discrimination because of their 
investment in maintaining their racial identity: “most immigrants have become carbon copies 
of something they’re not, because Americans already here have tended to negate anything 
foreign—to be foreign has meant to be less. In this sense, the Puerto Rican is an irritant 
because, as it is becoming more evident, he wants to be accepted and respected for what he 
is, not for what others want him to be.” Rendón then shifts his attention to the social 
conditions for Puerto Ricans in New York, describing their numerical dominance among 
indices of poverty, unemployment, tuberculosis rates, and residential segregation in the 
barrio: 
 Coming out of the subway into the streets of “el barrio” after being in downtown 
Manhattan is like stepping into another world. A senses-offending squalor is first 
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apparent after the tall, glass and steel cityscape, a contrast suddenly sprawling 
before the eyes of squat three and four story tenements littering the streets. It is 
hard to judge which is more disturbing—the suddenness of the climb up the 
subway stairs or the abruptness of East 96th street which runs like an invisible 
Berlin Wall between affluent Manhattanites and East Harlem Puertorriqueños and 
Harlem blacks. 
 
Like Thomas’s essay, Rendón’s text helped contextualize the community based initiatives of 
the Young Lords, who sought a “revolutionary war to bring power to their people.”297  The 
Young Lords undertook a series of “liberation” actions aimed at improving conditions in the 
barrio including: the creation of lead paint testing programs, founding a mobile clinic to test 
for tuberculosis, free clothing exchanges, a breakfast program for poor children, free day care 
programs, community based educational initiatives, and in July 1970, the takeover of Lincoln 
Hospital in the South Bronx, long declared unsanitary and unsafe. 
MEXICAN-AMERICANS/CHICANO 
By August of 1972, the “La Raza” course had been amended to twelve hours, divided 
evenly between six hours for “Mexican-Americans/Chicano” and six hours for “The Puerto 
Ricans.”298 As with “La Raza” studies, the syllabi for “Mexican-Americans/Chicano” 
reflected the direct impact of the Chicano Movement on course content. However, this new 
iteration of studies also incorporated social science literature by predominantly white 
sociologists and historians, much of which reproduced hegemonic narratives that ran counter 
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to the political and educational agenda of Chicana/o movement activists. According to Dr. 
Frank Montalvo, who helped design the Latina/o program of study, material reasons 
underwrote this contradictory blend of scholarship, “There wasn’t much information 
regarding Latinos in general, so it was a matter of searching. The scholarly literature was 
very negative and kind of general and it talked about problems in a general context.” On 
the course’s use of primary sources from movement activists, Montalvo observed: The 
movement activism provided more focus for us, provided a direction on understanding 
major issues in the country.  So, we tended to lean on those documents that related to 
social movements.299 
In their first two hours of study, DRRI students were introduced to Mexican history. 
Course objectives included: 
1. Acquaint students with the history and contributions of the various Indian tribes 
and their relationship with the Spanish conquistadores. 
2. Examine the term Mestizo 
3. Provide a brief history of the Mexican people with emphasis on certain important 
facts such as: a) Mexico’s independence from Spain b) Mexico War c) Treaty of 
Guadalupe-Hidalgo and its guarantees to the Mexican American people d) 
Mexican Revolution of 1910 e) the great depression f) the Bracero Program g) 
Milieu of the Southwest 
 
Reading assignments for this first hour included Mexican Americans in the Southwest (1970) 
by sociologist John Burma and North from Mexico (1968) by Carey McWilliams, followed 
by a viewing of the twenty-minute film North from Mexico (1971) which declared that 
Mexican-Americans “have long been one of America’s forgotten minorities. Today, they will 
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no longer allow themselves to be forgotten.”300 The third hour of instruction concentrated on 
Reies Tijerina (“el Tigre”) and the Land Grant Movement with lesson objectives focused on 
“reviewing the happenings and ramification of Tierra Amarilla.” In 1967, members of the 
Alianza Federal de las Mercedes (Federal Alliance of Land Grants) under leadership from 
Tijerina, raided the federal courthouse at Tierra Amarilla in northern New Mexico, in an 
attempt to reclaim Northern Mexico lands for Hispano residents. The fourth hour of 
instruction concentrated on “Chicano/Mexican American Education and Employment” with 
the following course objectives: 
1. Review and analyze the educational levels of Chicano/Mexican Americans and 
Anglos throughout the Southwest. 
2. Examine factors that have retarded Chicano/Mexican American achievements 
in the field of education. 
3. Examine and review general school practices affecting Chicanos/Mexican-
Americans. 
4. Investigate the effects of segregation in the school systems as it affects 
Chicano/Mexican American students. 
5. Explain the term “Shrunken Head of Pancho Villa”301 
Prior to the 1960s, biological and cultural deficiencies theories labeled Mexican 
American students as “too clannish” and noted “they do not care about education” or as 
language handicapped. For that reason, schools largely transmitted dominant Anglo-
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American values, norms, and expectations to Mexican origin students.302 DRRI students 
were required to read excerpts from La Raza by Stan Steiner (1970), wherein Steiner drew 
much of his educational data from the 1968 pamphlet, “The Mexican American: Quest for 
Equality” published by the National Advisory Committee on Education for Mexican 
Americans. Among the report’s more startling findings were that the average Mexican 
American child in the Southwest dropped out of school by the seventh year; in Texas, 89 
percent of children with Spanish surnames dropped out before completing high school, 
and Mexican Americans accounted for more than 40 percent of the so-called “mentally 
handicapped” in California.303 While acknowledging that federal funds had been 
allocated for bilingual education, the report’s authors noted that “perhaps an even more 
serious one is the problem of involuntary discrimination — that it, our insistence on 
fitting the Mexican American student into the monolingual, monocultural mold of the 
Anglo American.”304 To supplement their reading of Steiner, DRRI students also read 
from “The Excluded Student,” a May 1972 Report by the US Civil Rights Commission, 
which declared: 
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“The suppression of the Spanish language is the most overt area of cultural exclusion.  
Because use of a language other than English has been cited as an educational 
deterrent to Americanization, schools have resorted to strict repressive measures.  In 
spite of the fact that nearly 50 percent of Mexican American first graders do not 
speak English, they are often compelled to learn a new language and course material 
in that language simultaneously during the first years of their educational 
experience.305 
The study also documented the limited availability of Mexican-American schoolteachers 
relative to percentage of Mexican-American schoolchildren. It found that of 325,000 teachers 
in the five Southwestern states, only 12,000 or 4 percent were Mexican-American, while 
nearly 20% of students were Mexican-American. Moreover, it found that Mexican-
Americans were underrepresented on local boards of education in those same states, with a 
survey finding that of 4,600 school board members, only 470 or 10 percent were Mexican-
American. The weak educational status of Mexican origin schoolchildren, alongside the 
urgency for bilingual education had been an emerging national dialogue since the mid-1960s. 
In 1966, the National Education Association (NEA) held its first conference on the education 
of Spanish-speaking children. Thereafter, in 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed into 
legislation the Bilingual Education Act (BEA), allocating federal funds to public school 
districts with a high percentage of students with limited English speaking ability.306 In 1970, 
the U.S. Department of Education, Health, and Welfare (HEW) issued a memorandum 
indicating that students could not be denied access to educational programs because of a 
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limited ability to speak English.307 That same year, the Mexican-American Legal Defense 
and Education Fund (MALDEF) prepared to provide legal counsel for United States v. Texas, 
after Judge William Wayne Justice of the U.S. District Court ordered the State of Texas, 
via the Texas Education Agency (TEA) and nine school districts to remedy past 
discrimination and practices of de jure segregation that disproportionately harmed black 
and Mexican-American schoolchildren. In June 1971, Congress approved $500 billion for 
the Office of Education, with $35 million allocated for bilingual education.308 This particular 
block of instruction coincided with the apex of federal advances towards desegregation in 
American public schools. Twenty-four years after Westminster v. Mendez (1947), prohibiting 
the segregation of Mexican-American schoolchildren in California and eighteen years after 
Brown v. Board of Education (1954) eliminating segregation in public schools nationally, the 
reformist impulse in American education had never been stronger. While DRRI students 
immersed themselves in the literature of Mexican-American educational history, nationally, 
issues of affirmative action in higher education, mandatory school busing, and the 
elimination of de facto segregation were taking center stage amongst American educators, 
policymakers, and the Nixon administration.  
  The extent to which the Chicano Movement directly influenced the 
“Chicano/Mexican-American” curriculum was even more pronounced in the next three 
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blocks of instruction, dedicated to “Ethnic Organizations and Political Effectiveness”;  
“Brown Power & Brown Berets”; and “José Angel Gutiérrez.” Objectives for lesson 2214 
included: 
1. Acquaint students with the various organizations such as: a) G.I. Forum b) 
MAPA c) MAYO d) PASSO e) El Teatro Campesino 
2. Trace the development of Mexican American organizations and their 
effectiveness within the Chicano/Mexican-American community 
3. Discuss Rodolfo “Corky” Gonzalez and the Crusade for Justice 309 
 
This section provided historical context for the diverse groundswell of activism that 
underwrote Movimiento politics during the years 1965-1971 just prior to the establishment of 
the DRRI.  The rise of the Chicano or “Brown Power” movement explicitly named the 
grievances with earlier tactics of social and political advancement. Broadly, the course 
emphasized the trajectory of Mexican-American political consciousness from the 
conservative, liberal-based framework adopted by members of the “Mexican-American 
Generation” to the confrontational style politics embraced by the Chicano paramilitary group, 
the Brown Berets. The choice of which groups to highlight reveals a moderate approach to 
the study of Mexican-American political ideology bounded within a domestic context, unlike 
the transnational, anti-colonial philosophy manifest in Lessons 2812 “Black Contemporary 
Thought.” Collectively, the course hewed to the language of civil rights, disavowing the 
internationalist solidarity agenda and Marxist ideological orientation of some Chicano 
activists. For example, the American G.I. Forum, a small veterans group established in 1947 
by Dr. Hector P. García, became a nationally recognized Mexican-American advocacy 
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organization after addressing the refusal by a white-owned funeral home in Three Rivers, TX 
to bury Mexican-American World War II veteran Felix Longoria. The GI Forum’s efforts 
were largely directed at combatting discrimination, providing veterans’ services, and 
community based outreach. Immersed in the language of citizenship, the GI Forum’s 
constitution noted: “As loyal citizens…we sincerely believe that one of the principles of 
democracy is religious and political freedom for the individual and that all citizens are 
entitled to the right of equality in social and economic opportunities.”310  Emphasizing their 
status as “Americans” and as military veterans who had shed blood in the battlefields of 
World War II, the Forum “readily broadcast the patriotism of Mexican-Americans.”311  Yet 
in doing so, Forum members also directly correlated whiteness with citizenship, as 
emblematized by Garcia’s remark, “I resent the term ‘brown power.’ That sounds as if we 
were a different race. We’re not. We’re white. We should be Americans.”312 
The Mexican American Political Association (MAPA) and Political Association of 
Spanish Speaking Organizations (PASSO), both founded in 1960 in response to the 
presidential election of John F. Kennedy, focused on increasing Mexican American political 
representation in the electoral process and generally advancing the agendas of Mexican 
American elected officials like Congressman Henry B. Gonzalez of Texas, Congressman 
Edward P. Roybal of California, and Senator Dennis Chávez of New Mexico. Focused on 
“getting out the vote” drives and concentrating on matters of school desegregation, public 
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discrimination against Mexican-Americans, and unfair hiring practices of Mexican 
Americans in federal occupations, these groups represented a collective pursuit for Mexican-
American civil rights during the 1950s that celebrated an idealized version of American-ness, 
bound by claims that their rights to liberty, equality, and democracy as citizens had been 
abrogated by socially sanctioned, race-based practices of discrimination. 
 In shifting focus to the founding of the Crusade for Justice by Rodolfo “Corky” 
Gonzalez, the instructors for “The Mexican-American/Chicano” highlighted the ideological 
rupture between older generations of ethnic based activism, premised on models of inclusion, 
to younger generations who rejected such tactics and “presented a stiff challenge to a civil 
rights strategy that emphasized Americanization.”313 A former boxer, businessman, G.I. 
Forum member, and Democratic party official from Denver, Colorado, in 1966 Gonzalez 
founded the “Crusade for Justice” to protest police brutality and racism from law 
enforcement following the suspicious and brutal deaths of two Mexican-Americans at the 
hands of Denver police officials.314  Originally a local organization comprised of 
approximately thirty working-class families, the Crusade’s initial platform focused on 
discrimination in the Denver public school system, cultural programs, efforts to organize 
sanitation and postal workers, and supporting Gonzalez’s (unsuccessful) campaign for 
Denver mayor in 1967. Philosophically, the Crusade endorsed tenets of cultural 
consciousness, premised on notions of “La Familia” (the family) and self-determination. 
Politically, the Crusade rejected traditional establishment politics and measures by Johnson’s 
                                                
313 Oropeza, Raza Si! Guerra No! Chicano, 45. 
314 In the summer of 1962, Eddie Romero was gunned down by Denver police and in March 1966, Alfred 
Salazar was also killed under suspicious circumstances.  
 140 
Great Society, instead focusing on creating its own autonomous educational institutions, such 
as founding a separate school, Tlatelolco, and its own independent newspaper, El Gallo.315 In 
late spring 1968, members of the Crusade for Justice, under Gonzalez’s helm, organized a 
contingent to attend the Poor People’s March on Washington D.C., calling attention to the 
material conditions of poverty, residential segregation, and income disparities affecting 
people of color—African Americans, Chicanos, and American Indians—that civil rights 
reforms had failed to address. However, DRRI instructors chose to ignore Gonzalez’s 
growing anti-war activism. Beginning in 1965, as the War in Vietnam escalated, Gonzalez 
increasingly turned his attention towards denouncing the war and its disproportionate impact 
on the Chicano community. In 1966, Gonzalez began routinely speaking out against the war 
and organizing rallies to protest US interventions in Southeast Asia. According Lorena 
Oropeza, “Gonzalez flatly rejected military service as a testing ground for Mexican-
American manhood.”316  However, given Gonzalez’s anti-militarist stance, including his 
claims that the “economic stabilization of our country” rested on waging war, DRRI 
instructors chose not to emphasize this aspect of Gonzalez’s political platform, especially 
when the war in Vietnam was still underway. Additionally, the curriculum’s attention to the 
Brown Berets “development and leadership” suggests that DRRI instructors were more 
concerned with emphasizing the cultural nationalist ethos endorsed by figures like Gonzalez.  
 The inclusion of study of the El Teatro Campesino (The Farm Workers’ Theater) 
stands alone in this section of instruction as one of the few sites attentive to cultural 
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production within the Movimiento.317 Founded in 1965 as the cultural wing of the United 
Farm Workers (UFW), El Teatro was conceived of as a union tool for organizing, fund-
raising, and politicizing the exploitative conditions of farmworkers.318 Through improvised 
skits, referred to as actos often performed in the fields, during demonstrations and marches, 
Teatro members drew attention to the need for farmworkers to unionize against the abuses of 
agribusinesses, which included large-scale pesticide poisoning of farm laborers, exploitative 
wages, substandard housing, child labor, and no benefits. As Yolanda Broyles-Gonzalez 
argues, the Teatro Campesino emerged amidst a widespread flourishing of Chicana/o theater 
across the Southwest and Midwest, during which performers sought to “affirm an alternative 
social vision that relied on a distinct Chicana/o aesthetic.”319 Rooted in Mexican oral 
tradition, folk storytelling, and utilizing the practice of the carpa (tent show), El Teatro 
performances mixed biting satire, with sometimes crude or vulgar characterizations, to 
underscore the complex social realities of Chicanos, grounded in both working class social 
experiences and shared cultural heritage. As a political tool of the UFW, El Teatro presented 
counter-hegemonic narratives that directly critiqued the powerful agribusiness lobby, with 
skits often enacted in a combative style that privileged humor, parody, and “verbal jousting” 
between a fictionalized authority figure and prototypical “underdog” often representing farm 
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laborers.  Early actos included Los Vendidos (“The Sell-Outs,”1967) which examined racial 
stereotyping of Mexican-Americans in California; Huelgistas (“Strikers,”1970) highlighting 
the valiant struggle of union strikers and La Gran Carpa de los Rasquachis (“The Great 
Tent of the Underdogs,” 1972) which followed a Mexican Cantinflas-like character from 
his crossing the border into the United States and various indignities he suffered until his 
death.  Throughout this period, El Teatro founder and artistic director Luis Valdez also 
produced several anti-war actos.  
In the closing act of Valdez’s The Dark Root of a Scream (1967) a character 
named Señora Gonzalez lets forth an agonizing wail as the flag-draped casket of her son 
Indio, a U.S. soldier killed in Viet Nam, is opened in her presence alongside her family 
priest, Indio’s girlfriend Dalia, and his childhood friends, Gato, Lizard, and Conejo.320  In 
an earlier scene from the play, Señora Gonzalez faints and drops her son’s Medal of 
Honor. The priest retrieves it and attempts to comfort her: 
PRIEST: …in spite of your grief, you can be very proud of your son. The 
Congressional Medal of Honor is the highest award his country could give him. 
MADRE: La Medalla…ya van tres.321 
PRIEST: tres?322 
DALIA:  That’s right father. She has three. One for her oldest boy killed in 
France, another killed in Korea and now Indio. 
The priest’s attempt to comfort Señora Gonzalez by emphasizing her son’s heroic 
sacrifice on behalf of the nation tellingly casts her in the role of the archetypal patriotic 
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mother—stoic, silent figures that quietly support the nation’s war efforts even if it means 
the possibilities of their child’s mortality.323 In short, he represents a dominant strand of 
political rhetoric that though sympathetic to mothers of the war dead, nonetheless 
colludes in silencing potential opposition from them. Señora Gonzalez’s reply, “ya va 
tres” (that makes three now) reminds the audience that prestigious medals provide little 
consolation for the loss of her child—no matter how “noble” the cause of war. Further, 
by noting that she has lost two other sons in prior U.S. wars, Valdez indicts the tradition 
of military service by Mexican-Americans, recognizing perhaps implicitly, that it has 
done little to change the material circumstances for which they are enlisting. Dark Root, 
alongside Valdez’s other major anti-war actos Soldado Razo (Buck Private, 1971) and 
Vietnam Campesino (Vietnam Peasant, 1970) gave dramatic voice to the anguish, 
frustration, and contradictory set of allegiances experienced by Mexican origin 
communities across the Southwest, as well as other Latina/os significantly affected by the 
U.S. war with Viet Nam. Often addressing issues of community pressure to serve, 
familial pride, job discrimination, and limited opportunities for advancement, Valdez’s 
anti-war plays, according to Mariscal, “embody the tension produced by the desire to 
assimilate.”324 The scream that Señora Gonzalez concludes the play with is a particularly 
evocative one that would be echoed throughout Latina/o communities in the Southwest, 
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New York, Chicago, and Puerto Rico precipitated by rising casualty rates of Latina/o 
service-members. 
The DRRI curriculum expressly ignored anti-war activism within the Chicano 
community. As Montalvo notes, “The anti-war movement was not part of our mission 
and never discussed in class nor in meetings– not Corky, Cesar, or MLK. We knew about 
their sentiments, but we were very focused on training.”325 Aside from disavowing the 
anti-war stances adopted by figures like Gonzalez and Tijerina, “The Mexican-
American/Chicano” course plan devoted no efforts at even mentioning the Chicano 
Moratorium taking place two years earlier and representing the largest mass mobilization 
of any specific racial/ethnic group in US history. In August 1970, between twenty and 
thirty thousand Chicana/o nationalists and anti-war protestors peacefully assembled in the 
streets of East Los Angeles to call for an end to the war in Viet Nam. Their critiques of 
U.S. imperialism, structural racism, and economic inequality forced a fundamental re-
assessment of Mexican-American nationalism, as well as the dominant post-WWII 
narrative of democracy and freedom for racial minorities. 
 In rejecting the hegemonic political ideology of assimilation characteristic of 
earlier civil rights struggles, Movimiento members, like other cultural nationalist groups 
of the period, argued for wider social and political recognition of their ethnic and racial 
difference. Propelled by the achievements of the Civil Rights movements of the 1950’s 
and early 60’s, movement activists revised, adjusted, and even rejected prevailing logics 
of post-war liberalism that praised or called attention to their worthiness, patriotic 
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devotion, deservingness of full citizenship, and ability to appropriate whiteness. Rather, 
movement activists deployed the refrain “La batalla está aquí” (the battle is here) to 
foreground more immediate issues of concern to Mexican-Americans than fighting and 
dying “in a faraway land”: substandard housing, poverty, educational disparities, and 
deficient employment opportunities.326  As historian Lorena Oropeza makes clear in her 
study of the Moratorium, participation in anti-war activism prompted many Chicanas and 
Chicanos “to interrogate the meaning of masculinity for their struggle.”327  
The issue of gender, and more specifically, masculinity was not critiqued, but 
rather, implicitly endorsed by instructors within “The Mexican-American/Chicano” 
course offering. According to the forward of the syllabus for Minority Studies Division: 
“the readings will focus on men, their philosophies, and events.”328 As evident in course 
outlines 2213-2215, there were no readings authored by women, with course content 
focused exclusively on male leaders of political organizations. While the social 
movements of the 1960’s, from black liberation to Third World solidarity directly 
underwrote much of the course content for the DRRI in its early years, the role of gender 
had yet to be fully theorized, processed, and integrated into DRRI courses. The pointed 
omission of women within the “Mexican-American/Chicano” course study, and generally 
within the Minority Studies Division may have its origins in two mutual factors.  
First, by and large, the “Mexican-American/Chicano” studies division replicated 
the male-centered discourse of Chicano nationalism, with its attendant focus on 
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carnalísmo (“brotherhood”), and cultural-visual preoccupations with archetypal male 
warriors. Imagery of romanticized figures like Cuban revolutionary Ernesto “Che” 
Guevara and Mexican revolutionary Emiliano Zapata, potent symbols of male virility, 
defiance, and bravery, saturated Moviemiento cultural productions in artwork, songs, 
poetry, and literature. More importantly, the curriculum’s emphasis on cultural 
nationalism, predicated on la familia de la raza, (the people’s family) or the concept that 
Chicanos were a “family” reproduced a classic patriarchal framework, with women 
considered ancillary figures—caretakers and loyal supporters of the movement, but not 
its central protagonists. Nowhere was the masculinist orientation and sexual politics of 
the curriculum more explicit than in Lesson Outline 2213, “The Mexican-American 
Family” in which students were asked to “explain concepts relative to the family 
structure: a) Machismo b) Personalismo and c) Carnalísmo.”329 In this context, 
machismo, or a presumed standard of male behavior identified with Mexican culture, is a 
complex term connoting both positive and negative qualities.330 On one hand, it can mean 
such notable attributes as a protector of the family, decisive, dignified, hard working, and 
responsible. However, it is more widely recognized for negative associations with hyper-
masculinity, aggression, violence, desires to control women, and exaggerated sexual 
promiscuity. Social science literature of the early 1970s, substantially correlated 
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machismo with the latter.  The course reading for Outline 2213 drew heavily from 
sociologist John Burma’s Mexican-Americans in the US (1970), where Burma described 
a cultural dichotomy between Mexican-American males and females, portraying Mexican 
American women as “ideally submissive, unworldly, and chaste” or “at the command of 
the husband, who [keeps] her as he would a coveted thing, free from the contacts of the 
world, subject to his passions, ignorant of life.”331  
This passage emblematizes the social science literature of the era that stereotyped 
Mexican Americans as culturally different, with values that deviated substantially from 
that of Anglos and African-Americans. In her early study of sociological literature about 
Mexican-Americans, Sally Andrade noted that such studies, like Burma’s were most 
concerned with machismo and familism.332 Other notable sociological studies, such as 
William Madsen’s The Mexican-Americans of South Texas (1964) posited culturally 
determinist assertions, characterizing the sex roles of Mexican-Americans as rigidly 
defined between the macho ethos of the husband as an authoritarian figure and the 
subordinate position of women as nurturers and maternal figures singularly concerned 
with family well-being. In particular, Madsen emphasized a conflicting value system 
between Mexican-American and Anglos, contrasting the “Anglo democratic family with 
its concept of female equality” with crude characterizations of Mexican-American 
women as essentially docile, opinionless, and deferential.333  Though intended as a primer 
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on Chicana/o cultural identity and practices, the “Mexican-American/Chicano” course 
relied heavily on such social science literature as Burma’s and Madsens’s, thus perhaps 
unwittingly, reifying stereotypical portraits of Mexican-Americans as culturally divergent 
from mainstream conceptions of gender parity and normative Anglo-values.  
Second, as a structuring condition for the military, masculinity itself had 
experienced a series of transformations.  The war in Vietnam, though winding down, had 
successfully perforated the ideal of military manhood once vital within the Cold War 
national imaginary when military service was lauded as not only honorable, but a 
necessary pretext for the maintenance of a “free world.” As Robert O. Self observes, 
“Because he is meant to be noble and the best the nation has to offer, and because he is a 
mirror for the nation to gaze upon itself, the soldier is by nature a public figure, his 
manhood subject to explicit discussion and debate.”334 The Vietnam War’s unpopularity, 
immersed in scrutiny over US imperialism, racism, and classism translated into a 
fundamental public re-evaluation of the American soldier and of once valorized 
conceptions of militarized masculinity—the set of beliefs, practices, and attributes that 
enables individuals to claim authority based on an affirmative relationship with the 
military, conferred power by virtue of service that certifies one’s claims to competence, 
trustworthiness, or authenticity.335   
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By early 1972, the relationship between American manhood and military service 
had been irrevocably breached. As Americans looked to the war in Vietnam, a panoply of 
atrocities, abuses, and horror, they sought to reconcile the contradictory entanglement 
between soldiers as reflections of moral authority and soldiers as purveyors of violence. 
Young men themselves began to question the inherited legacy of American manhood 
directly correlated to the “dutiful manliness of the warrior.”336 Interrogating the 
relationship between manhood and military service in 1971, UFW leader Cesar Chavez, 
during a major speech at Los Angeles’s Exposition Park queried whether, “to be fully 
men, to gain respect from other men, the poor, brown, and black farmworkers of America 
ought to kill other farm workers in Southeast Asia.” How can Mexican Americans be 
proud, Chavez asked, “if our sons go off to war grasping for their manhood at the end of 
a gun?” 337 Likewise, the rise of second wave feminist critiques of traditional gender roles 
posed “a serious challenge to traditional male military values” according to William J. 
Gibson, marking the 1970s as a “time for deep crisis for a cultural production of war and 
the warrior.”338   
Overall, the “Mexican-American/Chicano” course stayed faithful to its broader 
aims of familiarizing students with Mexican-American history and expounding on the 
major tenets of Chicano nationalism. Under Sgt. Ron Gonzalez and Command Sgt. Major 
Fred Silva’s helm, the course’s curriculum enabled students to learn about, confront, and 
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grapple with basic elements of ethnic Mexican identity and heritage. However, in 
ignoring the anti-war philosophy of many Chicano movement members and the vital role 
of women, the course also subscribed to a narrow interpretation of Chicano identity 
politics that erased the more activist dimensions of the Movement’s ideology. 
PUERTO RICAN STUDIES 
If the “Mexican-American/Chicano” studies course sought to incorporate elements of 
contemporary ethnic-based activism, “The Puerto Ricans” curriculum shared no such 
pedagogical aspirations. Rather, instructors Silva and Gonzalez focused on a broad 
overview of Puerto Rican history, absent any of the revolutionary political currents taking 
shape throughout urban barrios in New York, Chicago, and Detroit. The first block of 
instruction, “Lesson 2311: Puerto Rico-Overview” consisted of little more than a viewing 
of a thirty-minute film, “Island in America.”339 Narrated by San Juan-born screen and 
stage actor Raúl Juliá, the short film related the problems of Puerto Rican migrants in the 
US, their struggles against racial discrimination and poverty, and included commentary 
by Joseph Monserrat, then President of the New York City Board of Education, and 
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Congressman Herman Badillo, who, in 1971, became the first Puerto Rican elected to 
Congress in the United States. The second block of instruction, “Puerto Rican-History” 
offered a more expansive course plan, albeit one that more closely resembled a high-
school social studies course than an immersive cultural learning plan. Lesson objectives 
included: 
1) Acquaint the student with the culture of the Taino Indians. 
2) Review and study the Spanish colonization of the Island and its attitude 
toward the Taino Indians. 
3) Examine the development of the economy and its effects on: 
a) The Taino Indians 
b) The importation of slaves from Africa 
4) Review Spain’s response to political developments on the island up to the US     
occupation340 
The sole assigned reading came from Kal Wagenheim’s Puerto Rico: A Profile (1970), 
wherein Wagenheim offered this synoptic version of Puerto Rican history: “Puerto Rico’s 
earliest citizens—some 30,000 copper-skinned Taíno Indians—were killed, frightened 
off, or absorbed by Spanish colonizers in the sixteenth century. Next came an influx of 
African slaves.”341  Elaborating further on the “genetic bouillabaisse” of Puerto Rican 
racial identity, Wagenheim noted: “Since the Spaniards brought few women with them, 
the black, white, and red races were mixed in a stew that has bubbled quietly for five 
centuries.”342 This “stew”, according to Wagenheim, produced the multi-racial “skin 
spectrum” of Puerto Rican racial identification ranging from blanco (“white”) to prieto 
(“dark-skinned”) to negro (“black”) and finally to the all-encompassing trigueño (“olive-
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skinned). To what extent, if any, students discussed the ethno-racial implications of 
phenotypic diversity among Puerto Ricans and their subjection to racial discrimination on 
either the island or in the US is left unclear from the course outline.  
The second block of instruction for Lesson Outline 2311, “Puerto Rico—Return 
to Colonization” recounted the colonial occupation of Puerto Rico by the U.S. Lesson 
objectives were outlined accordingly: 
1) Acquaint the student with the US military occupation of the island 
2) Analyze and study the development of nationalism on the island 
3) Acquaint the student with the economic situation and political developments 
during the period 1940-1968343 
 
 In “analyzing the development of nationalism on the island” DRRI students 
briefly touched on the period 1900-1950, when Puerto Rican nationalism reached new 
heights. After three decades of US colonial rule, when US economic penetration and 
industrialization of island plantation economies led to widespread poverty and out-
migration, political discontent festered. Thereafter, island inhabitants placed their faith in 
Pedro Albizu Campos, a veteran of the First World War, the first Puerto Rican graduate 
of Harvard Law School, and leader of the Nationalist Party. A gifted orator and 
unyielding revolutionary, Campos led the Nationalist Party from 1930 until his death in 
1965. Tensions were particularly acute during the early 1930s, when a sequence of 
skirmishes erupted between nationalists and police officials. In 1936, Albizu Campos and 
other nationalist leaders were charged and convicted of seditious conspiracy following 
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the murder of E. Francis Riggs, the island’s American police chief.344 In the aftermath of 
Albizu Campos’s conviction, Governor Blanton Winship authorized the execution of a 
group of nationalist protestors in what was subsequently deemed the Ponce Massacre. 
The mass killing of nineteen civilians--peacefully marching with the Nationalist Party at 
the time of the shooting--alongside the imprisonment of the era’s most vocal 
independista, greatly weakened the independence movement. 
 In 1940, the US Naturalization Act designated Puerto Rico as an incorporated 
territory, intended on extending the right of sus joli citizenship to Puerto Rican residents. 
But the revised naturalization statute proved little consolation against endemic poverty 
wrought by US controlled sugar manufacturers. Known as the “Poorhouse of the 
Caribbean,” almost half of the nation’s 1.1 million inhabitants were unemployed. Those 
that did find employment were primarily concentrated in sugar cane cultivation, largely 
controlled by US companies. Per capita income hovered at a mere $121. During this same 
period, US militarization of Puerto Rico accelerated, with the establishment of Camp 
Santiago, a Puerto Rican National Guard training facility, in Salinas. Considered a critical 
site for the armed forces’ presence in the Western Hemisphere, the following year saw 
the forced displacement of thousands of residents from the island of Culebra, as the US 
Navy installed a marine base, laying claim to 1,700 acres of the ten square mile island 
and air space above. Additionally, the island of Vieques was cleared of inhabitants and 
natural vegetation to make way for the Roosevelt Roads Naval Station, a massive military 
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base encompassing two-thirds of the island (32,000 acres) and three harbors, to be used 
as a testing site for bombing and shooting drills.  
 The final selected reading for the course section drew on excerpts from Latin 
American historian Earl Parker Hanson’s Puerto Rico: Ally for Progress (1962), 
centering on the political ascension of Luis Muñoz Marín, who in 1952 became the first 
democratically elected Governor of Puerto Rico. A former independista and socialist, 
Muñoz Marín had come to admire the Roosevelt’s administration’s New Deal platform. 
In the early 1950s, he oversaw the implementation of the Estado Libre Asociado (ELA), 
widely regarded to mean Commonwealth of the United States, which served as a third 
option between independence and statehood, both of which appeared increasingly 
unlikely. To Marín, and a vast segment of the population, it had become increasingly 
clear that independence from the US would most certainly destitute the island. As 
Puertorriqueños looked to their fellow Caribbean neighbors, they became acutely aware 
that their economic and social destiny was inexorably bound to the US, with US 
economic access a vital way to ensure a higher standard of living than they would be able 
to maintain without. Though Commonwealth status permitted the adoption of a Puerto 
Rican Constitution, its contribution to fundamentally altering the island’s subordinated, 
colonial relationship with the US remained unchanged, though it did allow the US to 
“rebuff accusations of colonialism at the height of the Cold War.”345 Following suit, 
Hanson likewise rebuked notions of colonialism. For him, Marín’s political rise signaled 
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an end to Puerto Rico’s embittered colonial history. As he noted in his text, “When a 
colonial subject wins an election on a revolutionary platform, and the ruling nation says, 
‘it is a fine idea, we will help you all we can,’ the spirit of colonialism has fled. Today, 
Puerto Rico is no longer a colony.”346 
The creation of the ELA briefly provoked a violent upsurge in nationalist 
sentiment, including an attempt by nationalists to assassinate President Harry Truman in 
1950. Nonetheless, the legislation carried support by a large segment of the Puerto Rican 
populace for the next two decades. 347  Under Marín’s leadership, and the entrenchment 
of his Popular Democratic Party (PPD) in electoral affairs, independence became a 
waning issue as the vast majority of island inhabitants now lent their support to either the 
Commonwealth or statehood option.  Meanwhile, Marín focused on developing a rapid 
export oriented industrialization program, “Operation Bootstrap” premising the island’s 
economic development on foreign private investment, replete with tax exemptions for US 
companies, loan assistance programs, and wage and rent subsidies.348  With economic 
prosperity on the horizon, Puerto Rican voters adopted Marín’s Commonwealth model in 
1952.  But alongside Puerto Rico’s transformative economic recovery, came another 
major shift that would define the decade. Since the early nineteenth century, Puerto Rican 
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policymakers and US officials alike had collectively fretted over the island’s supposed 
overpopulation problem. As historian Laura Briggs documents, among US social 
scientists, philanthropists, and lawmakers, “excessive, uncontrolled reproduction was an 
obstacle to capital formation” otherwise known as “development.”349  In addition to 
implementing family planning programs, emigration to the US was widely encouraged by 
Marín and other policymakers as a solution to overpopulation, but also stood as a 
“cornerstone of the island’s economic development policy.”350 In the wake of the Second 
World War, roughly a quarter of the Puerto Rican population relocated to the mainland in 
search of opportunity. According to César Ayala and Rafael Bernabe, between 1950 and 
1970, twenty-seven percent of the 1950 population of Puerto Rico had migrated to the 
mainland.351 For many, their aspirations lay unfulfilled, as the growing Puerto Rican 
population became one of the most impoverished and disenfranchised minority groups in 
the country, subject to rampant racial and social discrimination. But rather than address 
this point, DRRI Instructors Gonzalez and Silva continually invoked Hanson’s decidedly 
triumphantalist account of Puerto Rican history: 
ACHIEVEMENTS 
Since the election of 1940, and with the help and support of the United States, 
Puerto Rico has among other things: 
 
6) Extended that great impetus to all classes of Puerto Ricans to the point where 
thousands are today “civically employed” and giving their thoughts and labors 
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to improving their own lives, instead of expecting their government to do 
everything for them; 
7) Abolished its former colonial status and created an unprecedented political 
relationship with its erstwhile imperial rulers which permits the former colony 
to proceed with its development at an unprecedented pace.352 
 
Hanson’s exultant narrative, praising Puerto Rico’s presumed economic recovery and 
symbolic emancipation from colonialism, foreclosed a meaningful dialogue about the 
conditions of racialization, poverty, and inadequate access to resources characterizing the 
lives of a vast majority of Puerto Ricans living in the US. According to national studies, 
the median income for all “Spanish-speaking” households in 1971 hovered at just $7,500-
-not quite three quarters of the national median income-- while for Puerto Rican families, 
the number remained much lower at $6,200. Moreover, national averages maintained that 
nearly 90 percent of all Puerto Rican children dropped out of public education before 
reaching high school.353 By the early 1970s, nearly 900,000 Puerto Ricans, both island 
and mainland born, resided in the US. Yet their elision from the “Puerto Rican” 
curriculum signals a concentrated omission by Gonzalez and Silva, who instead, chose to 
focus their next area of instruction, Lesson 2313 “Puerto Rican culture,” on “a rural study 
of the island and jibaro.” In so doing, they wholly disregarded the emergence and 
efflorescence of mainland Puerto Rican cultural identity, including activism by the 
Young Lords.354 
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 As with the “Mexican-American/Chicano” course study, Silva and Gonzalez 
refrained from discussing anti-war politics. As Montalvo argues, “We were like infantry 
soldiers on the field, we had enough to deal with. It wasn’t simply a matter of academics. 
It wasn’t about just taking a test. It put it us on a sharp point on what would help them out 
in race relations.”355 The belief, at least for Silva and Gonzalez, was that the activist 
socio-political agendas of groups like the Young Lords, who blended political theory 
with community organizing, exceeded the DRRI’s mission for training in racial and 
cultural sensitivity. Though the Young Lords origins lay rooted in largely black and 
Puerto Rican urban struggles, their ideological orientation proved far too radical for Silva 
and Gonzalez. Privileging expansive notions of community, informed by a revolutionary 
spirit of resistance, and revolving around nationalist and internationalist concerns for the 
historical legacies of colonialism, the Young Lords advocated an emancipatory politics of 
self-determination incongruent with the liberal framework adopted by the “Puerto Rican” 
course study.  As outlined in the Young Lords 13 Point Platform (1969): 
2. WE WANT SELF-DETERMINATION FOR ALL LATINOS 
Our Latin Brothers and Sisters, inside and outside the united states, are oppressed 
by amerikkkan business. The Chicano people built the Southwest, and we support 
their right to control their fight against gringo domination and its (puppet) 
generals. The armed liberation struggles in Latino America are part of the war of 
Latinos against imperialism. QUE VIVA LA RAZA! 
 
 
3. WE WANT LIBERATION OF ALL THIRD WORLD PEOPLE 
Just as Latins first slaved under spain and the yanquis, Black people, Indians, and 
Asians slaved to build the wealth of this country. For 400 years they have fought 
for freedom and dignity against racist Babylon (decadent empire). Third World 
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people have led the fight for freedom. All the colored and oppressed people of the 
world are one nation under oppression. NO PUERTO RICAN IS FREE UNTIL 
ALL PEOPLE ARE FREE!356 
By October of 1973, the “Latino Studies” curriculum was minimally expanded to include 
Cuban Americans, with two newspaper articles addressing the influx of Cuban 
immigrants within the Miami area since the late 1960s.357   
CONCLUSION: MILITARY EXCEPTIONALISM & THE TRACTABILITY OF RACIAL 
LIBERALISM 
 The curricula for both the Black and Latina/o units of study conjure images of a 
radical pedagogical project, concerned with unsettling racist assumptions, histories, and 
attitudes. In many regards, the DRRI’s Minority Studies Division proved successful in 
expiating short-term practices of racial abuse and mistreatment towards minorities vis-à-
vis its intensive program of cultural sensitivity training. Indeed, the DRRI offers a 
compelling history of institutional reform. However, a closer inspection of the 
curriculum’s strategic absences, especially the Latina/o Studies division, exposes the 
ways the DRRI re-inscribed ideas of national belonging, citizenship, and racialized 
military subjectivity. 
 As Jodi Melamed writes of the post-war ascendancy of racial liberalism in 
American political discourse, these “state-sanctioned antiracisms repressed 
counternationalisms and deflected criticisms of U.S. global power.”358  The 
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institutionalization of anti-racist discourse embodied in the DRRI’s program of study 
represented an important step forward in combatting racism, but its emphasis on 
historical modes of racism simultaneously disavowed, contained, and repressed broader 
structural critiques of American military hegemony and US global imperialism. Put 
another way, even as the DRRI granted recognition to the historical conditions 
underwriting minority disenfranchisement in American life—political, economic, social, 
colonial, educational, cultural—it nonetheless effaced the military’s own role in 
perpetuating and/or benefitting from these conditions. The Black and Latino Studies 
curricula, with emphases on “new white consciousness”, personal behavior modification, 
and immersion in multicultural US history, however profound or consciousness-raising, 
nevertheless externalized racism to the domain of civil society. In so doing, DRRI agents 
preserved visions of the military as an exceptional site, autonomous from and in 
contradistinction to racial inequalities abounding in American public life. The DRRI’s 
ability to absorb, systematize, and re-calibrate minority difference as a material 
expression of the military’s commitment to cultural pluralism (diversity), elucidates the 
flexible logics of racial liberalism’s expansive capacity for organizing and structuring 
race. Despite its sustained promotion of racial tolerance and inclusivity, the American 
military could not evade the disparities of race informing its own constitution; a reality 





“El Soldado Americano”: Latina/os, Racial Arithmetic,  
& the American Dream, 1973-1977 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In February 1973, Air Force Colonel Clarence Miller, the Deputy Director of 
Instruction with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) issued a memorandum to 
DRRI Director Richard Hope, detailing grievances about the DRRI Minority Studies 
Division’s attention to Latina/o personnel. In his two page memo, Miller noted rising 
criticism that the Institute was “very black-white oriented” and “does not address, in a 
meaningful way, the needs of minority servicemen who are not black.”359  Upon his 
detailed review of the program, Miller indicated the following actions were being taken: 
a. Minority Studies Division is working on a Memo concerning a feasible ethnic 
identifier system for Latinos. The one presently proposed by OSD is not 
satisfactory. 
b. Much more research effort must be directed toward minorities other than black. 
One of the difficulties our instructors have in including meaningful material on 
minorities is the absence of research in this area—except black.  
c. The course should be expanded to provide more time for the La Raza block.  
 
 
As Miller’s memo makes clear, scrutiny over the DRRI’s Latino program of study arose 
both from tension over perceived disregard for Latina/o issues, but was also materially 
underwritten by a paucity of Latina/o authored scholarship, as well as confusion over 
how to properly classify Latina/os given their heterogeneous racial, ethnic, linguistic, and 
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national-origin backgrounds. As senior DRRI consultant Lt. Col. Frank Montalvo (Ret.) 
recalls, “Our [DRRI] focus was primarily around African-Americans. Latina/os felt 
neglected. Other minority issues, women’s issues, working-class issues, any of those 
other groups were considered relatively minor and secondary. That was always an issue 
at DRRI.”360  For an institution premised on advancing amicable race relations, the 
apparent indifference to Latina/o issues posed a serious crisis, with competition replacing 
friendliness between personnel. According to Montalvo, “There was a lot of friction and 
jealousy…and this sense that ‘my problems are more important.’ The African-Americans 
felt we [Latina/os] were riding on their coattails…on the Civil Rights Movement. They 
didn’t see a need to talk about Latina/os and bilingual education or English language 
requirements.”361  
  By late spring 1973, DoD officials could no longer afford to ignore Latina/o 
issues, including “English language requirements.” Concerns over Latina/os’ 
classification, representation, and treatment took center stage, hastened by three factors. 
First, as indicated by the 1970 US Census, Latina/os accounted for a rapidly accelerating 
portion of the US populace. At just under ten million, they constituted the second largest 
racial minority group in the country, meaning they would also increasingly comprise a 
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larger share of the United States Armed Forces (USAF).  Second, as USAF officials 
initiated preparations for implementing the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) on July 1, 1973, 
they recognized the changing racial and ethnic composition of those that would be 
entering service. According to DRRI Director Hope, “The reality was that a major 
portion of individuals that were recruited for military at that time were coming from inner 
cities and barrios.” Of the DRRI’s specific role, Hope added: “It was not just about the 
demographics, but about knowing who these people were who were being recruited to the 
military.”362 Third, “knowing who these people [racial minorities] were” entailed 
identifying, acknowledging, and correcting USAF policies implicitly undermining 
Latina/o service personnel’s well being. Such issues included: insufficient English 
language preparation for Spanish-dominant soldiers; neglecting to address racist behavior 
directed towards Latina/os; and lack of culturally relevant, Spanish oriented materials--
music, movies, popular literature, food, grooming items--at post-exchanges, 
commissaries, and service clubs on military installations.   
This chapter turns it attention to the calculus of race. Who were Latina/os? How 
should they be defined? And why did they matter to USAF policy-makers during the 
early-mid 1970s? By examining debates between DRRI personnel, the report by the 1972 
Task Force on Military Justice, and the 1973 “Study of the Spanish-Ethnic Soldier,” this 
chapter traces federal efforts to consolidate Latina/o service personnel under an 
identifiable, legible, and quantifiable label of ethno-racial classification. Throughout this 
chapter, I explicate how struggles over the meanings and assignment of a pan-ethnic 
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category of Latinidad expose how Latina/os disrupted the black-white racial binary of the 
US racial paradigm. Further, this chapter connects tensions over the formal recognition 
and institutionalization of Latinidad to three broader social phenomena: the demographic 
ascension of US Latina/os, the military’s transition to an All-Volunteer Force, and the 
increasing import of neoliberal doctrine in American life and culture. By mid-decade, 
military leaders increasingly turned their attention towards the nation’s burgeoning Latina/o 
population, hailed by a TIME magazine cover story in 1978 as soon to become America’s 
“Biggest Minority.”363  Finally, this chapter argues that the move towards culturally 
recognizing Latina/o military personnel worked in tandem with the military’s shift towards 
embracing a neoliberal model of race and citizenship, predicated on disavowing structural 
critiques of racism, in favor of a politically nullified and socially palatable form of 
multiculturalism.  
“WHAT ARE YOU OR WHAT DO YOU WANT TO BE CALLED?”: CLASSIFYING AMERICANS 
OF “SPANISH DESCENT” 
   
In April 1972, Secretary of Defense Laird commissioned the Task Force on the 
Administration of Military Justice in the Armed Forces to investigate claims of 
disproportionate punishment directed towards minority personnel. Headed by Nathaniel 
R. Jones, general counselor for the NAACP and General C.E. Hutchin Jr., the fourteen-
member panel devoted most of its eight month long study to examining racial disparities 
administered under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The task force’s 
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ensuing 261-page report also identified systemic patterns of racial discrimination against 
Latina/os in the areas of testing, classification, and language.364 In a section titled 
“Americans of Spanish descent in the armed forces” task force authors relayed their 
frustration over the DoD’s classification system which did not separately tabulate 
Latina/o personnel: “There are in this country some seven million Mexican Americans, 
four million Puerto Ricans and…five hundred thousand Cubans, Central and South 
Americans, and Dominicans. But, in the personnel statistics of the armed forces, they do 
not exist.”365  
Historically, DoD policy coded Latina/o service members, the majority of whom 
were of ethnic Mexican descent, as racially “Caucasian” in accordance with legal 
precedents established during the 19th century.366 Thus, most of the estimated 500,000 
Latina/os who served during World War II did so in racially integrated combat units, with 
the exception of the 65th Infantry Regiment (“Boriquaneers”) the only-all Puerto Rican 
combat unit. However, given the military’s policy of racial segregation, phenotypically 
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darker-skinned or black Latina/os, primarily Puerto Ricans, served in separate “coloured” 
units.367 A notable case is that of Esteban (Stephen) Hotesse, a Dominican-born soldier, 
who served with the famed Tuskegee Airmen, the U.S.’s first African-American military 
air squadron.368 Racial segregation in the military persisted throughout the Korean War 
(1950-1953), with “dark-skinned” Puerto Ricans assigned to the “all-Negro” 24th Infantry 
Regiment.369 
By the mid-1960’s, the draft and subsequent entry of tens of thousands of 
Latina/os into the MACV-era armed forces, made clear that USAF policy-makers 
insufficiently accounted for Latinos’ distinct ethno-racial experiences.  The task force’s 
findings constituted the first time USAF officials formally recognized “Americans of 
Spanish Descent” as a separate minority group.370  In their investigation, task force 
authors noted that Latina/os were subject to “cultural discrimination” largely related to 
their “differentness” as registered by language: speaking Spanish and/or non-standard 
English.371 Likewise, the failure of the services to separately track Latina/o personnel, 
according to task force authors, carried substantial implications: “This failing has 
particularly serious consequences for Americans of Spanish descent because it leads 
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directly to both a failure to perceive they have problems in the military and to a distorted 
understanding of what those problems are.”372  
Until 1977, the Army in particular, utilized a subjective classification system, 
whereby clerks filing the enlisted member’s form visually determined a person’s race or 
ethnic group. According to Army Major Don Rojas, a staff officer with the Office of 
Equal Opportunities Program (OEOP), “Rarely was the individual asked, ‘what are you 
or what do you want to be called?”373 Spanish-language surnames and skin color 
employed as “obvious indicators for determining ethnic background,” left lingering 
questions about how Afro-Cuban, Afro-Boricua, Dominican, and other phenotypically 
Afro-Latina/o soldiers were categorized.374 As of 1977, the Army utilized four racial 
categories: Caucasian, Black, Other, or Unknown. This caused dismay among Latina/o 
soldiers, some of whom, like Sgt. 1st Class Raul Vera, flatly rejected the oft applied 
“Caucasian” and/or “Other” label as an inaccurate portrayal of his ethno-racial identity, 
experiences, and heritage. Vera grumbled, “I have strong feelings about those words. I 
don’t like them. I don’t want to be an Other or Unknown for the rest of the time I have to 
wear this uniform—not if someday I’m expected to die in it.”375 
When it came to ethnicity, confusion persisted about what categories would be 
both sensitive to soldier self-identification, while also providing an accurate portrait of 
demographic diversity. It was an issue highlighted by the 1972 Task Force, which argued 
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that extant classifications for Latina/os were inadequate. Task force authors asserted that 
“Americans of Spanish descent” should be the primary classification system denoting 
“Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Central and Latin Americans, and/or others of 
Spanish speaking origin, with a distinct and separate classification for Mexican 
Americans and Puerto Ricans who are also native Americans.”376  The following year, 
USAF officials adopted the term “Spanish-descent” for Latina/o soldiers, but this term 
did not appease everyone.  
 Following Miller’s memorandum, in March 1973, Lt. Col. Montalvo, then Chief 
of the DRRI Minority Studies Division, prepared a three-page memorandum addressed to 
Miller criticizing the OSD’s classification system for non-black racial minorities. In 
particular, Montalvo took issue with DoD’s use of Code “A”, abbreviated as “Span-
Dscnt” (Spanish-Descent) referring to: “all personnel of Spanish extraction except when 
delineated separately.”377 Separate delineations of code “B” for “Mexican-Americans” 
[or “Chicanos”], code “C” [INS-PR] for Insular Puerto Ricans, designated as “those born 
and reared in Puerto Rico,” code “D” [OTH-PR] referring to “those personnel born or 
reared outside geographical entity of Puerto Rico,” and code “E”, for Cuban-Americans 
(no explanation provided) appeared problematic to Montalvo. By Montalvo’s logic, 
separate coding systems for groups B-E, “does not clearly allow for presentation of total 
number of individuals with similar ethnic backgrounds.”378 Because Mexican-Americans, 
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Puerto Ricans, Cuban-Americans, and “Other” Latina/os [Dominicans, Columbians, 
Peruvians, and Central Americans] shared Spanish ancestry, Montalvo felt a mechanism 
should exist for collecting aggregate data on the total number of Latina/os: “there is no 
generic designator that serves to identify totals of those coded A through E.” Following 
suit, Montalvo recommended, “that the term ‘Latino’ be used to report summary data for 
codes A through E.”  In contrast to the US Census, which in 1970 utilized the category 
“Spanish-origin,” and later adopted the term “Hispanic,” Montalvo suggested using 
another pan-ethnic identifier: 
That the designation, Latino, be used as the official generic descriptive term for 
all personnel with similar Central and South American, Caribbean, and Iberian 
cultural origins. The Spanish derivation, Latino, rather than the Anglo equivalent, 
Latin, more accurately reflects the Hispanic ethnic identification being sought. 
 
Montalvo did not stand alone in his preference for “Latino” to “Hispanic.” Master 
Sergeant José Lopez of the Southwest Regional Recruiting Command in San Antonio, 
Texas, felt “Hispanic” was insufficient: “Although Hispanic is used for statistical 
purposes only, the term itself is part of the problem. Hispanic, in reality, divides us into 
different categories—Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, but it doesn’t include South 
Americans. Concurring with Montalvo’s assessment, Lopez noted, “However, use of the 
term ‘Latino’ would include all present Hispanics plus the South Americans. As one 
identifiable group it would be easier to provide statistics on the total number of 
Latinos.”379 Major Don Rojas, a staff officer with the Office of Equal Opportunity 
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agreed, adding, “If the term ‘Latino’ is more inclusive, then adoption of the term should 
be seriously considered.”380  
Montalvo’s memorandum went unheeded. By 1975, DoD officials adopted the 
term “Hispanic” in accordance with revised federal guidelines—a process formally 
initiated two years earlier. In April 1973, members of the Subcommittee on Minority 
Education, a division of the Federal Interagency Committee on Education (FICE), 
completed a report entitled, “Higher Education for Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, and 
American Indians.”381  But the report itself was never published after educators of Puerto 
Rican, Cuban, Mexican and Native American descent assembled to discuss the report, 
stormed out of its meeting, incensed over how it wrongly identified racial minorities. 
According to Grace Flores-Hughes, a member of the “Special Concerns” section of 
HEW,  “they came ready for bear.”382 Nonetheless, FICE forwarded the report to HEW 
Secretary Caspar Weinberger for comment. In turn, Weinberger encouraged members to 
“…(1) coordinate development of common definitions for racial and ethnic groups.” 383 
In June 1974, FICE hastily established the Ad Hoc Committee on Racial and Ethnic 
Definitions to implement Weinberger’s recommendations under the helm of newly 
named Chairman, Charles E. Johnson Jr., Assistant Chief, Population Division of the 
Census Bureau. Over the course of a year, members of the Ad Hoc committee, which 
included African-Americans, Asian and Pacific Islanders, whites, and Native Americans, 
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held contentious meetings with arguments erupting over such terms as “colored” and 
“Oriental.” But the most explosive debates centered on developing classifications for the 
“Spanish speaking” community.  
Several prominent group members included Flores-Hughes of HEW, Felipe 
Garcia of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Abdín Noboa-
Rios, of the National Institute of Education, and Paul Planchón of the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB).384  Recalls Noboa-Rios, “there was never any 
consensus in that group to the very end. There were some bad feelings. I know two 
people didn’t speak for up to a year after it was over.”385 Noboa-Rios himself preferred 
the term “Latina/o,” derived from the Latin based Romance languages of Spain, France, 
Italy, and Portugal. Several members suggested, “Hispano” but were overruled by those 
that felt “Hispanic”—a US derivation of “Hispaña”, referring to the cultural diáspora 
created by Spanish conquest, would be less confusing, despite its rare usage outside of 
the US. In April 1975, the Ad Hoc Committee formally adopted “Hispanic” to refer to 
“persons of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South American, or other Spanish 
culture or origin, regardless of race.”386 According to the Ad Hoc committee’s report, a 
majority of members felt prior references to Spanish language or surnames for 
identificatory purposes were inappropriate standards, since “Spanish speaking” excluded 
many who were English language dominant or monolingual English-speakers, nor did all 
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members of the community hold Spanish surnames. The report concluded, “the term 
Hispanic was selected because it was thought to be descriptive of and generally 
acceptable to groups to which it is intended to apply.”387  In the end, Noboa-Rios 
conceded, “we came up with an agreement. For the purposes of the census it was 
important to know who we were, because we were an underrepresented population.”388  
  As Noboa-Rios’s point makes clear, the issue of “Hispanic” versus “Latino” 
ethnonyms exceeded semantics. For Montalvo, Lopez, and other Latina/o military 
officials, there remained a serious undercount of the total percentage of Latina/os within 
the military; a fact highlighted in an extensive, bilingual Soldiers magazine article from 
October 1973: “Since the Census Bureau doesn’t even know, its not surprising to 
discover that neither the Army nor the Department of Defense knows exactly how many 
Mexican-American, Cuban, Puerto Rican or other Latin people belong to the armed 
forces.”389 By mid-decade, Spanish surnamed individuals accounted for approximately 
47,000 soldiers or five percent of the Department of the Army (DA).  
Obtaining a precise count of the total number of USAF Latina/os members 
extended beyond mere bureaucratic imperative. If Montalvo and other interested officials 
could factually document an accurate percentage of Latina/o service personnel as a 
considerable and rising segment of the USAF—supported by an accumulative formula--it 
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also meant they could justify expenditures and a broadening of resources devoted to 
aiding Latina/o service-members. Such resources, as highlighted by the 1972 Task Force 
report, included:  developing equal opportunity programs and human relations councils 
devoted to Latina/o heritage and culture; increased efforts to recruit Latina/o “doctors, 
psychiatrists, lawyers, judges, and teachers”; additional ROTC programs emphasizing 
recruitment of Latina/os, and service-wide English language orientation programs for 
Latina/o personnel.390 CCOSP Chairman Henry Ramirez echoed this sentiment in a 1974 
letter to President Nixon. After visiting several military bases in West Germany, Ramirez 
had this to say:  
I had long talks with General Jones concerning the treatment of minorities, and 
especially the Spanish-speaking minority. I told him that I was convinced that 
the first step that must be carried out to bring full opportunity to the Spanish 
speaking in the armed services is through their identification, an accurate count 
that would show their age, grade, time in service, skill level, location and major 
command. I explained to him that only in this way can we determine where the 
Spanish speaking are and how they are progressing.391 
 
Montalvo underscored Ramirez’s point about accurately assessing Latina/o military 
personnel in his memorandum’s second major contention, regarding the OSD’s separate 
coding system between “C” [Insular] and “D” [Other] Puerto Ricans. Montalvo believed 
                                                
390 Task Force on the Administration of Military Justice, Report of the Task Force on the Administration of 
Military Justice in the Armed Forces (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1972). 28. 
391 Ramirez is referring to General David C. Jones, Commander in Chief, US Air Forces in Europe, 
Ramstein, Germany. Henry Ramirez to President Richard Nixon, May 30, 1974, Box 15. White House 
Central Files: FG 145: Robert H. Finch Collection. Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba 
Linda, CA. 
 174 
that problems and concerns between raised Puertorriqueños on the island and those raised 
elsewhere did not warrant separate codes.392 As outlined in his memorandum: 
Lack of educational and economic opportunities; ready access to and from 
Puerto Rico and U.S. urban centers; discrimination experienced in the United 
States; and resulting insulation of North American barrio communities leading 
to “Island in America” viewpoints, are among the factors which maintain 
greater similarity than dissimilarity among Puertorriqueños. 393 
 
For Montalvo, the dire economic, social, and political circumstances characteristic of 
Puerto Rican origin communities, both mainland and islander, merited serious and urgent 
federal attention; a sentiment shared by Manuel A. Gonzalez, New York Director of 
Hispanic Community Relations and a CCOSP member. In October 1973, Gonzalez 
drafted a letter to Tobin Armstrong, Counselor to President Nixon requesting intervention 
on behalf of New York’s Puerto Rican community: “It is the general consensus of the 
populace [Puerto Rican-Hispanics] that New York and other Eastern seaboard areas are 
bypassed or inadvertently recognized in matters that are vital.  Very little consideration is 
given to this sector of the country when it comes to employment and programmatic 
opportunities.”394 As with the DRRI’s curriculum, and much of the military’s own 
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material regarding Latina/os, emphasis tended to be placed on Mexican-Americans, given 
their numerical dominance with the US Latina/o populace. But unlike their Mexican-
American or other Latina/o peers, a far higher percentage of Puerto Rican soldiers faced 
an additional hurdle: English language proficiency.  
English language acquisition and proficiency among Puerto Rican soldiers had 
long been a problem for the US military. As of 1970, sixty percent of all inducted Puerto 
Rican soldiers were functionally illiterate in English.395 For many Puerto Ricans born and 
raised on the island, knowledge of formal English constituted less of an issue, than 
familiarity with conversational English. The Puerto Rican public education system 
required English language instruction from first through twelfth grades, but outside of 
formal schooling, Spanish remained the dominant spoken idiom. Beginning in 1969, all 
Puerto Rican soldiers born, raised, and inducted on the island were sent to the Defense 
Language Institute English Language Center (DLIELC) at Fort Jackson, South 
Carolina.396  
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At Fort Jackson, Puerto Rican recruits received three weeks of training. Courses 
lasted five days a week, with six hours a day spent learning spoken English and two 
hours a day devoted to military subjects. After three weeks of training, students were 
tested by listening to tape recordings in English, then required to correctly answer thirty-
one out of one hundred questions on an English-language written exam. Upon passing the 
course, students were permitted to enter basic training. However, if they failed, they 
would have to repeat the same three weeks of training, with no more than a total of nine 
weeks of training permissible. Thereafter, soldiers were required to take one of several 
aptitude tests (depending on military branch) to determine their individual probability for 
success and military occupational specialty (MOS).397  However, all aptitude tests were 
administered in English. Given the low-standards (roughly thirty percent) for passage of 
the English language exam at DLIELC, its not surprising most Puerto Rican soldiers 
scored poorly on the ACB, ASVAB, and other aptitude tests. This translated into lower 
MOS scores and subsequent pipelining of many Puerto Rican soldiers into infantry 
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divisions, service and supply handling, and other similarly low-skilled occupations, 
leaving little opportunity for promotion or selection for specialized or advanced skills 
training.  An opponent of English language aptitude tests, Brigadier General Antonio 
Rodriguez-Balinés, commander of the Army Reserve Forces in Puerto Rico argued, “Its 
not an intelligence test. If you really want to measure intelligence, the test must be in the 
native tongue in which that applicant was educated.”398 Moreover, the problem was not 
limited to island-born Puerto Rican soldiers. No military wide program existed to assist 
non-insular Puerto Rican Latina/o soldiers, including Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans 
(many of whom were “Nuyoricans”), Dominicans, Cuban-Americans, or others, for 
whom English was a second language. Yet by one estimate, nearly 30% of Mexican 
American adults could not read or write in English.399 Thus, their achievement on 
aptitudes tests was similarly inhibited. The issue of English language aptitude tests was 
earlier addressed by the 1972 Task Force, which identified English-only aptitude tests as 
a serious impediment to Spanish dominant soldiers and recommended that “service tests 
be administered by persons familiar with the language and be written in the language of 
the person taking the test, thereby making it possible for test results to reveal the 
individual’s full capabilities.”400 But this portion of the task force’s recommendation was 
not implemented.  
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The social implications of Latina/o performance on aptitude tests proved insidious. 
Time and again, Latina/os reported systemic discrimination based on widespread 
perceptions they were “dumb”, “slow” or “incompetent” owing to their accents or 
restricted English conversational ability. According to Captain Elíu Camacho-Vásquez, 
former Chief of Ethnic Studies at DRRI: 
Language shock magnifies cultural shock. It hits Latinos who don’t understand or 
speak English. This is compounded by the discrimination that already exists. 
Because of an ingrained ethnocentrism in the Army, and military generally, when a 
person from a different culture and background comes on active duty, he’s 
automatically rejected or programmed for failure. If he can’t be rejected for 
anything else, his lack of English is used against him. During basic training (BT), 
when a Latino soldier is told to do something and he doesn’t do it, its usually a 
matter of not understanding what was said. Yet the emphasis may be on the fact he 
didn’t do it.401 
 
Recalls one young Puerto Rican soldier who completed BT at Fort Polk, Louisiana, “I 
didn’t like the drill sergeant making fun of my accent. I never had to speak a lot of 
English on the island, so I need to practice a little, but he doesn’t need to make fun of me. 
It makes me mad.”402 Added Captain Vásquez-Camacho, “Its usually an asset to speak 
and think in two different languages. But when a person has an accent, too many officers 
and NCO’s equate that with stupidity.”403  
In addition to facing harassment for being “slow,” estimates indicate that English 
limited proficiency Latina/o soldiers cognitively missed between 20-30% of all training 
and military knowledge during BT. While they might pass BT, they faced additional 
problems when proceeding to Advanced Individual Training (AIT). If soldiers fared 
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poorly during BT, they could potentially face discharge. Yet discharges did not reflect 
language difficulties. Rather, the military might cite “learning difficulties” or “sub-
marginal intelligence” or employ another category before discharging soldiers. Regarding 
the omission of military English language proficiency schools and subsequent 
discrimination against Latina/o personnel, Sgt. 1st Class Vera bitterly observed: “Perhaps 
what the military is saying is that they don’t need Latinos anymore. During war they need 
our muscle to hold a rifle and our bodies to stop bullets, but in peacetime we’re ignored 
and kept in menial jobs.”404  
“A STUDY OF THE SPANISH-ETHNIC SOLDIER: ATTITUDES, PROBLEMS, NEEDS” (1973) 
 The military, and DA in particular, recognized racial discrimination against 
Latina/o personnel constituted a mounting problem. To this end, in 1973, DA officials, 
working with the US Army Research Institute for Behavior and Social Sciences (ARI) 
commissioned a study to better understand experiences by Latina/o service personnel, as 
well as assess their needs, treatment, and attitudes. Titled, A Study of the Spanish Ethnic 
Soldier: Attitudes, Problems, Needs, the 150-page quantitative report published in 
December 1973, was conducted by Lawrence Johnson & Associates (LJA), a Washington 
D.C. based research consulting firm. Over the course of several months, the think tank 
administered surveys, evaluations, and questionnaires to 1,000 Spanish-surnamed 
soldiers (pay grades E2-E9; O1-O4) and 600 Black, white, and “Other” soldiers at four 
stateside Posts (Fort Jackson, SC; Fort Ord, CA; Fort Carson, CO; and Fort Hood, TX) 
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and five communities in Germany.405 Consisting primarily of a specially composed 
“Army Experience Survey” and an adapted “Enlisted Personnel Questionnaire,” 
instructions for completing the surveys and all survey materials were executed in both 
English and Spanish, with each testing session carried out verbally by one English-
speaking proctor and one bilingual LJA researcher. 
In its  “Summary of Findings”, the report made three major claims: 
1. Differences in self-concept were found for both rank and ethnic group. 
2. Puerto Rican enlisted men reported significantly more problems and needs as  
       compared to Chicano, Black, and White enlisted men 
3. The data on attitudes toward Army personnel of all ethnic groups shows that 
Chicano, Puerto Rican, and enlisted men had more negative attitudes than 




The issue of “self-concept”, or the “attitudes and beliefs an individual maintains about 
himself” comprised the report’s first half, which began with an abbreviated three-page 
recap of sociological literature reviewing how discrimination affects racial minority 
groups. This section explicitly focused on “self-concept” developed in response to 
“interpersonal experiences.” At issue, was the degree to which “negative experiences” of 
racism, discrimination, and/or harassment altered how Latina/o military personnel viewed 
themselves: “research suggests that to the extent that minority group individuals 
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internalize stereotypes and negative attitudes held by the majority, minority group 
members will suffer lowered self-concept.”406   
Prior to 1972, few studies existed documenting Latina/o experiences with racism. 
In referencing a 1961 sociological study, LJA researchers noted most Anglo-Americans 
expressed assumptions that Mexican Americans were: “essentially inferior, 
undependable, irresponsible, childlike, indolent, unclean, and deceitful.”407 The report’s 
authors also cited sociologist Ralph C. Guzmán’s early 1967 work, arguing that dominant 
portrayals of Mexican-Americans in movies and other media, as “villainous, 
untrustworthy characters with shifty eyes and criminal proclivities” or as “sweet peasant-
type persons who are courteous and direct” underwrote negative attitudes towards 
Mexican-Americans.408 Regarding such portrayals, film historian Charles Ramírez Berg 
later argued that these stereotypes operated as “a negative mirror of dominant 
values…the sloppy, greasy appearance of el bandido in any number of Hollywood 
westerns, coupled with his nearly psychotic savagery and immorality, reflects poorly on 
Mexicans and Mexican Americans.” According to Berg, “this stereotype—standing in 
sharp contrast to the Anglo hero—has another effect: it reinforces the cleanliness, 
sobriety, sanity, overall decency and moral rectitude” of Anglos. “In the case of 
                                                
406 Ibid, 5. 
407 Ozzie G. Simmons, “The Mutual Images and Expectations of Anglo-Americans and Mexican-
Americans.” Daedalus, 1961. 286-299. 90. Referenced in Lawrence Johnson & Associates, “A Study of the 
Spanish-Ethnic Soldier: Attitudes, Problems, Needs.” (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 
1973) 6. 
408 In his study of cinematic portrayals of Latina/os, film historian Charles Ramírez Berg identified six 
major stereotypes: “the Bandido, Half-Breed Harlot, Male Buffoon, Female Clown, the Latin Lover, and 
the Dark Lady.”  Charles Ramirez Berg, Latino Images in Film: Stereotypes, Subversion and Resistance 
(Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2002). 66-86. 
 182 
Hispanics such portrayals mark them as symbols of ethnic exclusion.”409  Similar to 
concerns raised by Chicana/o activists, Guzmán also highlighted the liminal status of 
Mexican-Americans as existing “in a no man’s land between full acceptance accorded 
persons of European stock and the outright rejection Blacks have come to expect.”410 
Also noted in Guzmán’s study, were assertions that, “Puerto Ricans were regarded as 
“loud, aggressive, uncouth, irresponsible, and generally viewed less positively than 
Mexican Americans.”411 LJA researchers likewise cited Anthony Dworkin’s 1965 study 
on “Stereotypes and Self-Images held by Native-born and Foreign-born Mexican-
Americans” wherein Dworkin found that foreign-born Mexican-Americans (FBMA) had 
significantly higher positive self-image than U.S. born Mexican-Americans (NBMA’s). 
Dworkin’s study attributed this fact to exposure to and immersion in US based racism. 
NBMA’s used largely negative terms when describing themselves as “(a) emotional, (b) 
unscientific, (c) authoritarian, (d) materialistic, (e) old-fashioned, (f) short, fat, and dark, 
(g) poor and of a low social-class, (h) having little care for education, (i) mistrusted, and 
(j) lazy, indifferent, and unambitious.”412  
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To determine “self-concept” of Latina/os service-members, LJA researchers 
employed a modified “Army Experience Survey” (AES). After filling out a “Personal 
Data Questionnaire” consisting of fifteen questions concerning place and date of birth, 
marital status, pay grade, and other classification data, subjects completed the 36-
question AES, so that researchers could “obtain an index of an individual’s perception of 
himself.” 413 Respondents were to select between five answer categories: Never, Seldom, 
Sometimes, Frequently, or Always. Section I sample questions included: 
 2. I question my worth as a person/ Dudo de mi valor como persona 
12. I have feelings of inferiority/ Tengo un complejo de inferioridad  
15. In order to get along and be liked, I tend to be what other people expect me to 
be/ Para  ser aceptado por los demás tiendo a ser como ellos quieran que yo sea.  
   18. I think I’m crazy or something/ Creo que yo soy loco o algo parecido  
   29. I want to be like the typical soldier/ Quiero ser como el soldado típico  
   34. I live by other people’s standards/ Vivo acuerdo a los valores establecidos por 
otros414 
 
Subsequent report results indicated that Spanish-surnamed enlisted soldiers held a lower 
self-concept than the self-concept reported by either Black or White enlisted soldiers. 
Likewise, no major statistical difference between differing Spanish-surnamed ethnicities 
was documented.415  
To examine the Army’s role in augmenting or detracting from Latina/o military 
personnel self-concept, Section II consisted of a “Problems and Needs Scale,” with 27 
questions addressing: promotion and education, services, interactions with Army 
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personnel, social life and recreation, and language facility (comprehension and speaking). 
Sample questions included: 
38. I can get records, which I really want, in the PX/ Puedo conseguir discos que 
verdaderamente quiero en el PX 
 
47. My educational opportunities in the Army are determined by how well I speak 
English/ Mis oportunidades educativas en el Ejército dependen del dominio del 
inglés 
 
55. I have been called unacceptable names by my Army superiors/ Mis superiores 
en el Ejército me han llamado con expresiones inaceptables  
 
58. My superiors show the same respect for my intelligence as they do for men 
from other ethnic backgrounds/ Mis superiores demuestran el mismo respeto a mi 
inteligencia que a la de los miembros de otros grupos étnicos. 
 
61. The Army serves food that my ethnic group likes/El Ejército sirve comidas que 
son del agrado de los de mi grupo étnico  
 
Regarding question 38 on the subject of music availability, including Spanish-language 
records in PX’s, over 69% of Puerto Rican and 42% of Chicano enlistees responded they 
could never find music appropriate to their tastes.416 Not surprisingly, and as previously 
discussed regarding English language correlates to military success, question 47 yielded a 
significantly high percentage of Spanish-surnamed soldiers responding affirmatively to 
the assessment. Among enlistees, nearly 60% of Puerto Rican, 32% of Chicanos, and 
45% “Other” Spanish-surnamed groups conceded that English language fluency as a 
criterion frequently or always determined military educational opportunities. Consistent 
with responses by enlistees, among NCO’s, 55% of Puerto Ricans, 25% of Chicanos, and 
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21% of “Others” concurred that English proficiency determined probability for 
educational advancement. These numbers were far higher than those reported by Whites 
(9%) and (15%) of Blacks responding to the same question.417 Regarding question 55, 
relating to racial or ethnic slurs (“unacceptable names”), both 25% or nearly 1/3 of Puerto 
Rican enlistees and NCO’s declared they were either always or frequently recipients of 
inappropriate language, put-downs, or insults. This percentage exceeded that for Chicano 
enlistees/NCO’s (19%) and Blacks (21%).418  Widespread perceptions that Latina/o 
military personnel possessed lower intelligence likely accounts for LJA’s inclusion of 
question 58. In response, nearly 21% of Puerto Rican NCO’s and enlistees, as well as 
15.2% of “Other” Spanish surnamed enlistees/ NCO’s professed they were either never 
or seldom “shown the same respect for their [my] intelligence” as “men of other ethnic 
backgrounds.”  
As a social phenomenon, “respect” is an illusory concept, subject to and 
dependent upon differing cultural interpretations, definitions, social milieus, generational 
status, and a host of other context specific variables. Without personal testimony, it 
remains unclear which practices of behavior or attitudes by superiors, Puerto Rican and 
other Spanish-surnamed soldiers were referencing when they responded to question 58. 
However, it can be inferred from their responses that whether intentional or not, they 
nonetheless perceived their superior officers as refusing them corresponding amounts of 
respect concerning their intellectual capacities. Examples might include: using intellect-
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based slurs (ie “dummy”), speaking in slower registers, or assigning lower-skilled or 
menial tasks—all documented examples of discrimination reported by Latina/o soldiers. 
Finally, relating to food preferences, among enlistees 57% of Puerto Ricans, 42% of 
Chicanos, and 42% of “Others” reported dissatisfaction with Latina/o food availability, 
relaying that the Army either never or seldom offered food “their ethnic group likes.” 
This was a far higher percentage than the 20% and 22% asserted by Blacks and White 
enlistees respectively.419  
 Feedback from Section II confirmed two issues distinguishing the Army 
environment for Latina/o personnel, and thus underwriting their lowered “self-concept.” 
First, Army administration disregarded, remained indifferent to, or otherwise failed in 
seriously considering quality of life issues for Latina/o soldiers. When compared to 
critical inquiries about overt racial discrimination, questions centering on material needs 
(ie music selection, food choice) might appear arbitrary. But in fact, they exposed overt 
contradictions between the Army’s explicitly professed commitment to ensuring a 
racially inclusive, hospitable climate for soldiers of color and oversight in actualizing 
such conditions.  Second, questions about institutional disparities—namely, English 
language proficiency and dynamics of “respect”—told a far more unpleasant story. 
Recalling Sgt. Vera’s pronouncement that Latina/os were “ignored” during peacetime, 
the substantial quotient of Latina/o soldiers divulging experiences of racism, ranging 
from system-wide problems with English language instruction, to outright manifestations 
of racial degradation (i.e. ethnic slurs), and displays of hostility or mockery by superior 
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officers, signaled fundamental neglect by the Army towards Latina/o service members. 
To the extent that Latina/os suffered indignities, adverse conditions, or even exploitation, 
their frustration bore out vis-à-vis internalizing their racial distress, thus engendering 
feelings of inadequacy, marginalization, and hopelessness—indices of self-concept. The 
report’s final section, “Discussion and Conclusions” corroborated this point: 
“It appears that younger enlisted Chicanos and Puerto Ricans experience lower or 
negative self-concept. Since the Spanish-ethnic groups, especially the Puerto 
Ricans, report a high degree of problems and needs, it is likely that the experiences 
of significant problems in the military have had a negative effect on their self-
concept.  Perhaps then, problems and needs are an important factor in the formation 
of the self-concept of the Spanish-ethnic soldiers.”420 
 
However, rather than critiquing the Army for its failures to address systemic racism, the 
report’s authors hypothesized a decidedly narrow-minded measure for ameliorating the 
lowered self-concept of Spanish-ethnic soldiers:  
 
It seems possible that as the Spanish-ethnic soldier succeeds in the Army and 
increases in rank or pay grade, that he begins to take on more of the ways of Anglos 
and becomes more Anglicized. As this process occurs, his self-esteem may increase 
though identification with the majority group and the resulting acceptance by the 
majority group.421 
 
Thus, the “answer” to problems of Latino self-concept, according to report authors, lay 
with Latinos’ ability to approximate whiteness and “acculturate” themselves to Anglo 
dominant values, viewpoints, and conceptions.  This anachronistic assertion surfaced in 
stark contrast to the mission of the DRRI, and broader American sociological paradigms 
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privileging cultural pluralism and claims by racial minorities to embrace and/or express 
their racial identities. 
 Designed by LJA staff, section III, “Attitudes Toward Army Personnel Scale,” 
measured soldier attitudes toward “Spanish ethnics”; Blacks and/or Whites; and 
interactions between “Spanish ethnic soldiers” and others. For this survey, LJA 
researchers did not employ the terms Chicano, Mexican-American, or Puerto Rican, but 
instead utilized “Spanish-speaking” and “Spanish-ethnic.”422 Like previous sections, 
Section III utilized a five-point self-rating scale ranging from “never” to “always” as a 
means of assessing to what extent each soldier believed a given statement agreed with his 
personal experience. Sample questions included: 
66. White soldiers get away with doing a lot less work than Spanish-speaking 
inhabitants/   
                      Los soldado blancos logran hacer menos trabajo que los soldados 
latinos 
69. Spanish-speaking soldiers get treated equal to White and Black soldiers in the 
Army/  
          Los solados latinos reciben igual trato que los soldados blancos en el 
Ejército 
 
Regarding question 66--perceptions that white soldiers fulfilled less work-duty, all racial 
minority groups, but primarily Puerto Ricans (26.6%), responded White soldiers always 
maintained diminished workloads compared to Spanish-speaking soldiers. Even when 
adjusting for rank, this opinion held true among both enlistees and NCO’s, most likely 
reflecting the higher concentration of Whites in officer or other positions of authority, 
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where their share of labor-intensive or “grunt-work” was presumably lighter.423 As to 
question 69, recognizing equality of treatment for Spanish-speaking soldiers, among 
enlistees, 47% or nearly half of Puerto Ricans, 32% of Chicanos, and 30% of “Other” 
groups felt they were either never or seldom afforded equal treatment compared to their 
White and Black counterparts.424 Section IV of the Enlisted Personnel Questionnaire 
consisted of 153 multiple choice questions regarding the effectiveness of military race 
relations councils and DRRI training. Approximately half of Chicano and Puerto Rican 
NCO’s and enlistees reported race-relations training to be somewhat effective in reducing 
tensions within the Army. 425 
Taken in aggregate, “A Study of the Spanish-Ethnic Soldier: Attitudes, Problems, 
Needs” revealed that Puerto Rican enlisted men reported substantially more problems 
compared to Chicano, Black, and White enlisted personnel. Chicano enlisted men 
expressed more problems and needs than Whites, but did not differ statistically from 
Black enlisted men. The vast majority of racial minorities, blacks and Spanish-surnamed 
soldiers, reported facing major problems regarding slow promotions because of racial 
bigotry; limited educational opportunities; being subject to harsher discipline (ie Article 
15) than their white counterparts; discrimination in off-post housing; and difficulties with 
civilian merchants and police.426   
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The report rightly documented language as the most pervasive problem for 
Latina/o soldiers, particularly Puerto Ricans. Unlike Chicanos, largely reared in the 
American Southwest where they enjoyed more exposure to English, Puerto Rican recruits 
from the island as well as those hailing from Spanish-dominant US urban enclaves and 
households, received less immersion in English. Therefore, more Puerto Ricans described 
difficulty communicating with their superiors, thus causing them to receive undesirable 
assignments and oftentimes, harsher discipline. As a quality of life issue, English 
language deficiency created other conflicts for Puerto Ricans. For example, Puerto Rican 
soldiers reported waiting for longer periods of time before receiving service at Post 
hospitals than did other ethnic groups. Report authors ascribed this to “an inability to 
effectively communicate with the medic receiving them at the Post hospital. 
Consequently, they spend quite a bit of time trying to get medical attention from medics 
who cannot tell or will not determine what their medical need is.”427 
 On the question of discrimination, language-based or otherwise, the report minced 
few words: “Discrimination against minority groups exists in the Army.”428  As evidence, 
LJA researchers cited contentions by Spanish-speaking NCO’s, “who spent years in the 
Army” that they, alongside Black NCO’s, received slower rates of promotions and 
educational opportunities than did their white counterparts. Here, the authors’ declaration 
countered assumptions that English language acquisition and acculturation (ie longer 
duration in the Army) necessarily translated into parity between whites and non-whites. 
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Put another way, even when soldiers of color--Black, Latino, or “Other”--performed 
equivalently or met the same standards of qualification, including English, they were not 
privileged to equal treatment when it came to education, opportunities for advancement, 
or even material items (ie culturally appropriate PX items or meal availability). As the 
report noted, “In short, Spanish-speaking soldiers believe that Whites are getting a better 
deal in the Army than soldiers from Spanish-ethnic backgrounds.”429 
 Contrary to federal efforts at consolidating Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, 
and other Latina/os into an identifiable pan-ethnic category, report authors alleged “it is 
probably a mistake to talk about the Spanish-ethnic soldier in the Army.”430 Noting 
differences reported between distinct Spanish-ethnic groups, they elaborated: “It is more 
appropriate to consider the experiences of Puerto Ricans and Mexican-Americans 
(Chicanos) separately since they report different kinds of problems as well as different 
numbers of men experiencing problems.” On this point, the most salient missing feature 
of the study became glaringly apparent. The “Personal Data” entry form (see Appendix 
B) asked soldiers to identify themselves according to five designations: “(A) White, (B) 
Black, (C) Chicano/Mexican-American, (D) Puerto Rican, or (E) Other.” Yet in 
differentiating between “Black” and “Puerto Rican” or “Other,” LJA researchers failed to 
account for those Puerto Ricans, or “Others” (likely Panamanian, Cuban, or Dominican) 
who racially identified as Black.431 With this erasure of Afro-Latinidad, the study’s 
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discursive frame replicated essentialist and hegemonic nationalist, ethnic, and racial 
categories, omitting the historical and overlapping genealogical racial formations of 
Afro-Latinos. As Maritza Quiñones Rivera observes, “Afro-Puerto Ricans have to 
negotiate their blackness silently, while protecting their Puerto Ricanness, their common 
denominator, in an often antagonistic racial environment.”432 Throughout a “Study of the 
Spanish-Ethnic Soldier,” report authors repeatedly noted symmetries between Black and 
Puerto Rican responses: “Puerto Ricans tend to respond similarly to Blacks, more so than 
do Chicanos,” and “positive feeling between the Puerto Ricans and Blacks comes 
through” but declined to critically examine how phenotypic characteristics, such as 
similar skin pigmentation or hair texture affected patterns of racial discrimination or 
shared cultural identity between Blacks and Afro-Latinos (namely Puerto Ricans).433 For 
example, the study found that “difficulties with merchants in the civilian community are 
greatest for Puerto Rican and Black enlistees as compared to Chicano and White 
Enlistees,” but made no discernible effort to understand how blackness inflected 
propensity for being subject to harassment or bigoted behavior.434 A case in point 
occurred in March 1976, when Army Staff Sgt. Anthony Love-Gonzalez attempted to 
take his “dark-skinned” Puerto Rican wife to dinner at the Hotel Lenz in Fulda, Germany.  
Sgt. Love-Gonzalez and his wife were denied entry by a doorman, who subsequently 
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permitted three German couples to enter the establishment.435 That same year, taxi drivers 
in Stuttgart refused en masse to accept black and Puerto Rican soldiers as fares. Not 
surprisingly, half of Puerto Rican enlistees responded that they received more respect 
from Black soldiers, as opposed to only 21% of Chicano soldiers.436  
 Finally, Puerto Rican, Chicano, and Other “Spanish-ethnic” soldiers agreed most 
in their diminished attitudes toward the Army. Though their reasons varied, the report 
noted: 
Spanish-ethnic enlisted men are not happy with the Army as it is today. In 
conversations with LJA Spanish-speaking researchers, they indicated that they 
hoped changes would occur in the way Army life is today. They believe that they 
are not treated as fairly as White and Black soldiers. Furthermore, they feel that 
difficulties are not of their own making, and that Spanish-speaking soldiers are 
doing a good job in the Army.437 
 
In conversations with researchers, Spanish-ethnic soldiers relayed their concerns that the 
military should develop enhanced procedures for dealing with language difficulties. 
Echoing prior commentary about English-language aptitudes tests, at least one soldier 
mentioned entrance exams should be given in Spanish, better enabling Spanish-speaking 
soldiers to obtain more desirable job placements, while several soldiers remarked that 
English-language aptitude tests did not reflect their “true abilities.”438 Report authors 
concluded, somewhat alarmingly, that Army officials should more comprehensively 
foreground concerns by Spanish-ethnic soldiers, since they, “predicted confrontations 
between Spanish-speaking soldiers and soldiers of other ethnic groups if the situation 
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does not improve. This suggests there may be dissent building among Spanish-ethnic 
soldiers in the Army today.”439 Dissent among its ranks was not something the Army 
could afford, particularly not when it was at a critical juncture in its move towards an All-
Volunteer Force. 
RACE, “QUALITY” AND THE SHIFT TO THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE (AVF)  
  For many Americans, the Armed Forces of the early 1970s had devolved into a 
decaying institution.  The civic idealism of the past had been replaced with contentions 
that the military was fast becoming a depot for burnouts, social outcasts, and the poor. In 
popular culture, the clean-cut, smiling visage of World War II hero Audi Murphy had 
been supplanted by the “combat vet”—glassy eyed, frayed and drug addicted. 
Throughout the early 1970s, returning Vietnam War GIs were stigmatized in film and 
print as either physically impotent, hapless figures, enervated by too many years at war or 
as potentially psychotic, dangerously unhinged individuals capable of indiscriminate 
violence. Films such as Blood of Ghastly Horror (1972), Welcome Home Soldier Boys 
(1972) The Stone Killer (1973) and The Crazies (1973), among dozens of others, typified 
the “psycho-vet” genre popular during the era. 440 
 Questions about the mental competency and moral character of new soldiers 
haunted debates leading up to and following enactment of the AVF on July 1, 1973. The 
general public and policy experts collectively weighed in on the merits and drawbacks of 
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a system reliant on persons seemingly less motivated by desire to serve their country, and 
more by economic benefit, with one columnist warning the Army would become a 
“mostly black, mostly poor ‘mercenary force.’441 In her study of the AVF’s creation, 
historian Beth Bailey chronicles how these attitudes were portrayed in the mainstream 
press, which consistently depicted the new volunteer Army in a state of crisis. The New 
York Times bemoaned its “conspicuous shortcomings,” suggesting a re-instatement of the 
draft just three months into its tenure.442 ABC news ran a television special with the less 
than flattering title, “The American Army: A Shocking Case of Incompetency.”443 And in 
a report to the U.S. Naval Institute, former director of the Selective Service Curtis W. 
Tarr warned that the turn to an all-volunteer force would create a military 
overrepresented by African-Americans, and those in lower mental categories.444 Offering 
a slightly more sympathetic analysis, Joseph A Califano Jr. a former White House aide to 
President Lyndon Johnson heavily criticized the Nixon administration’s support for the 
AVF. In an op-ed piece to the Washington Post, he claimed “by design and incentive an 
all-volunteer army is structured to bring in the armed forces the poor and near poor.”445  
 No matter what end of the political spectrum these claims came from, two central 
questions pervaded deliberations on the AVF.  First, would a volunteer force—especially 
one increasingly comprised of women and racial minorities—have the necessary 
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attributes for the nation’s defense?  And second, would this system exploit racial and 
class inequalities? Tarr’s and Califano’s statements elucidate just how much race and 
class informed these considerations. According to Bailey, “every discussion of “quality” 
and the army was shadowed by assumptions about race.”446 Convictions that racial 
minorities, especially African Americans, underperformed mentally, lacked appropriate 
educational training, and were disinclined to tolerate authority preoccupied military 
planners who summated that they were not “quality” material.  This was an especially 
disturbing prognosis, as the Army and military generally, experienced widespread 
acceleration in the number of African-American accessions. In 1974 alone, 30% of new 
army recruits were African-American.447 Between 1971 and 1974, the number of black 
accessions within the Army rose from 14.3% to 19.9% in the Army and from 11.4% to 
17.7% in the Marine Corps.448 
 The conversation around race and quality also mirrored larger anxieties about the 
military’s shift toward the logic of the marketplace. As early as 1967, when conservative 
economists Milton Friedman and Walter Oi penned anti-draft articles in the New 
Individualist Review, a libertarian journal published by the University of Chicago, 
arguments for terminating the draft were framed by both free-market principles and 
ideologies of individual liberty. During his presidential campaign in 1968, Richard Nixon 
capitalized on both liberal, anti-war sentiments critical of the draft’s inequitable effects 
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on racial minorities and conservative critiques of universal conscription as “a gross 
infringement on personal liberty.”449 Synthesizing both arguments, Nixon organized 
much of his political platform on a pledge to end conscription, assuring audiences that his 
plan for higher pay and increased military benefits would sufficiently attract enough 
candidates for enlistment. As Bailey notes, “Nixon offered Americans a case against the 
draft built on the conservative/libertarian claim that liberty is the most central of 
American values.”450 Nixon’s solution, the market-driven all-volunteer force, mirrored 
wider cultural and ideological currents shaping the decade. 
 By the spring of 1973, the Vietnam War began gradually fading from public 
consciousness, but its narrative of loss and trauma endured as a capstone to the collective 
“miseries” permeating American life. Inflation from war spending, coupled with rising 
oil prices stemming from political turbulence in the Middle East resulted in “stagflation”-
-a crippling combination of high rates of inflation and economic stagnation. For the first 
time in four decades, American wages declined. Rising global economic integration 
yielded widespread deindustrialization as a new, “internationalized model of capitalism 
with emphasis on free trade, government deregulation, and entertainment and information 
industries” replaced the long-held Fordist model, which had dominated American 
political economy since the post-war era.451  Unemployment, recession, oil shortages, and 
a depressed stock market only served to further erode already waning public confidence 
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in national government; a decade-long trend cemented by the Watergate scandal and 
Nixon’s resignation in August 1974. Generalized disaffection and rising mistrust of 
government fractured the New Deal liberal consensus underwriting expanded 
government during the post-war years. As more and more Americans experienced a 
“crisis of confidence” in their nation’s leaders and the public sector, they retreated 
inward, turning towards an ethos of self-development, individual expression, and 
personal fulfillment, famously evoked by writer Tobias Wolfe’s diagnosis of them as the 
“Me Generation.”452   
 Anthropologist David Harvey identifies the early 1970s, a period of rapidly 
advancing globalization, as incubating neoliberal philosophy, or the emphasis on free-
market ideology, individual rights, and personal responsibility.453 In the years that 
followed, neoliberalism, with its attendant focus on self-affirmation, inflected and 
produced new modes of citizenship—neoliberal citizenship--predicated on one’s ability 
to avail him/herself of market opportunities. Positive visions of citizenship became less 
about community engagement or collective uplift, but instead, increasingly connected to 
demonstration of individual enterprise and economic self-promotion. With greater 
frequency, this new domain of citizenship relied upon notions of self-discipline, personal 
uplift, and autonomously regulated behavior. The military, acutely aware that young 
Americans were self-fashioning new understandings of citizenship, responded by 
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substituting traditional emphases on civic duty with the grammar of laissez-faire 
economics. 
   With the termination of the draft and unavoidable reality that larger shares of 
young, middle-class Americans were increasingly drawn towards college instead of 
military service, the USAF eschewed traditional recruiting models privileging ideas of 
citizenship bounded by obligation to country.  Instead, military officials turned towards 
advertising, appealing to desires by youth for stable economic opportunity, travel, and 
skills training.  Beginning in the early 1970s, the army “defined the market as a site of 
consumer desire, a sphere in which the emotional weight of individuals’ hopes and 
dreams and fears was more powerful.”454  Accordingly, in April 1971, Army advertisers 
created the “Today’s Army wants to join you” campaign, an inversion of artist James 
Montgomery Flagg’s 1917 Uncle Sam poster, “I Want you for US Army.”455 Print 
advertisements, radio spots, and television commercials portrayed young men and women 
in casual attire, dressed in jeans and sneakers, sporting long hair or short Afros and 
contemplating the Army’s nearly 300 occupations. As historian Jeremy Saucier notes, 
“these were not warriors carrying machine guns, but students, car enthusiasts, or 
secretaries.”456 In 1975, the Army introduced its “Join the People Who’ve Joined the 
Army” slogan reflecting Secretary of the Army Howard “Bo” Callaway’s insistence on 
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creating an “all-American army” reflecting the nation’s racial and ethnic diversity.457  
This same campaign even showcased some of the Army’s earliest attempts at Spanish-
language advertising, as demonstrated in a February 1978 advertisement from Readers 
Digest. Titled “Desarrollo” (Development), the print advertisement highlights the 
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Beneath images of Cpl. Shaul completing basic training, taking orders, and playing pool 
with a racially diverse assembly of friends, the ad reads: 
Fui al Army con la idea de hacerme soldado. Pero no logré pensándolo solamente. 
Tuve que empeñarme y desarrollarme. Ha sido una verdadera experiencia de 
desarrollo. El Army me puso en condiciones mejorándome. Me puso en contacto 
con personas de todas clases; antes me había rodeado únicamente con gente muy 
parecida a mi. Me ayudaron grandemente mis superiores y yo trate de ser como 
ellos. Y ahora siendo cabo de patrulla me hago responsable de otros, algo que 
nunca había hecho antes. Y todo no es tan abrumador como pensaba.  
 
I went into the Army with the idea of becoming a soldier. But I was not thinking 
about achieving this alone. I had to persist and develop myself.  It has been a real 
experience of development. The Army put me in conditions that improved me. It 
put me in contact with people from all classes; before I surrounded myself solely 
with people like myself. My superiors helped me greatly and I try to be like them. 
And now I am responsible for others in my patrol, something I never thought was 
possible before. And its not as overwhelming as I thought. 458 
 
 
Emphasizing personal development, self-fulfillment, and camaraderie (ie “people from 
all classes”), this print ad encapsulates the Army’s shift towards emphasizing individual 
desires for advancement, while also underscoring the “diversity” of the “new Army.” 
With uncertainty about the racial composition of the military still at the forefront of 
debates over the AVF, the Army’s move towards this model of multicultural advertising, 
featuring racially inclusive images, distills the complex ways military officials responded 
to deep-seated divisions in American cultural life over the politics of race, war, and 
enduring social inequality. If the military historically benefited from images of “foxhole 
democracy” or the concept that in the heat of battle, “Pluribus became Unum” it now 
replicated and reinvigorated such discourse in its “Join the People” campaign. Implicit to 
                                                
458 N.W. Ayers Advertising Agency Records. Collection No. 59, Box 4. Folder 4. Archives Center, 
Smithsonian National Museum of American History.  
 202 
the ad campaign’s narrative, was the idea that individuals from varying racial and 
economic backgrounds could join the military and become “the people”—forging a sense 
of shared solidarity and national identity that historian Richard Slotkin calls the myth of 
American nationality, “the idealized self-image of a multiethnic, multiracial democracy 
hospitable to difference, but united by a common sense of national belonging.”459 To 
post-Vietnam American sensibilities, this new multicultural and racially inclusive army 
signaled an ideal representation that offered healing from the profound social divisions 
cleaving the American public in recent years. 
“EL SOLDADO AMERICANO”: NEOLIBERALISM AND EMBODYING THE AMERICAN 
DREAM 
 Amidst debates over race, quality, and the new peacetime military, issues of 
Latina/o test performance, Spanish language adherence, and discrimination receded to the 
margins of policy priorities. The complex configurations of race and cultural identity 
informing debates over the future of Latina/os in the military were largely jettisoned. To 
wit, very few of the 1972 Task Force’s recommendations were actualized, except for 
adoption of pan-ethnic identifiers (“Spanish-descent” and “Hispanic”), increased 
Spanish-language advertising, and minimal expansion of the DRRI’s Latina/o Studies 
curriculum. Still, Latina/os accounted for a gradually rising portion of the USAF, rising 
from 5.4 percent of total DoD personnel in 1974 to 6.3% by 1979.460 To a greater degree 
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than ever before, military authorities clung to discourses of equal representation, even 
when their actions were merely cosmetic.  
 In June 1975, members of the Latin American Federation of Europe, an 
organization comprised of fifteen service clubs representing Latina/o service members, 
lobbied for increased screenings of Spanish language films.461 Following negotiations 
with the Army & Air Force Exchange Services (AAFES) spearheaded by Army Captain 
Tony Diaz, the AAFES agreed to showcase five Spanish language films in ten 
communities across Europe, beginning with the first two features, “El Senor Doctor” 
(1965) and “Les Tres Mosqueteras” (1942), both starring well-known Mexican comedian 
Cantinflas. Efforts to diversify Spanish language film availability in Europe were 
followed by the expansion of Spanish language films across military bases in the US.462 
Likewise, in September 1975 the AAFES began widening the scope of its Spanish 
language reading and music materials.463 That September, following an informal inquiry 
of “Spanish surnamed customers,” AAFES officials began the process of stocking more 
Spanish language materials, including magazines such as Vanidades, Buenhogar, 
Selecciones, Mecánica Popular, and Luz in bases exchanges at forty-two military 
                                                                                                                                            
 
461  By summer 1975, nearly 20,000 soldiers of “Spanish descent” were stationed in Europe. "Hispanic 
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installations in the US, Korea, Okinawa, Europe, Guam, the Philippines, and Taiwan.464 
While these measures accounted for a small, but significant impact towards improving 
quality of life issues for Latina/o military personnel, on the whole, they did not 
fundamentally alter more pressing matters related to discrimination, including English 
language aptitude tests, promotion & advancement, and interpersonal dynamics. 
 The military, echoing federal policy during the 1970s, instead turned toward the 
emerging ideal of “diversity,” embracing racial and ethnic differences of groups like 
Latina/os as “a good to be valued—not a problem, but a promise.”465 This much was 
evident in Soldiers magazine’s “Hispanic Americans Speak Up,” a September 1975 feature 
article coinciding with national “Hispanic Heritage Week.”466  In its introduction, “Speak 
Up” reported on the challenges facing “Spanish Americans”: “Ten million Hispanic 
Americans have the same social desires as all Americans. But, like the Black American, there 
are cultural problems. Highly visible surnames, accented English speech, cultural life style, 
and ethnic stereotyping all work against their economic and social progress.”467 Blaming 
delayed Hispanic economic and social advancement on their “highly visible surnames,” 
“accented English speech” and “cultural life style,” the passage invokes the “culture of 
poverty” perspective prominent within public policy and sociological debates on race 
reminiscent of the 1966 Moynihan Report. In it, “Hispanic Americans” are made racial 
analogues to “the Black American” and thus, according to proponents, prone to inhibitive 
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cultural tendencies preventing their full inclusion in US society. However, unlike the “Black 
American,” the article, supplemented by a historical sidebar noting, “It all began with 
Columbus” treated Latina/o identity as evocative of earlier paradigms of immigrant 
assimilation, thereby assuring readers Latina/os held the capacity for incorporation into the 
military and nation at large.468 
 “Hispanic Americans Speak Up” was produced in conjunction with a roundtable 
sponsored by the DRRI, where five “Spanish Americans” weighed in on matters of racial 
discrimination, military sponsored English language proficiency programs, “culture shock” 
and the military’s treatment of Hispanic personnel. Army Spc. Carmen Laboy, a native of 
Puerto Rico, joined fellow discussants, Peruvian SPC Jorge Mesa, Mexican American SPC 
Blanca Garcia, Puerto Rican Spc Gilbert Rivera, and Spanish American SPC Manuel 
Gonzalez sharing personal biographies meant to highlight a range of “Hispanic experiences” 
in the military. A self-described “typical North American” with blonde hair and blue eyes, 
Spc. Gonzalez of Fort McNair, Washington D.C. recounted the prejudice he endured in 
primary school: “When I first started school I noticed that because of my name, I was more 
or less shoved off into a corner. I looked like everyone else, but had a strange sounding name 
so they said, ‘He’s different.’”469 Gonzales also recalled being referred to as a “dirty greaser” 
by his CO during basic training. On the subject of racial epithets such as “Greaser”, 
“Minority” and “Disadvantaged” Laboy admitted, “It’s only been since I joined the Army 
                                                
468 The sidebar, “It All Began with Columbus” recounts the history of Spanish exploration in the New 
World, before triumphantly concluding, “for more than 400 years Hispanic Americans have been leaving 
their mark on American society.” Ibid, 27. 
469 Ibid, 24. 
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that I’ve even heard about them.”  Garcia, a native of Alice, TX, added she was not shocked 
by such terms, since “I didn’t associate them with myself.”470 For his part, Mesa recalled 
being shocked by racial diversity in the US: “I wasn’t aware until I got here that there were so 
many Blacks in America.” On the presence of Native Americans, Mesa added, “I didn’t 
believe there were any left. They had all been killed off by John Wayne and his gang.” 
Finally, of the Army’s ability to “recognize the needs of Hispanics” Laboy asserted, “We 
have to have people like us tell them what we need.”471  
 The article’s portrayal of Latina/o ethnic and national heterogeneity aligned with 
egalitarian impulses characterizing the reformist racial politics of the 1970s. Whereas the 
military historically relied on its narrative of racial integration during the Cold War era, 
by 1975, it shifted focus to emphasizing its capacity for respecting and maintaining 
ethno-racial difference amongst enlisted personnel; a move that consolidated the prior 
logic of democratic racial liberalism with on-going assertions of cultural nationalism by 
racial and ethnic minorities. However, the materialization of “Hispanic” as an 
identifiable, pan-ethnic category of classification adopted by the USAF and evident in 
articles like “Hispanic Americans Speak Up” elided the complex origins underwriting the 
term’s very formation. Rather than attending to the structural inequalities propelling 
Latina/o participation in the military—inequalities of race, income, colonial legacies of 
dispossession and displacement—USAF officials camouflaged such critiques under the 
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sweep of multiculturalism, itself part of the emerging embrace of neoliberal philosophy 
in military recruitment and retention. 
Conclusion 
Imaginings of Latina/o military personnel as an ethno-cultural group ready and willing to 
avail themselves of military offerings, aligned with the neoliberal shift of the USAF.  A 
fact embodied by the August 1977 cover of Soldiers magazine, featuring from left to 
right, SP4 Oscar Marroquin, 1st Sgt Gilberto Carrasco, and Sgt. Joel Garcia, all members 













                                                
472 SP5 Manuel Gomez, “El Soldado Americano.” Soldiers. August 1977. 
Figure 6: Cover of August 1977 issue of 
Soldiers magazine, “El Soldado 
Americano”  
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The cover accompanied an article titled, “El Soldado Americano,” calling attention to 
Latina/o Spanish language difficulties in the Army, whilst also praising how “Latino 
soldiers proved themselves by fighting well with honor and distinction” in combat during 
World War II, Korea, and Vietnam.473  As evinced by the Spanish language title, 
“Soldados Americanos” (American Soldiers) the article discursively cast Latina/o 
soldiers as ideal citizen-subjects because of, not in spite of their cultural hybridity. More 
importantly, by blending English and Spanish, the article reinforced the message that the 
Army was a unique institution, distinctly committed to racial and ethnic diversity. A 
place where American Latina/os, unencumbered by racist legacies, were ideologically 
“free” to pursue and embody the American Dream.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Advertising Patriotism: The “Yo Soy El Army” Campaign, Neoliberal Citizenship, 
and Strategizing Latinidad 474 
 
Introduction          
At least ten years before the U.S. entry into the occupations of Afghanistan and 
Iraq from 2001-2011, Latina/os were attracting the attention of military officials who 
observed that their rapid demographic expansion over the last three decades made them 
the fastest growing pool of military-age people in the U.S.475 For at least one top U.S. 
military official, the future of the U.S. military resides with this youth population, as he 
noted that “our nation’s ability to fill ranks in the future will depend on our ability to 
successfully recruit Latinos.”476 In this chapter, I consider how the Yo Soy El Army 
(YSEA) /I am the Army campaign, a public relations recruiting initiative between the 
U.S. Army and the Latino-owned advertising firm the Cartel Group, represented the 
culmination of earlier years of research about the strategic utility of Latina/o cultural 
identity to the US Armed Forces.  Throughout this chapter, I consider how the Cartel 
Group’s deployment of “Barrio Anthropology ™” a branded research strategy that claims 
to offer insight about Latina/o cultural identity and values explicitly shaped the YSEA 
campaign by simultaneously mobilizing and muting Latina/o racial and cultural 
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difference. I argue that this strategic management of Latinidad must be understood in 
relation to a post 9-11 logic of mandated nationalism--the overt, urgent, and 
compensatory acts of national belonging, civic participation, and expressions of fidelity 
to the State performed by immigrants and communities of color who were cast as 
potential threats to the national body politic following the declaration of the “War on 
Terror.” For U.S. born and immigrant Latina/os, the public’s rising preoccupation with 
national security was complemented by an increase in anti-immigrant [read: anti-
Latina/o] attitudes materializing in a spate of legislation criminalizing undocumented 
immigrants, escalations in deportation campaigns, efforts to revoke birthright citizenship, 
heightened racial profiling initiatives and a host of other punitive measures. 
Simultaneously, the U.S. military occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan inaugurated a 
renewed ethos of patriotic sentiment in American culture with special reverence towards 
the U.S. Armed Forces. The YSEA campaign developed then between the political 
exigencies of the post 9/11 security State, with its exclusionary impulses against non-
citizens and racial minorities on the one hand and on the other, a cultural milieu lauding 
U.S. democratic liberalism as embodied by the military--a progressive, multicultural 
“social laboratory” of racial tolerance, economic possibility, and political inclusion.477  
In what follows, I explore how the representational framework employed by the 
YSEA campaign relied on and was articulated via sentimentalized renderings of 
Latinidad emphasizing quaint, if generic cultural differences of language and notions of 
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“community” that also silenced the more complicated realities facing U.S. Latina/os, 
including economic dislocation, racial marginalization, and a coercive, if not overtly 
hostile political environment. In particular, I note that YSEA campaign made deliberate 
use of two interrelated, yet distinct tropes affirming U.S. Latina/os as culturally different, 
though nonetheless allegiant subjects: 1) an ideological and rhetorical coupling between 
U.S. military and Latina/o cultural values and 2) a visual repertoire foregrounding Latino 
males as archetypal citizen-soldiers. By examining the campaign’s cultural frame, I 
expand on the concept of ‘military institutional presence,’ or the idea that propensity to 
enlist may be affected by exposure to and familiarity with the institution of the 
military.478 Though this term frequently refers to proximity to military bases and/or 
likelihood of having a relative in the Armed Forces, it is useful for considering in terms 
of the broader recruiting environment for Latina/os. 
The YSEA campaign appeared in multiple formats including television 
commercials, the Internet, billboards, print ads, and grassroots outreach events in 
Latina/o communities. When accounting for the increasingly pervasive presence of 
military recruiters in low income schools with large ethnic and racial minority 
populations, this symbolic and material presence of the military illustrates the 
multifaceted ways in which Latina/os are presented with messaging about appropriate [ie 
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state-sponsored] and highly visible channels of social and economic advancement—a 
state of affairs I suggest comprises a “culture of conscription.”479  
Moreover, the ideas of honor, patriotism, and family as expressed through the 
YSEA continuously circumscribed conversations about the social and economic 
impetuses contributing to Latina/o enlistment. For example, low educational rates--a 
factor directly affecting inclination towards military enlistment--continues to be a 
dominant feature of the Latina/o youth demographic. According to a Pew Hispanic 
Report from 2003, Latina/o youth were more likely than other youth to drop out of high 
school. In 2000, 21% of Latina/o 16-19 year olds were high school dropouts compared to 
non-Latino whites at 8% and 12% for African-Americans. The report also found lower 
levels of high school completion and observed that Latina/o youth in this profile 
remained underemployed, with lower rates of college attendance and completion.480 
Though the issue of educational attainment rates and military enlistment is not the focus 
of this chapter, and indeed has been addressed by other scholars it nonetheless remains an 
important facet of understanding the campaign’s wider influence and appeal.481  
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Following insights by scholars of U.S. militarism and war, including David R. 
Segal, Michael Sherry, and Catherine Lutz, this chapter draws from Jorge Mariscal’s call 
for a broader examination of “the unavoidable nexus between class, race, and the 
‘volunteer armed forces.”482 Though there has been nascent scholarship on the substantial 
role of Latina/o immigrant or “green card” soldiers in the Iraq War and the proliferation 
of JROTC programs in predominantly urban/ working-class neighborhoods, the role of 
ethnic commercial representation in military recruitment has received insufficient 
scholarly attention.483 And although media scholars have long called attention to the 
relationship between communications industries and the military, including Herbert 
Schiller’s early analyses of the military’s partnership with the “communications 
machine” there remains a scholarly deficit on the role of military advertising and 
Latina/os.484 Yet as demonstrated in the prior chapter, since the termination of the draft 
and shift to the All-Volunteer Force in 1973, the military has increasingly relied on 
strategic advertising campaigns emphasizing educational opportunities, job skills 
training, and personal development. These marketing tactics are especially pertinent to 
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understanding the growing proportion of Latina/os and other racial minority populations 
within the ranks over the last several decades and to whom these campaigns are 
increasingly directed at.  
In the field of communications studies, media scholar Angaharad Valdivia has led 
the call for greater attention to the intersection between the study of U.S. Latina/os and 
the mass media, taking up a question that is key to my analysis of the Cartel Group-- 
“how to determine what is Latina/o produced media and who is a Latina/o producer.”485 
Likewise, communications scholar Mari Castaneda’s work on Spanish language media 
has highlighted “the growing importance of Latina/o media in helping to shape the links 
between Latinidad, civil society, and the political economy of the Americas.”486 The 
YSEA campaign, with its hybridized English and Spanish tagline was a dynamic, 
integrated effort that bears further examination both for its symbolic import in 
representing a major U.S. institution, and for what it might say about future efforts at 
niche marketing to Latina/os. Drawing from anthropologist Arlene Dávila, I investigate 
the “active processes of production and consumption” that affect the “conceptualization 
of Latinos as a distinct group and the wider social and political implications of such 
representations.”487 One such implication is the role that ethnic marketing will play in 
subsequent military recruitment strategies directed at Latina/o youth. For example, 
Latina/o enlistment in the Army rose by 26 percent between 2001 and 2005, the years 
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during which the YSEA campaign was most active. Overall, Latina/o enlistment in all 
branches of the military increased by 18 percent.488 In the first year of the campaign 
alone, Latina/os accounted for 13 percent of the Army’s new enlistment contracts—an 
increase from 10.7 percent in 2000.489 Although I do not make a direct correlation 
between the YSEA and the increase in Latina/o Army enlistment, I do contend that it 
offers a crucial point of analysis for investigating the role of ethnic marketing campaigns 
in contributing to Latina/o military enlistment.  
 “BARRIO ANTHROPOLOGY” 
According to Jesus Ramirez, the executive vice president of the Cartel Group, 
“Our proprietary Barrio Anthropology(TM) approach gives us the ability to understand 
key motivators and cultural triggers” within the Latino community.490 Consistent with 
this messaging was a Cartel spokesperson who claimed that this marketing and research 
strategy allows their team to “go deep into the neighborhoods and barrios" to better 
understand Latina/os, thereby generating culturally authentic, customized ad campaigns 
for the Hispanic market.491 As Dávila’s work on Latino/a advertising has demonstrated, 
“ethnic marketing responds to and reflects the fears and anxieties of mainstream society” 
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via the discursive production, mediation, and circulation of cultural images and/or texts 
that “are more revealing of those who produce the representation than of those who are 
its subjects.”492 Given their location in San Antonio, TX –a city known for its large 
Latina/o population and status as “Military City U.S.A” because of its high proportion of 
military installations, the Cartel Group positioned themselves as cultural intermediaries 
uniquely suited to speak to and for the Latina/o populace on matters of the military.493 In 
a 2002 interview, Ramirez discussed his firm’s approach to “Hispanic marketing,” 
validating Davila’s point that Hispanic advertisers often conceive of themselves as 
“multicultural experts” and “corporate intellectuals.”494 Of Latinos, Ramirez remarked 
that they are: 
The last great consumer segment in the United States that is targetable, more 
homogenous than any other segment, yet more complicate d to understand than 
the general market, this is our domain, our market.495  
Ramirez’s claim that Latina/os constitute a homogenous group contradicts the complex, 
heterogeneous nature of the U.S. Latina/o population highlighted in chapters two and 
three, with respect to racial identification, class status, national origin, patterns of 
migration, generational longevity in the U.S., regional diversity, language preference, etc. 
Moreover, Latina/os Studies scholar Juan Flores has argued that the employment of this 
“demographic label” doubly commodifies Latina/os for those like Ramirez, who employ 
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this pan-ethnic label as a “commercial utility…to buy’ the Hispanic package” and also to 
“‘sell’ it.”496 In this process, Ramirez’s assertion legitimates the notion that Latina/os are 
a singular entity (ie a “segment”) and thus a commodity to be “targeted” or purchased--
especially by the Armed Forces.   
By alluding to scientific rationalism and technical methodologies, the Cartel’s use 
of “barrio anthropology” reproduced systems of racial and class difference via its 
evocative use of the complex and contested metaphor of the “barrio”.  Spanish for 
“neighborhood” or “district”, the term “barrio” reinforces the spatial, cultural, and 
linguistic separation between U.S. Latina/os and mainstream society, while also playing 
on notions of belonging and aspirational desires by immigrant and/or working class 
Latina/o communities. As noted by Pérez, Guridy, and Burgos Jr. “as a spatial formation, 
barrios emerge out of histories of segregation, marginalization, and exclusion-based race, 
class, ethnicity, and citizenship.”497 Further, the Cartel’s invocation of “barrio” mirrored 
their spatialized language of “penetrating” the Latino/a market and/or the U.S Army 
respectively. In the words of Cartel CEO Varela Hudson, “when you look at the numbers, 
there should be a more significant penetration of Hispanics in the Army.”498 This 
discourse of “penetrating barrios” reinforced and capitalized on essentialist portrayals of 
hopelessly traditional, perpetually inassimilable Latina/o communities. In so doing, these 
depictions substituted their materio-structural “histories of segregation” with trite, 
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stereotypically reductive imagery of quasi-American ethnics who simply needed the right 
cultural messaging to broker their entrance into U.S. institutions like the military. 
Likewise, rather than fully acknowledging the structural social and economic issues 
motivating Latina/o youth to enlist in the military, the Cartel Group insisted it was just a 
matter of cultural translation and access. 
THE CRISIS IN RECRUITMENT AND THE ARMY OF ONE 
Broadly speaking, the YSEA campaign arose from an extensive image overhaul 
during which the Army replaced its legendary two-decade old Be All You Can Be slogan, 
with its new motto, Be An Army of One in January 2001.  The new slogan, accompanied 
by a slick logo with a white star trimmed in black and gold edging as well as a state of the 
art interactive website (www.goarmy.com), was designed to counter declining 
recruitment numbers, as the Army had failed to meet its recruitment goals for three of the 
previous five years.499 According to Beth Bailey, this rebranding derived from the 
intersection of three reorganizing imperatives. The first, was the conviction by Army 
Chief of Staff Erick Shinsecki that the U.S Army needed to transform itself from within, 
promoting the role of individual soldiers. Second, Army Undersecretary Louis Caldera 
wanted to market the Army more broadly to the U.S. public to ensure long-term support 
and success. As Bailey notes, for Caldera this meant “it was time to run army recruiting 
like a Fortune 500 company and to invest in army marketing, media affairs, and public 
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relations efforts.”500 Finally, amidst allegations it was experiencing a post-Cold War 
“crisis of identity” a renewed emphasis on a “warrior mentality” or combat ethos unique 
to soldiers surfaced in promotional literature and recruitment programs.501 
The new logo, which was featured on sponsored items like the “America’s Army” 
video game, official NASCAR racing team, professional bull-riding team, and various 
recruiting ephemera such as pens, T-shirts, keychains, baseball caps, bumper stickers, and 
even seat cushions was intended to counter youth perceptions that in joining the Army, 
they would become “nameless, faceless cogs in a military machine.” 502 According to 
research conducted by Leo Burnett Worldwide, the advertising firm overseeing the $150 
million campaign, younger generations were little impressed with a military ethos 
emphasizing teamwork, collectivism, and selflessness.  While this sense of unit cohesion 
had been a hallmark of the Army in years past, younger generations or “Millenials” 
tended to view the military as dehumanizing, leaving insufficient time for a personal life 
and comprised largely of drudgery including “wading through the mud.”503 Both 
Caldera’s application of market principles, including competitive contract bids between 
advertising agencies and the overall emphasis on individual autonomy as symbolized in 
the moniker “One”  reflected a neoliberal ideology emphasizing individual freedoms, 
human dignity, and  the ability of the market, or in this case, the military, to ensure  these 
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values.504 Moreover, they synthesized their system of “barrio anthropology” with an 
adoption of militarized language emphasizing “market penetration.”  As expressed in a 
2001 article from United States Army Recruiting magazine discussing methods for 
improving “market penetration strategy” military recruiting employs an idiom of 
commerce.505 A telling example occurred at the press conference announcing the launch 
of the YSEA campaign, during which then Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera 
remarked, “I think advertising is very important, and advertising works. You advertise, 
you increase your sales.”506 In this context, sales refers to the number of young people 
enlisting in the U.S. Armed Forces— a group of “consumers” who have figuratively 
“purchased” the Army’s brand, where they could avail themselves of the military’s 
offerings: pride, economic empowerment, educational advancement, and improved social 
standing.   In contrast, at the press conference announcing the new campaign, Varela 
Hudson, the CEO of the Cartel Group, noted that the Yo Soy El Army campaign would 
account for “Hispanic cultural differences such as the need to fit in and be embraced.”507 
Hudson’s statement was a stark departure from the general tenor of campaign that 
underscored autonomy and self-reliance, in exchange for one that would emphasize peer 
acceptance and communalism amongst Latina/os.  
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In addition to collaborating with the Cartel Group, Burnett subcontracted with 
Images U.S.A., an Atlanta-based advertising firm to market to the African-American 
community. These efforts included advertisements in VIBE magazine, a multi-city 
“Taking it to the Streets” tour, commercials on BET, and “The Source Campus Combat 
Tour”, sponsored by the hip-hop magazine The Source, which visited five Northeastern 
college campuses with significant African-American student populations. While efforts 
toward recruiting Latina/os were undertaken because they are still underrepresented in 
the military, efforts toward African-Americans were meant to shore declining recruitment 
numbers.508 As an example, the percentage of new recruits who were African American 
dropped from 20 percent in 2001 to 13 percent in 2006, although these numbers had been 
steadily declining since before the occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq. These declining 
enlistment rates were first reported in the Youth Attitude Tracking Survey—a DoD 
annual study conducted between 1975 and 1999. Administered to 16-24 year olds, the 
reports collected data on propensity for military service, slogan recall, advertisement 
awareness, etc.  Not surprisingly, the reports noted the strong relationship between the 
mounting educational success of African-American youth with lower enlistment rates, 
and conversely, the corollary between the low educational achievement of Latinos and 
increased military enlistment.509It is worth noting that African Americans have 
historically been overrepresented in the military as they constitute approximately 18 
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percent of active duty personnel, but only 13 percent of the general population.510 In spite 
of this long legacy of service, the declining numbers of African-American enlistees is 
frequently and explicitly invoked when discussing Latina/o military recruitment. With 
little exception, the precipitous rise in enlistment amongst Latina/o military personnel 
over the past decade is frequently juxtaposed to the declining numbers among African-
Americans in both popular media accounts and academic writing.511 As Dávila has 
argued, these comparisons between the U.S.’s two largest racial minority groups serves to 
distance and distinguish Latina/os as “model minorities” whose propensity for service, 
especially in times of war implicitly discredits African Americans. Moreover, as Shapiro 
and Dempsey’s research suggests, the long term implication is that Latina/os will replace 
African Americans as the Army’s second largest racial and ethnic group attesting to 
popular narratives that they are exceptionally patriotic, and more willing for self-sacrifice 
than their African-American counterparts.512 Yet this description elides the longer 
historical arc behind targeted recruitment campaigns of Latina/os that began in the mid-
1990’s. 
Long before the publication of the 2000 Census in which Latina/os surpassed 
African Americans as the U.S.’s largest racial minority group, military and political 
strategists at the DoD and the Pentagon had been tracking the explosive growth of the 
U.S. Latina/o population, as well as the large disparity between their demographic 
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dominance and/or representation within the military.513 In addition to funding high-level 
think tanks to research what accounted for this discrepancy, they also supported several 
strategic initiatives aimed at closing this gap.  Spearheaded by U.S. Army Secretary 
Caldera, a first-generation Mexican-American from El Paso, TX, these plans included 
holding a 1999 city-wide summit in Los Angeles, during which Caldera focused attention 
on how the U.S. military could provide opportunities for Latina/o youth, citing their high 
re-enlistment rates and willingness to serve in combat arms units as evidence of a 
supposed natural fitness for service.  Caldera also proposed re-evaluating entry-level 
criteria, noting that although Latinos had excessive high school dropout rates--roughly 40 
percent in 1998-- those that completed GED’s were just as accomplished in their duties as 
enlistees with high school diplomas.514 Although Caldera continued to support high 
school graduation as a prerequisite for enlistment, even overseeing “Operation 
Graduation”, a public relations project promoting high school completion, he nonetheless 
concurred with the Army’s decision in late 1997 to begin accepting more equivalency 
certificate holders and/or night school graduates.515 Significantly, Caldera partnered with 
Latina/o advocacy organizations such as the National Council of La Raza (NCLR) in 
calling for a reassessment of and ultimately revisions to the Armed Services Vocational 
Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) exam, remarking that it presented “cultural traps” making it 
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difficult for Latina/os to perform well enough on it to qualify for enlistment.516 In this 
capacity, Cadlera was successful in addressing the biases of the ASVAB Latina/o 
military personnel had long highlighted and the subject of Chapter Three. Finally, the 
Army also funded a pilot project in ten cities in which it allowed up to 200 Latino 
candidates to attend intensive English language courses, so that they might retake Army 
qualification tests such as the ASVAB if they did not initially perform well enough on 
them to qualify for service. In sum, the YSEA campaign was the next logical phase in a 
series of both short and long-term programmatic steps taken to recruit Latina/os.  
POST 9-11: THE PARADOX OF PATRIOTISM 
As Ushias Zacharias adroitly notes, the post 9/11 “homogenized..monoculture of 
patriotism” delimited the terms by which communities of color were allowed (or 
disallowed) from participating in  the widespread idiom of nationalism that touted “feel 
good” platitudes of color-blind unity, even as it authorized the targeting and regulation of 
those groups for violating permissive boundaries of cultural, racial, and linguistic 
difference.517As numerous scholars have documented, the post 9-11 political climate 
authorized by the “War on Terror” deployed extensive, multifaceted technologies of 
racial surveillance against predominantly South Asian, Arab-American, and Latina/o 
communities. This political climate sanctioned the round-up and detention of thousands 
of Arab, Arab-American, and Muslim men by federal immigration authorities under the 
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pretense of investigating visa violations, an action symbolic of the newfound urgency 
over policing the body-politic, both from within and outside of the nation’s borders. 
Since the 9-11 terrorists had all legally entered the country, their subsequent actions 
provoked intense anxiety over immigration control. In popular culture and media, the 
presumption of governmental impotence at effectively preventing the entrance of the 
terrorists yoked itself to a separate discourse about undocumented immigration. Thus, 
media focus and political rhetoric colluded in a wholesale criminalization of foreign-born 
persons, conflating the status of undocumented immigrants with that of terrorists. As 
journalist Roberto Lovato noted, “the newly reconfigured national security culture that is 
wiring us for war’ has merged the threat of ‘bad’ Latino and Latino/a immigrants with 
‘bad’ Arabs through an ‘Al-Qaedization of Latino identity.”518 While there is a 
widespread and popularly received notion that 9/11 “changed everything”, systemic anti-
immigrant sentiments, including a pernicious rise in nativism during the mid-1990’s had 
been on the rise since before the attacks of September 11th. Yet the post 9/11 moment did 
accelerate long-standing policies of U.S. global dominance, military imperialism, and 
amplified State power.519 For U.S. Latina/os, this was reflected in their heightened 
criminalized status and amplification of systemic racial profiling initiatives in states such 
as Arizona, Alabama, and Georgia, which invoked suspicions of citizenship as pretense 
for arrests, deportations, and surveillance. For the Cartel Group, and others invested in 
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marketing Latinidad, this meant domesticating, and/or re-branding those qualities for 
which Latina/os were considered unforgivably foreign (ie stubborn ethnic and familial 
allegiance, natural predilection for violence, etc) as precisely those that made them ideal 
candidates for the military and more broadly, as model citizens for the nation.520 This was 
especially true of the ubiquitous deployment of concepts of “honor” and “pride” 
throughout the YSEA campaign and omnipresent in references to Latina/o military 
service.  
HONOR Y VALOR: THE VALUES AND HERITAGE OF MILITARY SERVICE 
In a 2003 address at the Pentagon celebrating Hispanic Heritage Month, former 
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld praised the role of Hispanic soldiers in the Iraq 
War, noting that Hispanic military personnel were helping to bring “liberty to the 
oppressed with their proven devotion to faith, the community, and the country.”521 
Rumsfeld’s quote testifies to a commonly expressed discourse that aligns Hispanic 
cultural values, accentuated by a love of country and family, with a unique aptitude for 
military service. As noted by Gina Pérez the “widely held sentiment about the 
distinctiveness of Latina/o patriotism is shared by prominent military officials and civic 
leaders, who regularly point to Latinos’ loyalty and patriotism as models of American 
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citizenship.”522 This presumed congruence between Hispanic attitudes and the U.S. 
military not only appears extensively throughout YSEA print and television ads, but as 
demonstrated by Rumsfeld and a host of other governmental and military leaders, is 
frequently mobilized in political discourse. According to Army undersecretary Dr. Joseph 
Westphal, “The Hispanic community brings core values that are endemic in the Army 
culture - family, love of country, commitment to community, commitment to the nation, 
service to the nation and selfless sacrifice.”  This idea that the military facilitates personal 
development and achievement, while simultaneously locating these attributes in the 
home/family values instilled by Latina/o parents and communities was also regularly 
touted by Retired Brig. Gen. Bernardo Negrete-Maza, formerly of the Army Recruiting 
Command (USAREC) and a key consultant on the YSEA campaign. According to 
Negrete-Maza, a Cuban American émigré who often appeared in YSEA print ads 
alongside his mother, “the military structure is very similar to that of a typical Hispanic 
family. Respect for discipline, a strong sense of responsibility and bullet-proof 
loyalty."523  
Notwithstanding statistics about their high re-enlistment rates and ability to 
complete boot camp in greater percentages than other racial groups, the conflation 
between Latina/o and military values is accompanied by narratives of their distinguished 
legacies of service in the military and during such conflicts as World War II and the 
Vietnam War. For example, an oft cited statistic that Mexican Americans have earned 
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more Medals of Honor than any other racial or ethnic group, emblematizes this legacy of 
service and is a reminder of the ways in which Latina/os have acted as vital contributors 
to the material, geographic, and social infrastructure of the U.S. military.524 This legacy, 
sometimes colloquially referred to as the “Hispanic tradition” pays tribute to Latina/o 
distinguished service in warfare, celebrates their ideological “symmetry” with military 
values, and stands as unmitigated “proof” of their desire for assimilation. Likewise, this 
model of inclusion proceeds from and reiterates long-standing immigrant assimilation 
narratives as well as those citing military service as a historically critical site of 
acculturation for U.S. Latina/os.525  
   Launched just one day after the general campaign, the YSEA initiative made 
deliberate and extensive use of these narratives in a multimedia blitz of Spanish language 
television, radio, Internet, and print advertising. Commercial time was purchased for all 
major Spanish language networks including Univision, Galavision, Telemundo, 
Telefutura, and Fox en Espanol. The bulk of advertising focused on network television, 
which constituted 74% of the total media budget of $15 million allocated exclusively for 
Hispanic recruitment in FY01, followed by 24 percent for radio and one percent for the 
print market. Print advertisements appeared in local newspapers with significant Latina/o 
populations and several national magazines including Teen En Espanol, People en 
Espanol, HISPANIC, and Super Onda . Spanish key words were purchased on major 
search engines, supplemented by “Yo Soy El Army” links at Yahoo en Espanol, Terra, 
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and Univision websites. According to the Cartel’s creative director, Ed Segura, two 
fundamental concepts shaped the YSEA tagline: “That the Army is the most powerful 
force in the world thanks to each soldier and that each soldier is better because of the 
Army.”526  
Adhering to this formula, one of the first Spanish language ads to appear for the 
Army Reserve featured Spec. Carlos Perez, a second generation Mexican-American 
combat medic from Los Angeles, CA. In a thirty-second segment titled, “Earthquake”, 
Perez is the central protagonist of a U.S. Army disaster relief dramatization, taking place 
in an unnamed Latin American country. With faint echoes of Spanish dialogue layered 
over grainy black and white images of distressed men in straw hats and flannel shirts 
unloading relief trucks, the commercial forwards to Perez who stands resolute in front of 
a medical tent with the unmistakable large Red Cross emblem just above his left 
shoulder. As Perez leans against the tent, his face smeared with grime and perspiration, 
he looks directly into the camera and describes the scenario: “You’ve been deployed to 
help establish order where a 7.5 has just leveled the city. You’ve come along a small boy 
in shock. You can lead him to a medical station or follow him into the darkness of the 
building.” The audience is then presented with a frightened child standing in the doorway 
of an unstable building. As the child pleads, “Mi papa está adentro” (my father is inside), 
he takes a hold of Perez’s forearm. The commercial then returns to Perez who confidently 
asks, “What would you do?” The commercial ends with the black and gold star insignia 
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of the revamped Army logo and a cut to the Army website, www.goarmy.com. 
“Earthquake” very clearly imparted notions of personal valor, humanitarian compassion, 
and skilled readiness the Army hoped to convey as part of its larger messaging about 
soldier character and propensity for self-sacrifice.  
Yet “Earthquake’s” fantasy sequence transmitted much more than idealistic 
imagery of military adventure and purpose. Because of its largely sympathetic tone and 
avoidance of depicting combat (the soldier’s there on a humanitarian aid mission), the 
advertisement clearly distinguished between the benevolent, democratic U.S. military and 
its “corrupt, despotic, and distinctively Latin American counterpart” that enforced 
regimes of state violence and political suppression.527 According to Hudson, the YSEA 
redressed negative cultural perceptions about the military for immigrant parents who, 
“grew up under Castro, Somoza, and others.”528 Moreover, its highly visible 
foregrounding of a Latino soldier coming to the rescue of a family also deliberately built 
on common tropes about Latina/o family orientation, traditionalism, and community 
obligation. The exchange between the hero and his young victim could be read as an 
instructive parable —one that capitalized on the expressive hopes of first and second 
generation Latina/o youth who could imaginatively rescue their families from social 
marginalization and economic deprivation via  military service. The paternal overtones 
between the adult male and child appealed to masculinist, patriarchal sensibilities, casting 
the young, Latino man—often a figure of suspicion and contempt in mainstream U.S. 
                                                
527 Perez, “Hispanic Values, Military Values,” 171. 
528 Ibid.  
 231 
media that portrays Latino men as gangsters or macho thugs—in the role of protective 
savior, father figure, and role model. Further, this link between patriarchal responsibility 
and military service was mirrored in a series of web vignettes accompanying the 
“Earthquake” commercial. After viewing “Earthquake”, viewers were encouraged to visit 
the Army website in which they could learn more about Spc. Perez in a series of short 
web episodes or “webisodes” with titles such as “Camaraderie” and “Outlook”. Before 
clicking on the link to “Mentor”, visitors can read a brief description: “Like father, like 
son. Carlos is proof that there are no weak links in the chain. From tough beginnings, 
Carlos will be the first to tell you he has become better than who he was.” Perez’s 
webisode then opens with a series of sepia toned images of soldier profiles, before freeze-
framing onto Perez himself. In a close-up shot, Perez adds:   
My father served in Vietnam and I think his experience in the Army gave him an 
idea of how to raise us. I grew up in South Central L.A., so I guess its pretty hard 
for parents to keep your kids away from gangs and drugs. My dad, he was always 
strict with us..made us focus on school. I think that compared to other people in 
my neighborhood, in my area when I was growing up we came out pretty good. 
Perez’s interview establishes a generational link between his father’s military service in 
Vietnam and his own decision to enlist, while also promoting the military as a site in 
which the value of discipline, as inculcated in the military and a desire for education 
[“focus on school”], transcend  urban poverty and structural inequality, relayed as “tough 
beginnings”  and “gangs and drugs.” Like  “Earthquake”, two other commercials titled 
“Signs” and “Multitasking,” focused on career and training opportunities in the Army 
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that could then be (ostensibly) translated into civilian jobs.529 For example, in “Signs” 
viewers are presented with Army Reserve specialists Geraldo Colon, Jomarixa Toro, and 
Guillermo Rosario—who shift between their civilian identities as a petroleum plant 
operator, college student, and medical technician to Army fatigues where they are 
identified as a Telecommunications Operator, Cable Systems Installer, and Microwave 
Systems Operator respectively. As the scenes cut between Toro on a college campus and 
aboard a tank, a heavily Spanish accented male voice narrates:  
 In the community, they are important people. In the Army Reserve, they are the 
backbone of the U.S. Army while they live at home, they train and serve in the 
Army reserve part time but fully committed. They found over 180 ways to 
succeed in the Army Reserve. Serve your country while living in your 
community.  
As with “Earthquake”, the messaging of “Signs” emphasized the correlation between 
military training, self-actualization, and the increased capacity for employment upon 
completion of service. Perez himself credits his military training with helping him to 
quickly land a position as an Emergency Medical Technician with a Los Angeles based 
ambulance service . 
Significantly, Perez’s commercial was filmed in both English and Spanish. 
According to spokespersons for Burnett, Perez was chosen for the ad because he “seemed 
to be a typical Latino volunteer”, intimating that Perez’s bilingual fluency was 
characteristic of the youth demographic the ad is targeting. As Hudson noted, “a third of 
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this population is recent immigrants, a third is bilingual and somewhat acculturated, and 
the remainder is acculturated.”530 Overall, the military’s budget for Spanish language 
advertising increased by approximately $55 million between 2002-2006. However, the 
bilingual phrasing in which the word “Army” was substituted for the Spanish term 
ejercito (army) responded to the cross cultural sensibilities of Latina/o youth, who 
according to market research, are more likely to use the informal “Army” when referring 
generally to military service. As David Chitel, the CEO of LatCommunications Inc., 
notes “different branches of the military advertise mainly in English to appeal to the 
acculturated 2nd and 3rd generation Hispanics.”531 While the YSEA’s use of Spanglish 
might entice Latina/o youth, it served the dual purpose of accommodating their Spanish 
language dominant parents who often wield considerable authority in their children’s 
decision to enlist. When military officials buttressed the Cartel’s signature “Barrio 
Anthropology ™” approach, with exhaustive research conducted by the consulting firm 
of McKinsey & Company, the RAND Corporation, and the “Yankelovich Hispanic 
Monitor,” among others, they discovered that Latina/o youth were more likely to respond 
to approval by their families than financial incentives alone.532 
The role that parents and other “influencers” such as extended family members, 
teachers, clergy, community leaders, and guidance counselors might perform in 
convincing youth to enlist in the military has certainly not been lost on recruiters. This 
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was especially the case in the early years of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, during 
which market research suggested that parents, especially mothers, would be the dominant 
obstacles to enlistment.533 For example, six months into the YSEA campaign, bilingual 
direct mail pieces were sent to parents of prospective recruits “explaining how an Army 
enlistment could work for their children”, followed by direct mail pieces a month later 
and generalized boxer cards sent into communities with large Latina/o populations.534 
While recruiters often court youth by treating them to meals at a favorite restaurant or 
perhaps a visit to the gym or movies together, they can just as likely be found having 
dinner with a potential recruit’s family and/or chatting with parents on the phone. The 
ability to “establish rapport” was the number one skill outlined in a 2000 U.S. Army 
Recruiting Command (USAREC) pamphlet outlining the “five sales skills and five 
critical tasks” necessary for ensuring a “successful sale” or enlistment contract.535 
Recruiters like SSG Jose Diaz of the Miami East Recruiting Station observes that 
recruiting within Latina/o communities “becomes a major family event”, noting that 
“most of the time, I not only have to sit down with the potential candidate, but also his 
parents, grandparents, uncles, and siblings.”536 Within the YSEA campaign, this meant 
offering respect to the role that Latina mothers play in shaping their children’s decision to 
enlist. In addition to a slew of commercials featuring parents like Denora Borja, a 
working class Mexican-American mother from San Mateo, CA who is shown 
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contemplating her daughter Alice’s desire to enlist in the Army, print advertisements 
were especially directed towards parents.  
MADRES, HIJOS, AND THE GENDER OF CITIZENSHIP  
The television ad featuring Borja, however, stands as an exception to the general 
thrust of the YSEA campaignwhich predominantly featured young Latino men. Owing to 
classical definitions of liberalism, in which the abstract citizen of the state is always 
presumed as male, these efforts also explicitly drew on notions of the citizen-soldier, 
whose willingness to arm themselves in the service of the nation reflected the proper 
republican virtues necessary for citizenship.537 According to Elliot Cohen,“one might 
argue that the concept of the citizen-soldier embraces military service as a rite of passage 
by which one both learns and earns citizenship.”538 In the following two ads, this express 
linking between citizenship and manhood is foregrounded in two ways.  First, as with the 
ads featuring Negrete-Maza, there is an explicit gender pairing between Latino sons and 
their mothers. Second, these ads highlight the physicality and vigor of the Latino male 
body as an ideal protectors of the nation. While the embedded discourse of citizen-
soldiery traditionally demanded that citizen warriors protect the female subjects of the 
nation, usually sweethearts or wives (or by extension, a feminized rendering of the 
nation), the YSEA ads suggest that Latino men in uniform are defending their mothers--
in so doing, Latina mothers become the stand-ins for the nation itself.  This emphasis on 
                                                
537 Claire Snyder, Citizen-Soldiers and Manly Warriors:  Military Service and Gender in the Civic 
Republican Tradition. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999). 
 
538 Elliot Cohen, Citizens & Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1985). 117. 
 236 
Latina mothers draws sentimental reference to maternal sacrifice, immigrant desires for 
inclusion, and the purposefulness of military service and/or possible death as legitimated 
by the State. Moreover, it makes strong reference to the archetype of the “patriotic 
mother”—stoic, silent figures that quietly support the nation’s war efforts even if it 
means the possibilities of their child’s mortality.539  
In a September 2003 advertisement from Hispanic magazine, the audience is 
presented with Sgt. Claudio Pacheco, a U.S. Army Operating Room Specialist as he is 
flanked by his parents on either side.   
 
Figure 7  U.S. Army print advertisement, HISPANIC, September 2003. 
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To his is right, his father proudly gazes down at his son, as Sgt. Pacheco beams 
glowingly at his mother, who stands just to his center-left. She does not face the camera, 
but rather, looks lovingly up at her son.540 In a gesture of maternal warmth and affection, 
her right hand is strategically placed on his lower chest, just between his heart and pansa 
(“tummy”). This action may personify how Pacheco’s mother has morally and spiritually 
nourished him. In the upper left hand corner of the advertisement, a statement in block 
white lettering reads, “Cuando era niño nostoros lo cuidamos, ahora el cuida de todos 
nosotros” (When he was little, we cared for him, now he cares for everyone). The Yo Soy 
El Army brand vertically runs along the left-hand side of the page. Along the bottom, in 
tiny white lettering, the ad states, “Hoy, él tiene la educación, el entranamiento y la 
experencia para lograr lo que quiere. El es una persona con la que podemos contar, un 
Militar del U.S. Army [Today, he has the education, training, and experience to achieve 
what he wants. He’s a person we can count on in the U.S. Army]. 541  
Notwithstanding the obvious connotations with familial pride and honor, the ad is 
striking for its use of the first person tense, in which it is Pacheco’s parents who speak to 
the audience-- presumably fellow Latina/o parents who might have misgivings about 
their children’s future in the military. By presenting the text in the parent’s voice, the ad 
registers an atmosphere of familiarity, in which Pacheco’s parents can make claims to 
their son’s achievements as their own, while assuring other parents that they too can 
produce such a “hero” by relinquishing their child to the military. In this dialectic, 
                                                
540 U.S. Army, "Yo Soy El Army," advertisement, Hispanic, September 9, 2003. 
541 Ibid.  
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Pacheco’s family convincingly urges other parents to have faith both in their child and in 
the military, trusting the values they’ve imbued them with will only be enhanced via 
service in the Armed Forces. This astute pairing of Sgt. Pacheco with his parents actively 
works to reinforce the discursive language of symbiosis between Latino “family values” 
and “military values.”542 Since none of the ad’s participants look directly at the camera, 
the viewer is left to feel as if they are witnessing an intimate family moment—one that 
more closely resembles a family portrait than a recruitment ad.  In so doing, the 
messaging is clear: Latina/o parents can symbolically offer their children in kinship to the 
U.S. Army.  
Another advertisement from March 2006 showcases Spc. Antonio Martin Bryen 
scaling down the wall of an obstacle course [see Figure 8]. Dressed in full camouflage 
and gripping his rope steadfastly, Bryen peers off into the distance with a determined, 
single minded expression on his face. Above him, in block lettering the ad reads, “Usted 
le enseñó a no rendirese, aquí hacemos lo mismo (You taught him not to give up, here we 
do the same). Unlike the previous advertisement which imparted a warm, amicable 
feeling amongst parents and their child, this ad frontloaded the soldier’s physical stamina 
and mental toughness as a corporeal reflection of his parent’s values, guidance, and 
support. Below him, the ad reads: 
Usted les inculcó a sus hijos el valor de perservancia. Ahora, sus hijos, tienen la 
oportunidad de poner su character a prueba convirtiéndose en Militares del U.S. 
Army. En el Army, ellos tienen la oportunidad de desarrollar su Fortaleza, su 
character y sus habilidades en liderazgo gracias al entrenamiento y a los desafíos 
                                                
542 Perez, “Hispanic Values, Military Values,” 171. 
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que enfrentarán. También adquirián experiencia práctica y entrenamiento en alta 
tecnología. Además, pueden calíficar para recibir ayuda que pagará sus estudios. 
Si piensa que sus hijos están listos para supercar este reto, hable con ellos sobre lo 
que el Army les puede ofrecer. 
[You taught your children the value of perseverance. Now your children have the 
opportunity to put their character to the test by becoming soldiers of the U.S. 
Army. In the Army, they have the opportunity to develop their strength, character, 
and leadership abilities thanks to the training and challenges they’ll confront. 
Also, they’ll acquire practical skills and high-tech training. Moreover, they can 
qualify to receive funding for school. If you think you’re children are ready to 
surpass this challenge, talk to them about what the Army can offer]. 543  
 
 
Figure 8  U.S. Army print advertisement, HISPANIC, March 2006. 
Unlike the previous advertisements, this gritty depiction refused to mollify the more 
arduous aspects of Army life, including the potential for combat. Instead, it lauded 
individual strength, as a virtue inculcated by parents—one that could be best fostered in 
                                                
543 U.S. Army, "Yo Soy El Army," advertisement, Hispanic, March 4, 2006. 
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the Army via physical endurance challenges testing both the body and mind. While the 
emphasis on “confrontation”, “perseverance”, and putting “character to the test” might be 
principally aimed at stoking youthful bravura, the ad premises that the real challenge lies 
with compelling parents to speak to their children about enlistment in the Army.  
A third advertisement titled “Dog Tags” that appeared in the spring issue of Super 
Onda magazine, was a slightly altered translation of its English language counterpart for 
an “Army of One.” [see Figure 9]. Featuring a single pair of dog tags strewn against an 
olive canvas background, perhaps meant to imply a duffle bag or uniform, the ad’s 
tagline reads: “Yo Tengo el Poder. Yo So El Army” (I have the Power/ I am the Army).  
These latter two ads, with their emphasis on bodily strength and the warrior ethos, recall 
Mariscal’s concept of “warrior patriotism”, in which Latino men exercise military service 
as a means of proving their sense of fidelity to la patria or their nation. In so doing, both 
of these ads frontload characteristics such as “bravery, courage, service, and precision” 
associated with the “idealized masculinity of soldiers.”544 
                                                
544 Charlotte Hooper, Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations, and Gender Politics. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2001). 81. 
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Figure 9  “Dog Tags” Super Onda, 2006. 
In keeping with efforts to appeal to youthful vigor and enthusiasm, the YSEA also 
coordinated grassroots outreach events, presenting the Army as a hip and exciting 
institution for young Latinos. In 2004, the U.S. Army subcontracted with the San Diego 
based Latino Sports Marketing firm to create the “Hispanic H2 Tour,” featuring a 
customized black and gold Hummer, referred to as a “mobile branded platform”, outfitted 
with the YSEA logo beneath golden flames, featuring video games, recruitment videos on 
multiple screens, and speaker systems blaring Spanish language and Latina/o music [see 
Figure 10].545 The H2 tour also sponsored push-up contests for the chance to win Army 
branded jerseys, trucker hats, and in some cases, customized dog tags. The Tour visited 
                                                
545 In 2004, the U.S. Army was also one of the largest sponsors of the Lowrider Magazine Evolution Tour, 
a traveling automotive show featuring customized cars, including the H2 Hummer. 
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Latino neighborhoods nationwide, often appearing at sporting events, county fairs, and 
car shows where Latino teenagers were likely to be present. For example, at the 2003 
Calle Ocho festival in Miami, more than 40 recruiters manned three stations with flight 
simulators, basketball free-throw competitions and rock-wall climbing contests where 
they brought in close to 5,000 “leads” or potential recruits. According to the Latino 
Sports marketing firm, the national tour passed its “goal of qualified leads by 57%."  
 
Figure 10  H2 Hummer, U.S. Army screensaver. 
Conclusion 
The insistent valorization of military service in public messaging to Latina/o 
youth shows no signs of abating, as their dominance among indices of demographic 
growth, financial hardship, and limited educational opportunities will continue to flag 
them as an ideal source of recruitment for the U.S military. Moreover, as is widely 
repeated in the media by Latina/o civil rights organizations, military leaders, and policy 
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analysts, Latina/os are underrepresented in the U.S. military comparable to their presence 
in the general population. Although they account for 16 percent of the 18-24 year old 
U.S. population, they comprised less than 10 percent of active duty forces.546 If the 
success of the YSEA campaign is any indication, niche marketing towards Latina/os in 
the military will serve as a valuable asset toward closing this gap. That the different 
branches of the military should accurately reflect the racial composition of the U.S. is one 
championed repeatedly by military personnel, government officials, and even the general 
population. It is also the guiding imperative behind the U.S. Army’s recruitment 
initiatives directed at Latina/os.  In times of peace, this may constitute nothing more than 
a bureaucratic policy objective and/or important symbol of racial and ethnic 
egalitarianism in the U.S. However, the protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq added a 
decidedly insidious and tragic dimension to military recruitment. By some accounts, 
Latinos represent less than 5 percent of the officer corps of the U.S. military, but 
represented nearly 20 percent of combat troops in the Iraq War.547 The fact that they 
continue to be disproportionately concentrated in lower ranked military occupations, 
including infantry positions where they are more likely to see combat, make this 
discrepancy in rank manifest in chilling terms. For example, during the initial phase of 
ground combat in Iraq, Latino/as accounted for 16 percent of all U.S. casualties in the 
war, though at the time, they made up only 9 percent of total enlisted personnel.548 In the 
state of Texas, a region identified by the Department of Defense as a key recruiting 
                                                
546 Linda Bilmes,  “Uncle Sam really wants Usted” The Los Angeles Times. 21 August 2005 
547 Dempsey and Shapiro, “The Army’s Hispanic Future,” 528-529.   
548 Ibid, 557. 
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market and home to the Cartel Group, forty of the first 100 Texans killed in the Iraq War 
were Mexican-Americans. Put another way, their casualty rate was 18 percent higher than 
their overall population within the state.549 Though U.S. troops were officially withdrawn 
from Iraq in December 2011, some continued to be deployed to Afghanistan until 2014, 
to say nothing of other potential sites of war and occupation in what some scholars have 
referred to as a “permanent landscape of war” commenced by the U.S.’s role in the 
Global War on Terror.  
While the YSEA materialized out of a very particular socio-historical moment, 
catalyzed by the events of 9/11 and responding to calls for military representation, its 
implications are far reaching and have much to say about the ways in which Latina/os are 
differentially perceived, treated, and organized within public discourse. In addition to 
recognizing the significance of economic and social forces such as educational 
achievement and opportunities within the labor market, there should be a wider 
appreciation for the role that cultural producers like the Cartel Group have in shaping 
attitudes about the military.  
 
                                                
549 Latinos account for 30 percent of Texans in the military, but their casualty rates were 33 percent higher 
than those represented in service. Of those, 62.5 percent were concentrated in the lower enlisted ranks. T.A. 
Badger, “Hispanics Overrepresented among Texans killed in Iraq” Associated Press State & Local Wire 12 




“The great wars of this century are extraordinary not so much in the unprecedented scale 
on which they have permitted people to kill, as in the colossal numbers persuaded to lay 
down their lives…”~Benedict Anderson550 
 
 This dissertation began with a ghost story, and thus it will end with another set of 
ghosts that haunt this project and its research objectives. Their names are: Pfc. Francisco 
Martinez Flores, Cpl. Robert M. Rodriguez, Lance Cpl. Jesus Suarez del Solar, Sgt. Joe J. 
Garza, Sgt. Edward Anguiano, Lance Cpl. Juan Lopez Rangel, Cpl. Jesus Martin "Marty" 
Antonio Medellin, Sgt. Joseph Menusa, Pfc. Karina Lau, and they are only a few of the 
several hundred Latina/o soldiers who have died during the US-led campaign of the 
Global War on Terror. 
  The dissertation formally began in 2007 when I visited the Basilica of San Juan 
del Valle located in McAllen, TX-- a national shrine dedicated to Our Lady of San Juan 
de los Lagos, located approximately seven miles from the US-Mexico border. While 
there, I encountered a set of memorial panels dedicated to military servicemen and 
women. The eleven acrylic glass panels with gilded frames featured hundreds of wallet 
sized photos of primarily Mexican-American or Latina/o armed service members, 
accompanied by handwritten notes, funeral notices, prayer cards, sonogram images, and 
prom photos. Many of these photos, supplemented by notes asking for the Virgen’s 
protection of their loved ones, also made their way into the Cuarto de Milagros (Miracle 
                                                
550 Benedict Anderson. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 
(New York: Verso. 1983). 144. 
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Room), alongside service uniforms, trensas (braids of human hair), and service medals. 
According to a Basilica spokesperson “there were just so many photos we had to do 
something with them.”  
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had entered their fourth year and with this new 
era known as the “War on Terror” came the familiar presence of Spanish surnames 
among the casualties listed on the nightly news. The fact that Latina/os historically and 
continue to be disproportionately concentrated in lower ranked military occupations, 
including infantry positions where they are more likely to see combat, brought an 
insidious dimension to the story of Latina/os during “Operation Iraqi Freedom.”551 In the 
state of Texas, a region identified by the Department of Defense as a key recruiting 
market, 40 of the first 100 Texans killed in the Iraq War were Mexican Americans. Put 
another way, their casualty rate was 18 percent higher than their overall population within 
the state. These included young people like Amancio Perez III and Ruben Valdez Jr., 
childhood friends from San Diego, TX who died eleven months apart.552  Likewise, four 
of the first American coalition soldiers to die in OEF were non-citizen Latinos who were 
posthumously awarded citizenship.553 Earlier in July 2002 former President George W. 
                                                
551 Jason K Dempsey. and Robert Shapiro, “The Army’s Hispanic Future.” Armed Forces & Society 35(3):  
2009. 526–561. 557. 
552 An army medic, Perez III was killed on May 28, 2003 in Taji, Iraq.  Marine Lance Corporal Valdez Jr. 
was killed on April 17, 2004 in Al Anbar Province. 
553  Jose Angel Gutierrez, the first ‘American’ casualty of the war, died on March 21, 2003. Other non-
citizens were killed during the following days, including Cpl. Jose Angel Garibay (from Mexico), Army 
Pfc. Diego Rincon (from Colombia), Staff Sgt. Riayan A. Tejeda (from the Dominican Republic), and 
Lance Cpl. Jesus Alberto Suarez (from Mexico).  
 247 
Bush signed an executive order offering expedited citizenship to legal permanent 
residents (LPR status) who enlisted for military service.554 Collectively, the narrative 
offered by the mainstream US press, members of Congress, Latina/o civil rights advocacy 
groups, and military leaders about Latina/o military service offered what media scholar 
Hector Amaya terms, “a metanarrative of nationalism” reinforcing the message that non-
citizen Latinos demonstrate ‘love’ for their ‘adopted country’ by ‘serving’ the armed 
forces and ‘sacrificing’ or giving the ultimate sacrifice of their lives for our ‘freedom’ 
and for the ‘nation’.  
This language of service and sacrifice is not unique to Latina/o soldiers, but what I 
do find unique is the historical elision of the complexity of factors for which these 
Latina/o soldiers came to service—the discursive strategic erasure or distortion of their 
biographies that delimits broader narratives about migration brought on by global circuits 
of capitalism, imperial foreign policy practices in Latin America including US military 
intervention, and neo-colonial occupation of Puerto Rico, as well as domestic factors of 
poverty, restricted social and economic opportunities, geographic isolation, and social 
marginalization experienced by US Latina/o communities. Like Amaya and others, I saw 
a profound contradiction between the mobilization of this inclusionary, neoliberal model 
of citizenship, premised on notions of military sacrifice, fidelity, and patriotism, into 
what some have called the “Hispanic Tradition”–the long legacy of Hispanic military 
service, but also the idea that Hispanics have served with a unique form of patriotism and 
                                                
554 Congress further specified Bush's executive order in 2004. Elaborations stated that any legal resident 
who enlists may immediately petition for American citizenship rather than wait the five years normally 
required to start the process. Prior to the executive order, those in the military were required to wait three 
years before gaining citizenship. 
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heroism over and against the exclusionary impulses inaugurated by the “War on Terror.” 
And certainly against the nativist measures that question the legitimacy and 
“Americaness” of Latina/o bodies—efforts to revoke birthright citizenship, a sharp 
increase in immigration raids, initiatives to ban ethnic studies, implementation of 
restrictive housing covenants, etc. 
With this project, I have attempted to make my own small contributions to the 
fields of American Studies, U.S. Latina/o Studies, and Critical Race Theory.  With 
American Studies, I have sought to make the case that studying the military matters and 
matters greatly. Although a vast body of American Studies scholarship concerns areas of 
US empire, militarism, and warfare, the explicit study of the US Armed Forces remains 
provincial at best. Yet if we are to understand how power operates, particularly the power 
of the State, then it would behoove us as scholars to study one of its primary institutions. 
As Foucault reminds us, systems of power relations are not as clearly demarcated 
between dominant and subordinate classes, the governed and non-governed. Power is 
constituted and/or mediated via a network of social relations dispersive in their reach, 
articulated via ‘micro’ or localized expressions.555  In echoing Foucault’ point that power 
is constituted via the practices, beliefs, and forms by which subjects come to “conduct 
their own conduct” much of my interest in post-Vietnam military policy was to 
understand which mechanisms, practices, and modes utilized by the military, could 
                                                
555 Michel Foucualt. Discipine and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Pantheon Books, 1977. See 
also, David Couzens Hoy. Foucault: A Critical Reader.  Oxford: UK, NY, NY: B. Blackwell., 1986). 134. 
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induce communities of color, namely Latina/os, to become disciplined as agents of 
dominant power relations.  
Second, while I am indebted to recent historical scholarship within Mexican-
American studies documenting the experiences of U.S. Latina/o soldiers within World 
War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War, this dissertation was largely motivated by 
the scholarly deficit on the post-1973 period. There is considerable work left to be in 
done in this area, but my hope is that I have contributed in some small part to a broader 
understanding of race relations, military service, and cultural identity formation during 
the post-Civil Rights era. As my research suggests, studies of these more recent decades 
are critical for understanding the heterogeneity of the US Latina/o diaspora, including 
post-1965 histories of Caribbean and Central American migration to the US. 
   Finally, I drew inspiration for this dissertation from historian Jake Kosek’s 
observation that “The nation is.. embodied in individuals—athletes, cultural icons, and 
political leaders, among others… their success or failure is often linked implicitly to 
patriotic notions of the strength and well-being of the national character.”556 During war, 
the militarized body of the soldier assumes special meaning—what then of the soldier of 
color, or in this case, Latina/o soldiers? What meanings and understandings of identity, 
national or otherwise, are embodied through their service or from their sometimes 
exemplary moments of “selflessness”? What symbolic labor the does the militarized body 
of color perform? In tracing out the military’s efforts to martial Latinidad, indeed, the 
                                                
556  Jake Kosek, Understories: The Political Life of Forests in New Mexico (Raleigh, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2006)150.  
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cultural and labor currency of a community long on the ideological and material 
periphery of the nation-state, I have attempted to demonstrate the ways in which the State 
manages the enduring “ghost” of race that haunts the American psyche and troubles its 
contradictory logics of national belonging. Given the long arc of the US propensity for 
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USMC       United States Marine Corps. 
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WAVES     Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service 
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